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Abstract 
This comprehensive analysis of regime change indicators reveals that problems of 
conceptualization and measurement are major reasons why current research fails to draw 
compelling conclusions that foster cumulative knowledge. The paper first argues that even 
though the literature discusses the conceptualization of regime types at length, there is little 
attention to defining regime change. Furthermore, quantitative studies of regime change largely 
elide conceptual and measurement challenges. Second, although indicators of regime type are 
highly correlated, agreement between indicators of regime change is extremely low. Third, 
focal points such as elections and coups drive agreement among these indicators, suggesting that 
such measures often reflect notable events instead of regime change per se. Finally, a 
robustness check of nine articles on regime change published in top journals demonstrates 
that findings are often not robust to alternative indicators, implying that indicator choice 





I. Introduction  
A striking level of instability witnessed after the end of the Cold War has turned our attention to 
regime change. For instance, the Baltic states and more recently Tunisia witnessed 
democratization, while countries such as Hungary or Russia—which once experienced 
liberalization—are made increasingly authoritarian through “executive aggrandizement” (Bermeo 
2016). This prompts renewed interest in regime change and spurs new studies in the large and 
intellectually vibrant literatures regarding the causes and consequences of democratic transitions, 
democratic breakdowns, and authoritarian resilience.  
These studies are often methodologically sophisticated but yield few consistent findings. 
For instance, some claim that economic inequality inhibits democratization (Muller 1995; Boix 
2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006), while others find no evidence for this relationship 
(Przeworski et al. 2000; Houle 2009). Presidentialism increases the likelihood of democratic 
breakdown according to some scholars (Przeworski et al. 2000; Maeda 2010), or has no effect 
(Power and Gasiorowski 1997; Cheibub 2007; Houle 2009). In short, an enormous literature has 
yielded few axiomatic findings.  
This paper argues that the absence of rigorous, consistent conceptualization and 
measurement of regime change helps explain the lack of cumulative knowledge. It joins work by 
other scholars who have critiqued measurements of regime change, noting that they fail to reflect 
democratic ideals fully (Bogaards 2010; Paxton 2000) and yield inconsistent findings on 
outcomes from democratization to war (Casper and Tufis 2003; Bogaards 2010). However, it 
advances these studies by providing a more comprehensive review of existing measures and their 
implications for the study of regime change. 
In this paper, we distinguish between regime rupture—large-scale changes between 
democracy and autocracy that fundamentally affect the logic of political rule—and reform—more 
fine-grained changes in a polity’s institutional arrangements—and examine numerous indicators 
of regime change derived from 13 original datasets on regime type. We demonstrate that the 
problem of measurement is more worrisome than previous work suggests: indicators count 
vastly different numbers of regime change events over time, and agreement between these 
indicators is extraordinarily low. Moreover, we find that elections and coups increase agreement 
among indicators, suggesting that where agreement exists, it is driven by highly visible symbols 
of regime change. Finally, a robustness check of nine articles on regime change published in top 
journals reveals that findings are often not robust to the use of alternative measures.  
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Our goal is to raise awareness of the consequences of indicator choice on scholarly 
findings. The robustness checks of our colleagues’ research are not intended as a critique of their 
work or the theories they put forth, but rather to underscore the lack of interchangeability of 
conventionally used indicators. We highlight the methodological problems that make it difficult 
to draw conclusions from current scholarship.  We do not aim to explain regime change or to 
argue that a particular type of indicator is more appropriate than another. Rather, we point to the 
factors that scholars should more explicitly consider in testing hypotheses, and urge the research 
community to more rigorously conceptualize and measure regime change in future work.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section II discusses challenges in the 
conceptualization and measurement of different forms of regime change. Section III reviews 
common measures of regime change. Section IV examines agreement between them. Section V 
analyzes the robustness of empirical studies to alternative indicators. Section VI suggests some 
improvements for empirical research. Section VII discusses our contributions and concludes. 
 
II. Conceptualizing and Measuring Regime Change 
1. Conceptual Challenges  
Challenges in conceptualizing and measuring regime change derive from the debates over the 
conceptualization and measurement of regime type, particularly democracy. Scholars disagree 
about the definition of democracy. Specifically, they are at odds over whether to adopt a binary 
concept of democracy and dictatorship or to see democracy on a continuum. Those who advocate 
the binary definition argue that democracy, like pregnancy, reflects a fundamental, qualitative 
change in condition. A regime is either democratic or not. Typically, these scholars rely on a 
procedural definition of democracy emphasizing competitive elections for executive and legislative 
offices in which multiple parties compete and alternation in office between parties is observed 
(Alvarez et al. 1996; Cheibub et al. 2010). Those who advocate a continuum take the view that 
regimes exhibit democratic qualities to a greater or lesser extent (Dahl 1971; Bollen and Jackman 
1989; Diamond 1999).  
This debate reflects two very different ways in which political regime change is 
conceptualized. For those who conceive of regime types in binary terms and only distinguish 
between democracies and autocracies, any change from democracy to autocracy or vice versa 
constitutes a large-scale change in the logic of politics. We call this form of regime change 
rupture. On the other hand, a perspective that conceptualizes political regimes along a continuum 
between two ideal types or that distinguishes between various distinct forms of democracy, 
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autocracy, and hybrid regimes, allows for what we term reform: more fine-grained changes that 
may affect single political rights, civil liberties, or some institutional characteristics, but do not 
imply a complete overhaul of the system. Both rupture and reform come in two flavors. As to 
rupture, countries may change from a democratic to an autocratic political order (breakdown) or 
vice versa (transition). Liberalization is a reform that entails an increase in a country’s democratic 
qualities. Backsliding decreases these qualities.  
The pace and magnitude of institutional changes distinguish rupture and reform. Gradual 
institutional changes over a long period of time characterize reform, while large, abrupt changes 
classify as rupture. Contrast, for example, the political rupture in Peru under Alberto Fujimori with 
the reform in Russia under Vladimir Putin. On April 5, 1992, Alberto Fujimori responded to 
political deadlock by suspending the constitution, removing adversaries from the judiciary, and 
dissolving Congress. In the aftermath of this autogolpe, Fujimori established an autocratic regime 
that ensured his reelection in 1995 and 2000 (Cameron and Mauceri 2006; Seawright 2012). 
Thus, Peru saw abrupt and large-scale institutional changes that characterize this regime change 
event as rupture. Putin’s process of regime change, by contrast, constitutes an example of 
reform. Putin gradually rolled back democratic freedoms by passing more restrictive media laws 
in 2005, cracking down on political opponents through an anti-terrorism law in 2006, and 
placing greater sanctions on public assemblies, NGOs, and the internet in 2011. In a move to de 
facto circumvent constitutional term limits, Putin installed his then prime minister, Dmitry 
Medvedev, as President from 2008-2012, while himself serving as prime minister, and then 
pushed for the extension of presidential term limits to six years before his return to the 
presidency in 2012 (Freedom House various years). It is hard to identify any specific moment 
that marked the transition from democracy to autocracy in this process of reform. 
 
2. Measurement Challenges 
Measurement issues have received a great deal of attention in the study of regimes, but there is 
little explicit attention given to measuring regime change. In our view, the challenge in studying 
regime change is to define and measure it in a way that allows us to detect both rupture and 
reform, and both minimalist and maximalist definitions of democracy present challenges in this 
regard. A minimalist focus on turnover through elections (or any other single aspect of 
democracy that signals regime change), often advocated by those who see democracy in binary 
terms, cannot detect fine-grained reforms because it only allows for changes between the 
democratic and autocratic ideal types. A maximalist view that requires highly informed citizens to 
engage in near-constant deliberation to produce policies that maximize social, economic, and 
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cultural equality, is equally problematic, because it makes it extremely unlikely that regimes pass 
the threshold to democracy and, thus, difficult to detect rupture.  
A related challenge regards determining the relevant time period for measuring rupture 
and reform. Several authors designed their data on the premise that regime change is “marked by 
singular, characteristic events, such as free or fraudulent elections, constitutional changes, coups 
d’état, declarations of martial law, or arrests of prominent individuals” (Gasiorowski 1996: 472), 
yet the changes in the rules and informal procedures that shape political regimes take place over 
time, separated by months or even years. Moreover, not all crises, no matter how startling, 
denote regime change. Further, it is doubtful that such events should be seen as the “moment” 
of regime change. The relevant changes often begin long before troops leave the barracks or 
elections are called. Understanding which changes constitute reform or rupture is thus difficult. 
Another measurement challenge is to avoid excessively including cases of political 
change and crises that fall short of significant changes in the democratic qualities of political 
regimes. For instance, tighter restrictions on press freedoms, including some prosecution of 
independent journalists, may be deeply unsettling, and they may also be early warning signs of 
more systemic efforts of backsliding. However, practices that are limited in scope may not be 
sufficient to characterize the event as backsliding. Similarly, the expansion of press freedoms or 
crackdowns on corruption may be a welcome change but they do not necessarily reflect 
liberalization or transition. Such changes can be the normal push and pull of politics; they are 
near ubiquitous and can be observed even in advanced and seemingly stable democracies. 
Conversely, not all significant changes are immediately obvious. Sometimes regime 
changes result from dramatic political events—tanks rolling into the streets to oust a 
democratically elected president or the presidential suspension of an elected legislature, on the 
one hand; the election of a president through free and fair competition, on the other. Yet, often 
they come gradually—whether through piecemeal restrictions of political and civil liberties, 
diminished accountability or electoral fraud, in the case of backsliding and breakdown, or 
through the slow expansion of liberties, extension of accountability and increasingly competitive 
elections, in the case of liberalization and transition. This makes it hard to identify one specific 
year of regime change, and absent highly visible changes, can lead scholars to overlook change 
altogether. It also draws into question how we should think about the time period that 
constitutes a regime change event. Following the conventional country-year design of extant 
datasets of regime types and empirical studies of regime change, we would identify several 
distinct years and thus potential cases of rupture or reform. However, it seems more adequate to 
interpret them as one multi-year period of change. 
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III. Extant Indicators of Regime Change 
Given these challenges, it is perhaps not surprising that published research on regime change 
often lacks a clear definition of the phenomenon under investigation. The literature on regime 
change relies on varied measures, often employing them out of convenience or for 
methodological reasons that have little to do with the underlying theory of political regime 
change. Even where scholars have carefully taken into account the underlying conceptions of 
regime type when choosing indicators, they often fail to consider explicitly the implications of 
using these measures as indicators of regime change.  
Existing measurements create different challenges for studying rupture and reform. 
Dichotomous indicators cannot be used to analyze reform. Polychotomous or continuous 
indicators often do not identify qualitative thresholds between different forms of political rule, 
thus making it difficult to use them in analyses of rupture. They also combine factors that reflect 
different combinations of democratic features (e.g., accountability, electoral competition, and 
liberties), making it hard to isolate arenas of democratic or autocratic change.  
 
1. Datasets on Regime Type: Conceptual Differences 
Our review considers thirteen original datasets of regime type that are used to study regime 
change. We include twelve datasets that are used in published research on regime change. In 
addition, we consider the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset (Coppedge et al. 2016a).  
This dataset was released in January 2016 and has not yet formed a basis of a body of published 
work. However, we include it because it is likely to become a leading basis for analysis in the 
field and because it explicitly recognizes and measures varied conceptions of democracy.  
The indicators that we review differ with respect to their conceptualization of 
democracy. In particular, they disagree on whether to adopt a minimalist definition of democracy 
focusing on (electoral) contestation alone (Przeworski 1991), a notion of “polyarchy” involving 
both contestation and participation (Dahl 1971), or an even broader definition of democracy that 
adds civil and/or political liberties (Reich 2002; Freedom House 2015) to the concept of 
democracy.  
These indicators can be grouped into one of three conceptualizations of democracy. 
Przeworski et al.’s (2000) dataset on regime type and its update by Cheibub et al. (2010) employs 
a minimalist concept of democracy, whereby democracy is “a regime in which some 
governmental offices are filled as a consequence of contested elections” (Alvarez et al. 1996). 
Contestation, thus, is central in this concept. Svolik (2012) adopts a similar approach. 
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The second conceptualization adds other criteria. Boix et al. (2013), Geddes et al. (2014), 
and Skaaning et al. (2015) introduce participation as second core dimension, requiring countries to 
meet a minimal suffrage requirement to qualify as democratic (Dahl 1971). Bernhard et al. (2001) 
add a stateness criterion to contestation and participation: democratic countries must have 
achieved full sovereignty. Conceptually, the Polity IV data (Marshall et al. 2014) focus on 
contestation and participation as well. However, their measurement puts a particularly strong 
emphasis on political institutions and executive constraints as third dimension of political rule. 
Magaloni et al. (2013) formulate four necessary conditions of democracy: contestation, 
participation, a civilian government, and executive constraints. 
The V-Dem project recognizes that the notion of “democracy” entails up to seven 
different principles: the electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, majoritarian, and 
consensual principles (Coppedge et al. 2016b). Thus far, separate indicators of the first five 
principles are available. The electoral democracy score is the foundation of the other four 
indicators because elections are seen as necessary condition for democracy. Consequently, 
including all five indicators in this study would bias our findings. Therefore, we only consider the 
first score.1 The project’s definition of electoral democracy follows Dahl’s (1998) concept of polyarchy 
and thus focuses on contestation and participation (Coppedge et al. 2015).  
The remaining four datasets employ a broad concept of democracy. Reich (2002)2 and 
Ulfelder (2012) examine a regime’s level of contestation, participation, and civil and political 
liberties. Freedom House (2015) assesses a country’s political rights (contestation and 
participation) and civil liberties (e.g., freedom of expression and belief; associational and 
organizational rights; rule of law; personal autonomy and individual rights). Wahman et al. (2013) 
use the imputed average Polity IV (Marshall et al. 2014) and Freedom in the World (Freedom 
House 2015) scores to measure political regimes. The authors derive the threshold between 
democratic and autocratic rule on their indicator empirically by estimating the mean cutoff point 
of five established democracy indicators (Bernhard et al. 2001; Cheibub et al. 2010; Boix et al. 
2013; Freedom House’s (2015) measure of “electoral democracy,” and Polity IV). This identifies 




                                                
1 The findings remain unaffected when we include all five V-Dem indicators (see Appendix). 
2 Reich (2002) is an update of Gasiorowski (1996). As with Cheibub et al.’s (2010) update of the Przeworski et al. 
(2000) data, we include only the more comprehensive dataset in our analysis. 
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2. Measurements of Regime Change 
In selecting the indicators for our analysis we aim to include the most commonly used indicators 
of regime change and to reflect the breadth of indicators employed in the literature. Several 
datasets on regime type—in particular, Freedom House (2015), Polity IV, Skaaning et al. (2015), 
and Wahman et al. (2013)—allow for variable cutpoints between democracy and autocracy and 
different magnitudes of change, and our literature review revealed that scholars employ different 
thresholds on the same regime type indicator to code instances of rupture and reform. Yet, 
adding more than one indicator based on the same dataset may bias our findings. What is why 
we include only one indicator per type of regime change in this paper. We replicated all the 
analyses reported below with an extended set of indicators of regime change and present the 
findings in the Appendix.3  
Our analysis covers eleven indicators of breakdown, ten indicators of transition, and five 
indicators of reform, based on the aforementioned 13 original datasets of regime type.4 As to 
rupture, six of the twelve indicators of regime type (Boix et al. 2013; Cheibub et al. 2010; Geddes 
et al. 2014; Magaloni et al. 2013; Svolik 2012; Ulfelder 2012) are dichotomous and identify clear 
qualitative thresholds between democratic and autocratic regimes. To these, we add Bernhard et 
al.’s (2001) original measure of democratic breakdown. Reich’s (2002) data are trichotomous and 
distinguish between democracies, semidemocracies, and autocracies. Rupture is any move 
between democracy and autocracy. We use the commonly employed thresholds of +6 on the 
Polity IV score, 2.5 on the Freedom in the World index, and 7 on Wahman et al.’s (2013) 
indicator to derive three more indicators of rupture. 
Regarding reform, the analysis includes five indicators. These are defined as any change 
on Freedom House’s (2015) Freedom in the World index, the Polity IV indicator, Skaaning et al.’s 
(2015) Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy5, and Wahman et al.’s (2013) combined Freedom House 
and Polity score. Identifying regime change events using the V-Dem indicators is particularly 
challenging because the data are continuous between 0 and 1. To distinguish trivial from 
meaningful changes, we define a reform as any change on V-Dem’s electoral democracy scale by 
at least a standard deviation.6 
                                                
3  Note that our indicator selection is conservative—agreement is even lower when additional commonly used 
indicators of regime change are used. 
4 See Appendix for an overview of all measures of regime change, their definition, sources, coding rules, and 
exemplary studies that use them. 
5 As Skaaning et al. (2015) do not provide guidelines of how to use their index to distinguish between democracies 
and autocracies, we do not include it among the rupture measures. 
6 Lindberg (2015) presents a way to transform the continuous into a five-point ordinal scale, using cutoff points at 
0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8. Such an ordinal indicator can then be used to study reform as any change between these 
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IV. Evaluating Extant Indicators of Regime Change 
We turn now to an evaluation of these indicators. We begin by considering measurement issues 
in Freedom House and Polity IV, given their importance in the literature. We then examine the 
congruence in measures, finding extremely low agreement in the number of instances of rupture 
and reform they identify. Finally we model the agreement of these measures and show that they are 
more likely to agree when focal points such as coups or elections are present. The purpose of 
modeling the agreement of indicators (which, we emphasize, is distinct from modeling rupture 
and reform), is to determine whether we can expect that coding processes—and particularly the 
existence of highly visible events—affect the data collection process and (in)congruence of 
extant indicators. 
 
1. Freedom House and Polity IV: Empirical Ambiguity 
Polity IV provides annual measures of both autocratic and democratic features according to five 
dimensions of the exercise of authority: competitiveness of political participation, regulation of 
political participation, competiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive 
recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive. Its aggregate score ranges from -10 to +10, 
with higher values corresponding to more “democratic quality” of the regime. Freedom House 
(2015) measures civil liberties and political rights. Both dimensions are coded on a seven-point 
scale with higher numbers corresponding to a higher number of restrictions imposed on the 
respective dimension. 
Both indicators have been subject to several critiques. First, rules for coding individual 
elements and aggregating them into a single score are subjective and often opaque.7 Freedom 
House’s 7-point political rights and civil liberties indices aggregate information on 3 (4) 
dimensions, which are coded on 40- (60-) point scales. These dimensions, in turn, summarize 
multiple questions. Coding information is only available at the dimension-, not at the individual 
question-level. Moreover, this information is only available from 2005 onward. Polity sub-
components, in contrast, are available for all countries and years. 
Second, the various aggregation steps in the creation of the Freedom House indices 
imply a multitude of possible combinations of individual scores. At the question level, there are 
9,765,625 logically possible combinations of the subcategory questions to obtain a plausible score on 
                                                                                                                                                  
categories. In the appendix, replicate all our analyses using reform measures based on the ordinal instead of 
continuous scales. 
7 See Munck and Verkuilen (2002), Casper and Tufis (2003), and Cheibub et al. (2010) for overviews. 
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Freedom House’s Political Rights scale. In turn, there are 30,517,578,125 combinations of the Civil 
Liberties questions. At the subcategory level, there are 2,873 (63,869) different logically plausible 
combinations for the political rights (civil liberties) indices. 
Of course, most of the possible combinations are not found empirically. Yet, over the 
period 2005-2015 alone, we find a striking number of combinations in the data. Usually, there 
are at least 5-10 combinations of subcategory scores that yield the same aggregate score. For the 
7-point scales, we find more than 25 combinations of questions per score in the data. Polity’s 
aggregation rules have similar effects. We count 2,100 logically possible combinations of the five 
Polity component indicators. Again, the majority of them are empirically implausible. However, 
we find, for instance, nine different combinations for a score of -6, and fourteen for -5. 
This leads to a third critique: changes in scores do not necessarily reflect similar 
underlying changes in liberties or institutional arrangements. For example, a change from -6 to -5 
on Polity (that is, a change from autocracy to anocracy) could be from any of the nine 
combinations that result in a -6 to any of the 14 combinations that yield a score of -5. That 
makes 84 different possible regime changes. Alternatively, a change from 2 (52 combinations in 
the data) to 3 (69 combinations in the data) on Freedom House’s Political Rights scale could 
reflect any of 3,588 different movements. In short, any aggregate score on the Polity IV or 
Freedom in the World index represents a high number of underlying institutional characteristics, 
and movements between these categories provide only limited information.  
Finally, the regime thresholds created on the basis of Polity IV or Freedom House are 
arbitrary. Freedom House takes the average of the Political Rights and Civil Liberties ratings to 
create a trichotomous Freedom Rating according to which countries can be Free (1.0 to 2.5), 
Partly Free (3.0 to 5.0) or Not Free (5.5 to 7.0). The addition of a third category appears to 
provide more information, but the majority of cases fall at the high or low ends—and they tend 
to remain there for longer periods of time. The middle category is where most regime changes 
take place, and this is where we need refined definitions and measures. Similarly, Polity IV’s 
official cut-off points are -6 (autocracy) and +6 (democracy), with all countries in between 
defined as anocracies. Again, these thresholds are arbitrary, and given the high number of 
permutations of the component indicators that arrive at a specific score, movements across 






2. Coding Instances of Regime Change 
It is perhaps not surprising that indicators differ widely in terms of the number of regime change 
events identified, as Table 1 shows. Some discrepancies may be due to the different time periods 
covered—the likelihood of specific forms of regime change varies over time (e.g., Huntington 
1992; Doorenspleet 2000). Nevertheless, even when the period is restricted to 1946-2000, for 
which most (with the exception of Freedom House) data are available, we find that disagreement 
about the number of country-years experiencing regime change is large. For example, Reich 
(2002) identifies 106 instances of transition in the post-WWII period (1.79% of all observations), 
while Svolik (2012) codes only 89 observations (1.07%). Similarly, Magaloni et al.’s (2013) data 
allow for the coding of 49 breakdown events after 1945 (0.58% of all country-years), while 
according to Ulfelder (2012), breakdown happened almost three times as frequently in the same 
period (109 events; 1.45%). 
These discrepancies become even larger when measuring reform. For example, according 
to Skaaning et al. (2015), liberalization (backsliding) occurred in 379 (261) country-years after 
World War II. According to Polity IV, 556 (341) country-years experienced liberalization 
(backsliding). 
Naturally, these discrepancies are also due to differences in the range of values of both 
indicators. But they also suggest that the set of cases examined in an analysis of rupture or 
reform, and thus any inferences about the determinants of regime change or its consequences, 
crucially depend on the chosen indicator of regime change. This implies that we cannot even 















Table 1: Indicators of regime change  





events % obs 
# 
events % obs 
# 
even
ts % obs 
# 
event
s % obs 
    TRANSITION BREAKDOWN 
Bernhard et al. 2005 1913-2005 NA NA NA NA 63 1.73% 54 1.69% 
Boix et al. 2013 1801-2007 134 0.83% 108 1.23% 83 0.52% 65 0.74% 
Cheibub et al. 2010 1947-2008 102 1.14% 102 1.14% 66 0.74% 66 0.74% 
Freedom House (FIW: free) 1973-2015 91 1.19% 91 1.19% 72 0.94% 72 0.94% 
Geddes et al. 2014 1946-2009 103 1.32% 103 1.32% 75 0.96% 75 0.96% 
Magaloni et al. 2013 1951-2012 83 0.98% 83 0.98% 49 0.58% 49 0.58% 
Polity IV (AN=AUT) 1801-2014 131 0.80% 106 1.17% 80 0.49% 64 0.71% 
Reich 2002 1801-1998 131 1.22% 106 1.79% 92 0.86% 73 1.23% 
Svolik 2012 1946-2007 89 1.07% 89 1.07% 57 0.69% 57 0.69% 
Ulfelder 2012 1956-2010 113 1.51% 113 1.51% 109 1.45% 109 1.45% 
Wahman et al. 2013 1973-2010 98 1.51% 98 1.51% 62 0.95% 62 0.95% 
    LIBERALIZATION BACKSLIDING 
Freedom House (FIW, any 
change) 1973-2015 919 12.04% 919 12.04% 738 9.67% 738 9.67% 
Polity IV (any change) 1801-2014 811 4.94% 556 6.13% 511 3.11% 341 3.76% 
Skaaning et al. 2015 1801-2015 657 3.80% 379 3.66% 483 2.79% 261 2.52% 
V-Dem: Electoral Democracy 1901-2015 803 5.05% 669 6.50% 400 2.52 302 2.93% 
Wahman et al. 2013 (any 
change) 1973-2010 1033 15.87% 1033 15.87% 730 11.21% 730 11.21% 
 
 
3. Agreement between Measures of Regime Change 
It is commonly assumed that measures of regime change are interchangeable because the 
indicators or regime type that they are based on correlate very highly. Table 2 refutes this 
conventional wisdom. It presents the average pairwise correlation coefficients for all indicators 
of rupture and reform and contrasts them with the average correlation among the corresponding 
democracy indicators.8 While it is indeed the case that the average pairwise correlation between 
the regime type indicators is very high (between 0.85 and 0.86), we find strikingly low 
correlations among all indicators of regime change. In fact, the correlation ranges between a high 
0.46 (transition) and a low 0.33 (backsliding).  
This turns our attention to the study of agreement between the various indicators, which 
is defined as the number of indicators coding the respective regime change event, divided by the 
total number of indicators available. Thus, agreement ranges from 0 to 1. All cases coded as 0 are 
excluded from the analysis because they have plausibly not experienced the respective form of 
regime change.9  
                                                
8 For an overview of all pairwise correlations, see Tables A3 through A6 in Appendix II. 
9 All analyses were carried out with an alternative coding of agreement that looks at a period of three years (t +/- 1). 
This is a relatively generous coding because it codes agreement between indicators even when the change was 
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Table 2: Average Correlations among Indicators of Regime Change 
  Democracy Transition Breakdown 
Bernhard et al. 2005 NA NA 0.56 
Boix et al. 2013 0.86 0.49 0.47 
Cheibub et al. 2010 0.85 0.50 0.51 
Freedom House (FIW: free) 0.79 0.31 0.22 
Geddes et al. 2014 0.87 0.49 0.48 
Magaloni et al. 2013 0.87 0.53 0.50 
Polity IV (AN=AUT) 0.83 0.40 0.39 
Reich 2002 0.80 0.39 0.49 
Svolik 2012 0.88 0.56 0.50 
Ulfelder 2012 0.85 0.53 0.49 
Wahman et al. 2013 0.86 0.40 0.23 
Mean (SD) 0.85 (0.03) 0.46 (0.08) 0.44 (0.11) 
  Democracy Liberalization Backsliding 
Freedom House (FIW, any change) 0.86 0.45 0.39 
Polity IV (any change) 0.85 0.37 0.33 
Skaaning et al. 2015 0.86 0.32 0.26 
V-Dem: Electoral Democracy 0.85 0.34 0.23 
Wahman et al. 2013 (any change) 0.89 0.52 0.43 
Mean (SD) 0.86 (0.02) 0.40 (0.08) 0.33 (0.08) 
 
We measure agreement for each form of regime change as well as for backsliding and 
breakdown, and for liberalization and transition. Figure 1 depicts agreement rates over time, 
averaged over a period of five years.10 It underscores that despite the considerable overlap in 
underlying data sources, average agreement is disturbingly low. On average, agreement between 
the rupture measures is slightly less than 20 percent, and roughly 40 to 50 percent for reform. 
Furthermore, only a handful of cases are unequivocally identified as regime change 
events by all indicators available. We find 100 percent agreement at time t for 145 backsliding 
events (out of a total of 1,699; equaling 8.53 percent), 20 instances of breakdown (out of 352; 
5.68 percent), 357 liberalizations (out of 2,335; 15.29 percent), and 14 transitions (out of 457; 
3.06 percent). Agreement is no more than 50 percent in 76.87 percent of the backsliding, 80.11 





                                                                                                                                                  
recorded in one source a full two years before another indicator picked it up. All results reported here remain robust 
to this more generous measure (see Appendix). 
10 See Appendix for similar figures on agreement by year, using the extended set of indicators, and expanding the 
window to a three-year period. 
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4. Explaining Variation in Agreement 
What explains variation in agreement across regime change events? We argue that focal points—
that is, the presence of elections in the case of transition and liberalization, or coups in the case 
of breakdown and backsliding—play an important role in explaining agreement. 
To understand why focal points have a significant impact on the agreement of indicators, 
we need to recognize the crucial role of coders in producing regime type ratings (Bollen and 
Paxton 2000). Usually, the majority of country-years are coded retrospectively, and information 
about specific countries becomes sparser as we move back in time. As information becomes less 
available, coders increasingly build their ratings around notable political events such as coups or 
elections that unequivocally characterize political changes and thus facilitate the identification of 
regime change events and justify a particular rating.  
Additionally, coding rules often explicitly call for coups or elections to precede a change 
in a country’s rating. For example, Gasiorowski (1996: 472) admits that gradual change is 
possible, but his rating changes mostly in the aftermath of an election or a coup. We find a 
similar focus on focal points in the coding rules of the Freedom in the World data: 
“A score is typically changed only (italics authors) if there has been a real-world 
development during the year that warrants a decline or improvement (e.g., a 
crackdown on the media, the country’s first free and fair elections), though 
gradual changes in conditions, in the absence of a signal event, are occasionally 
































Liberalization Liberalization & Transition Transition
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Naturally, regime changes do not exclusively take place in the context of “signal events.” 
Indeed, there is reason to believe that regime change in terms of fewer or greater restrictions on 
civil and political liberties may take place long before elections are held or coups are staged. But 
elections or coups provide focal points around which researchers and policymakers may become 
aware of changing democratic practices, facilitating the identification of ruptures or reforms. 
Therefore, we expect agreement between different indicators of rupture or reform to be higher for 
regime change cases that coincide with focal points—and in particular elections and coups.  
Importantly, finding positive effects of coups and elections on agreement does not 
suggest that coups and elections increase the probability of rupture or reform, but rather they 
increase the likelihood that multiple indicators code a specific regime change event in the same 
year. This would suggest that regime changes accompanied by such events are more likely to be 
picked up than those that are not.  This, in turn, would imply that we can only identify with 
certainty a—plausibly unrepresentative—set of actual regime change events. 
We test this argument using data from the National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy 
(NELDA) dataset (Hyde and Marinov 2012). We rely on the dataset’s sample to code years with 
and without Election. 11  Our Coup variable codes country-years that experienced at least one 
successful (military or civilian) coup in year t (data from Powell and Thyne 2011). Our agreement 
measures for the various forms of regime change are defined as above. Due to data availability, 
the following analysis is restricted to the period 1950-2010. The universe of cases examined here 
is all those country-years for which at least one indicator coded a regime change. 
Table 3 depicts average agreement across the backsliding, breakdown, liberalization, and 
transition measures. It confirms previous findings and shows that agreement is generally higher 
for reform (44 to 52 percent) than for rupture (28 to 30 percent). More importantly, it points to 
strong differences in agreement rates between backsliding and breakdown cases that did and did 
not experience coups. Coups are associated with an increase in agreement by up to 33 percentage 
points (breakdown). In contrast, they are associated with marginal increases in agreement among 
the liberalization and transition indicators only. The reverse is true for elections, which increase 
agreement of the liberalization and transition measures by up to 17 percentage points 





                                                
11 Note that some microstates as well as countries without national elections (e.g., China, Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates) were excluded from NELDA and thus are missing in our dataset. 
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Table 3: Average agreement around focal points, 1950-2010 
  Mean No coups Coups 
No 
Elections  Elections 
Breakdown 28.28% 17.53% 50.47% 29.05% 25.68% 
Backsliding 43.92% 41.00% 57.49% 43.04% 43.78% 
Backsliding & 
Breakdown 18.82% 15.67% 33.64% 17.87% 19.96% 
Transition 29.87% 29.32% 35.53% 17.94% 35.01% 
Liberalization 51.48% 51.43% 52.16% 42.94% 55.96% 
Liberalization & 
Transition 21.73% 21.53% 24.49% 16.51% 27.27% 
 
We employ OLS regression analysis to test this argument further, regressing agreement 
on the coup and election dummy variables. Apart from these focal points, other factors may 
contribute to average agreement rates. Agreement may be affected by the importance of a 
country in the world community; larger or politically and economically more powerful countries 
are under increased international scrutiny, affecting the attention paid by researchers and non-
governmental organizations. This may also increase the availability of information about these 
countries. Consequently, we employ GDP, Population size, and GDP per capita as control variables 
(source: World Bank 2015). All three measures are logged. We further add Trade openness (sum of 
exports and imports divided by GDP; World Bank 2015) and GATT/WTO membership (source: 
Ulfelder 2012). Moreover, more aid-dependent countries may be subject to more international 
scrutiny. We use log Aid per capita (source: World Bank 2015). Finally, we control for the Number 
of measures available (log) for the respective form of regime change examined; agreement may be 
lower if more measures are available. Elections and Coups are measured in t, membership in 
GATT/WTO is measured in t-1, and the remainder is averaged across the three years preceding 
the year of analysis. All models include country- and time-fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered by country. 
Table 4 summarizes our findings. We examine the effect of coups and elections on 
agreement among the breakdown (Model 1), backsliding (Model 2), breakdown and backsliding 
(Model 3), transition (Model 4), liberalization (Model 5), and transition and liberalization 
indicators (Model 6).  
Overall, the results suggest that agreement of the breakdown and backsliding indicators 
is statistically significantly higher around coups, while elections increase agreement rates of the 
transition and liberalization measures. Successful coups increase agreement for breakdown 
(backsliding) by about 27.6 (18.9) percentage points, while elections are associated with an 
increase in agreement for transition (liberalization) by 14.1 (16.5) percentage points. All these 
estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level. Elections are generally not statistically 
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significantly related to agreement of the backsliding and breakdown measures, while coups lack 
predictive power with respect to the agreement between transition and liberalization indicators.12 
Coups and elections increase agreement between indicators of backsliding and 
breakdown, while elections increase agreement of the liberalization and transition measures, all 
else equal. Yet, coups and elections are closely related to agreement over indicators, but they are not 
determinative of regime change. These focal events shape societal expectations of change, but as 
Schedler (2001) notes, “even transitions ignited by focal events often unfold within a larger 
framework of oscillation or incremental transformation.” Moreover, they accompany only a 
minority of regime changes. Our dataset counts only 402 country-years with at least one 
successful coup (3.2% of all country-years for which coup-data are available). Similarly, elections 
took place in only about 26 percent of our country-year observations.  
 
Table 4: Agreement between regime change indicators 
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6) 
  Breakdown Backsliding 
Breakdown & 
Backsliding Transition Liberalization 
Transition & 
Liberalization 
Successful coup in t 0.276*** 0.189*** 0.187*** -0.013 0.028 0.022    
  (0.06) (0.03) (0.02)    (0.10) (0.03) (0.02)    
Election in t 0.006 0.022 0.026*   0.141*** 0.165*** 0.131*** 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)    (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)    
Population, ln (Ø t-3 to t-1) -3.818 0.553 -2.337**  -7.547 0.262 -0.686    
  (4.32) (2.45) (1.09)    (4.77) (1.43) (0.73)    
GDP p.c., ln (Ø t-3 to t-1) -4.117 0.552 -2.368**  -7.384 0.247 -0.698    
  (4.31) (2.46) (1.10)    (4.69) (1.46) (0.75)    
GDP, ln (Ø t-3 to t-1) 4.086 -0.515 2.377**  7.455 -0.317 0.656    
  (4.32) (2.46) (1.09)    (4.75) (1.46) (0.75)    
Trade (Ø t-3 to t-1) -0.001 -0.000 -0.000    -0.000 -0.001 -0.000    
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Aid p.c., ln (Ø t-3 to t-1) 0.000 0.012 0.007    0.019 -0.012 -0.011    
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)    (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)    
Member of GATT/WTO, t-1 -0.021 0.005 -0.003    0.065 -0.016 0.011    
  (0.07) (0.02) (0.02)    (0.05) (0.03) (0.02)    
# measures available, ln 0.393 
 
0.780*** 0.431 -0.997* -0.267    
  (0.47)   (0.22)    (0.74) (0.56) (0.20)    
N 223 800 822    276 1003 1024    
Adj. R2 0.456 0.195 0.239    0.163 0.163 0.148    





                                                
12 Our results remain robust when agreement is measured over a period of three instead of one year (see Appendix).  
 19 
V. Indicators of Regime Change and Accumulation of 
Knowledge 
The low agreement between indicators of regime change has important ramifications for 
empirical analysis. Conclusions drawn on one set of dependent variables are often not supported 
by analyses employing alternative measures of regime change. This draws the validity of studies 
of regime change into question, and suggests that the lack of cumulative knowledge about 
regime change is in part due to the ambiguity and unreliability of currently used measurements.  
To illustrate the dependence of findings on the specific measure of regime change 
employed, we examined the robustness of empirical models of rupture and reform to alternative 
indicators of regime change. The studies considered here investigate the effect of a broad set of 
independent (i.e., socioeconomic, institutional, international) variables and use different 
methodological approaches to the study of regime change. They are classified into one of the 
four types of regime change according to the coding of their dependent variable13:  
On liberalization, we include Burke and Leigh’s (2010) study on the impact of economic 
growth on regime changes toward democracy and autocracy. They argue that economic growth 
reduces the likelihood of both liberalization and backsliding. We further include Cornell (2013), 
who finds that democracy aid has the most positive effect on the likelihood of liberalization in 
one-party regimes. Third, we include Ansell and Samuels’ (2010) work on the effects of land and 
income inequality on liberalization. They posit that autocracies with more equal land and less 
equal income distributions are more likely to democratize. 
As to backsliding, we again include Burke and Leigh (2010) again because they study 
both liberalization and backsliding. Further, we add Gibler and Randazzo (2011), who find that 
established independent judiciaries reduce the likelihood of democratic backsliding, while newly 
formed judiciaries have no such effect. Third, we examine the robustness of Goldstone et al.’s 
(2010) finding that it is political regime types, not socioeconomic variables that explain the onset 
of adverse political change. 
Regarding transition, we add Pevehouse (2002), who posits that membership in 
international organizations is positively linked to the likelihood of democratization. Next, Donno 
(2013) examines the effects of pre-electoral opposition coalitions and international conditionality 
on election outcomes in electoral autocracies and finds that competitive autocracies are more 
                                                
13 We thank all the authors of these studies for kindly sharing their data with us and are grateful for their comments 
and feedback on our findings and this paper. 
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likely to democratize after elections. Moreover, both opposition coalitions and international 
conditionality increase the likelihood of post-electoral transition. 
We consider two studies of breakdown. Andersen et al. (2014) argue that state capacity in 
the form of administrative effectiveness stabilizes democratic rule and thus lowers the risk of 
breakdown. Finally Houle (2009) contends that inequality has no effect on transition to 
democracy, but increases the likelihood of democratic breakdown.14 
We leave the sample definition of the original model unchanged. Yet, as indicators cover 
different time periods and countries, the number of observations in our models differs at times 
from the original studies. We never added observations to the analysis, but observations were 
dropped if they could not experience the respective form of regime change as defined by the 
dependent variable. 15  We ran all reform models on both a full set of country-years that can 
potentially experience the regime change event of interest 16 , and on a sample restricted to 
democracies (backsliding) or autocracies (liberalization).17 
 
Table 5: Testing the robustness of extant studies on rupture using alternative measures 
of regime change  
 
  TRANSITION BREAKDOWN 
Coding DV scope 
Pevehouse 
2002b Donno 2013 scope 

















Bernhard et al. 2001 AUT 
only 
NA NA NA NA DEM
only 
      
Boix et al. 2013 AUT 
only 
        DEM 
only 
      
Cheibub et al. 2010 AUT 
only 
        DEM 
only 
      
Freedom House (FIW: free) AUT 
only 
        DEM 
only 
      
Geddes et al. 2014 AUT 
only 
        DEM 
only 
      
Magaloni et al. 2013 AUT 
only 
        DEM 
only 
      
Polity IV (AN=AUT) AUT 
only 
        DEM 
only 
      
Reich 2002 AUT 
only 
        DEM 
only 
      
Svolik 2012 AUT 
only 
        DEM 
only 
      
Ulfelder 2012 AUT 
only 
        DEM 
only 
      
Wahman et al. 2013 AUT 
only 
        DEM 
only 
      
  % 
(partial) 
success 
80.0% 40.0% 0.0% 0.0% % 
success 





    
                                                
14 Note that estimates dynamic probit models of regime change. We depart from his original model specification, 
however, and estimate simple probit models of the determinants of breakdown. Thus, strictly speaking, our 
robustness checks of Houle (2009) are somewhat less than robustness checks. 
15 For example, all country-years scoring -8 and below on the Polity score were dropped if the dependent variable 
measured backsliding as decrease on Polity by at least 3 points. 
16 That is, for example, a country scoring a 9 on the Polity IV scale was excluded when the three-point increase on 
the scale indicates.  
17 We use the indicators’ own thresholds of democracy / autocracy, as employed in the analysis of rupture. As 
neither the Lexical Index of Democracy (Skaaning et al. 2015) nor the V-Dem data (Coppedge et al. 2016a) suggest 
thresholds to distinguish between democracies and autocracies, these indicators are excluded in this second part of 
the reform robustness checks. 
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Table 6: Testing the robustness of extant studies on reform using alternative measures of regime change 
 
  LIBERALIZATION BACKSLIDING 















ne et al. 
2010 












M4 T2 T1, M3 
Freedom House (FIW, any change) all           all         
Polity IV (any change) all           all         
Skaaning et al. 2015 all           all         
V-Dem: Electoral Democracy all           all         
Wahman et al. 2013 (any change) all           all         
Freedom House (FIW, any change) AUT only           
DEM 
only         
Polity IV (any change) AUT only           
DEM 
only         
Skaaning et al. 2015 AUT only NA NA NA NA NA 
DEM 
only NA NA NA NA 
V-Dem: Electoral Democracy AUT only NA NA NA NA NA 
DEM 
only NA NA NA NA 
Wahman et al. 2013 (any change) AUT only           
DEM 
only         
  
% 






% 62.50% 25.00% 
      
 
75.00% 12.50% 25.00%         62.50% 
Notes: White cells mean that the results from the original model were obtained successfully. To count as success, the coefficients of the main 
independent variable(s) of interest must point in the hypothesized direction and the effect must be statistically significant at the 10% level or better. 
Light grey indicates partial success in cases where the authors were interested in the effects of more than one variable, but not all of the coefficients 
were as hypothesized in our robustness checks. The bottom % counts partial success as well. all refers to all country-years that can potentially 
undergo the regime change event of interest. 
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The robustness checks employ all of the indicators identified previously, even though 
some of the papers analyzed (e.g., Goldstone et al. 2010) restrict their theoretical predictions to 
major regime changes only. We do so in order to examine the interchangeability of as broad a set 
of indicators as possible. Further, by ex ante excluding certain indicators, we would have been 
required to make theoretical assumptions about the causal mechanism at work, which is not the 
purpose of this study. As a consequence, a disregard of scope conditions may explain some of 
our results. However, our goal is not to draw into question extant findings, but rather to examine 
the validity and interchangeability of extant measurements of regime change. Thus, finding that 
only a few of the robustness checks yielded the same results should not be understood as 
invalidating the original study’s conclusions.  
Tables 5 and 6 summarize our results. White cells denote that we obtained the same 
results as in the original model using the specified dependent variable and scope condition. Dark 
gray represents failure to do so. Light gray means that we obtained similar results not for all but 
at least one of the coefficients of interest. To count as success, the coefficient(s) of interest must 
point in the expected direction and must be statistically significant at the 10% level or above. 
Our results suggest that published findings in the study of regime change depend to a 
large extent on indicator choice. For the majority of models analyzed here, we failed to obtain 
the same results for more than 50 percent of the indicators. Success rates are even lower when 
the extended set of indicators is used (See Appendix). This shows that indicators commonly 
assumed to tap into similar concepts are generally not interchangeable, and published findings 
appear to depend on the indicator chosen. Taken together, the robustness checks suggest that we 
know very little about the factors driving regime change. 
 
VI. Improving Research on Political Regime Change 
Examining measurements of regime change reveals a number of problems. Agreement between 
them is extremely low, which suggests that they measure different phenomena and that results 
depend on the choice of indicator. This leads to the conclusion that the lack of accumulated 
knowledge in the study of regime change is due, at least in part, to imprecise measurements. 
Unless we develop more comprehensive and reliable measurements of regime change, it is hard 
to draw empirically sound and valid conclusions about the determinants of regime change and 
the consequences thereof. 
The preceding discussion suggests a number of guidelines and desiderata for future, 
more rigorous research on regime change across subfields in political science. First is to develop 
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a clear consensus over how to conceptualize regime change. Currently, there is a lack of 
agreement on the definitions of backsliding, breakdown, liberalization, and transition, as well as 
the underlying characterization of democracy. A distinction between rupture and reform is useful 
as it is likely that rupture and reform have different causes and plausibly different consequences. 
Second is to employ indicators that clearly map onto these regime changes. In our review 
of the literature, we rarely found that scholars justified their indicator choices. Often, it seems 
that researchers assume interchangeability between indicators. It is true that the correlation 
between the various indicators of regime type is high. Yet, this does not translate into a high 
correlation between the indicators of regime change. Indicators of regime change are not 
interchangeable, and the choice of indicator is consequential for the empirical analysis, as this 
paper shows. This calls researchers to be conscious of the choices they make when picking 
indicators, and consumers of the literature to take into account the different measurement 
choices when considering lessons learned and adjudicating between findings. 
Third is to go beyond conventionally used datasets in the country-year format. Rather, a 
regime change dataset should code regime change events instead of having one observation for 
each country and year. The latter may lead scholars to mistakenly treat one long period of regime 
change as several distinct and shorter regime change events. Consider, for example, V-Dem’s 
indicator of Electoral Democracy in Mexico and Zimbabwe (Figure 2). A standard country-year 
format masks important regime change patterns in both countries: we identify regime change 
events in Mexico in 1918, 2000, and 2013, and in Zimbabwe in 1923 and 1978. However, our 
coding scheme is unable to pick up the gradual backsliding process in Zimbabwe between the 
end of World War II and the country’s formal independence in 1980. Any annual change in 
electoral democracy was too small to be coded as regime change event, yet the accumulated 
change was substantial. Similarly, the conventional coding scheme does not tell us when the 
Mexican liberalization process was initiated. A country-year-based scheme would suggest that 
liberalization happened between 1999 and 2000. However, as Figure 2 underscores, Mexico had 
embarked on a gradual liberalization process already around 1970, which accelerated markedly in 
the late-1980s. 
Moreover, no extant measure qualitatively identifies both rupture and reform. 
Consequently, the creation of an indicator of regime change that picks up both regime rupture 
and reform, but does not impose arbitrary thresholds between different forms of political rule, is 
an important task for future researchers. Such an indicator would not only greatly improve 
research, but may also be used to identify early warning signs of an ensuing large-scale rupture.  
 
 25 















VII. Conclusion  
Despite centuries of thinking, too little is known about the factors driving transition, 
breakdown, liberalization, and backsliding. Debates over the role of economic conditions, 
political institutions, cultural characteristics, and other potentially facilitating factors can only be 
resolved when scholars consciously consider the measures they use and seek to develop research 
methods that promote cumulative knowledge building. So, too, questions over sequencing and 
the relationship between rupture and reform can only be answered when these changes are 
defined carefully and analyses match them. Recognizing the problems with extant measures is 
the first step in spurring the community to address existing problems, allowing us to engage in a 
collective conversation over these critical issues. 
Moreover, a lack of attention to the conceptualization and measurement of regime 
change hampers the accumulation of knowledge in other areas of research, such as international 
security, international political economy, and comparative politics more broadly: does 
democratization increase trade openness (e.g., Milner and Kubota 2005; Milner and Mukherjee 
2009)? Is democratization associated with increased inflows of Foreign Direct Investment (e.g., 
Li 2009; Pandya 2014)? Are democratized countries less likely to fight one another (e.g., Maoz 
and Russett 1993; Ward and Gleditsch 1998; Sunde and Cervellati 2013)? 
The findings in this paper demonstrate that regime type and regime change indicators are 




















regime change indicators. It may well be plausible that most rupture and reform events are 
preceded by media crackdowns, or visible improvements in the degree of freedom. Yet, because 
the indicators are so influenced by the easily detected focal points, and the analyses that draw on 
these indicators are so as well, we are ill-positioned to pick up gradual reforms below the 
intensity of “signal events,” or for our analyses to shed light on such change. This may make 
scholars and the international community blind for early warning signs of beginning processes of 
backsliding, and it hinders our ability to study carefully the factors that spur such changes. 
Ultimately, this delays learning necessary to guide appropriate, early policy responses. 
This is especially crucial in the case of backsliding and breakdown. The inability of the 
international community to recognize such events, and for the scholarly community to help 
pinpoint factors that make them more likely, potentially grants national leaders more leeway in 
cutting back political or civil rights. The recent cutbacks on the constitutional court’s powers and 
increases in the government control over the media in Poland, as well as similar movements 
toward greater authoritarian qualities in Hungary, Russia, and Turkey only underscore the need 
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Appendix I: Additional Figures 
 
Figure A1: Average agreement by year—1-year window 
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b) extended set of indicators 
 
 
Figure A2: Average agreement by five-year period—1-year window 
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Figure A3: Average agreement by year—3-year window 
a) core indicators 
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Figure A4: Average agreement by five-year period—3-year window 
a) core indicators 
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Appendix II: Additional Tables 
Table A1: Indicators of regime change: coding rules and literature examples 
  
















Bernhard et al. 
2005 authors' coding of backsliding as defined by authors NA 
Bernhard et al. 
2005 
Reenock et al. 2007; Bernhard et 
al. 2003; Bernhard et al. 2004   
Boix et al. 2013 authors' coding of DEM and AUT regime change from DEM to AUT 
regime change from 
AUT to DEM Boix et al. 2013 
Boix 2003; Svolik 2008; Brambor 
and Lindvall 2014 Boix 2003 
Cheibub et al. 
2010 authors' coding of DEM and AUT 
regime change from 
DEM to AUT 
regime change from 
AUT to DEM 
Cheibub et al. 




DEM: free; AUT: partly free + not free - FH 
Status 
regime change from 
DEM to AUT 
regime change from 
AUT to DEM 
Freedom House 




DEM: free + partly free; AUT: not free - FH 
Status 
regime change from 
DEM to AUT 
regime change from 
AUT to DEM 
Freedom House 




DEM: free; AUT: partly free + not free - 
Political Rights only 
regime change from 
DEM to AUT 
regime change from 
AUT to DEM 
Freedom House 




DEM: free + partly free; AUT: not free - 
Political Rights only 
regime change from 
DEM to AUT 
regime change from 
AUT to DEM 
Freedom House 




DEM: free; HYB:partly free; AUT: not free - 
Status 
regime change from 
DEM to AUT 
regime change from 
AUT to DEM 
Freedom House 




DEM: 1 to 2.5; HYB: 3 to 5; AUT: 5.5 to 7 - 
Political Rights only 
regime change from 
DEM to AUT 
regime change from 
AUT to DEM 
Freedom House 
2015    
Gasiorowski 
1996 
DEM: democracy and semidemocracy; AUT: 
autocracy; regime change with transitions--> 
change takes place in the middle of a transition 
period; if odd number of transition years: regime 
change after ((1/2)n+1)/n) years 
regime change from 
DEM to AUT 
regime change from 
AUT to DEM 
Gasiorowski 
1996 
Power and Gasiorowski 1997; 
Gasiorowski and Power 1998; Lai 





DEM: democracy; HYB: semidemocracy; AUT: 
autocracy; regime change with transitions--> 
change takes place in the middle of a transition 
period; if odd number of transition years: regime 
change after ((1/2)n+1)/n) years 
any change from 
DEM to HYB or 
HYB to AUT 
regime change from 
AUT to HYB or HYB 
to DEM 
Gasiorowski 
1996    
Gates 2006 DEM: 0.6 to 1; AUT < 0.6 
regime change from 
DEM to AUT 
regime change from 
AUT to DEM 
Gates et al. 
2006 
Gates et al. 2006; Strand et al. 
2013 
Gates et al. 2006; Strand 
et al. 2013 
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Geddes et al. 
2014 authors' coding of DEM and AUT 
regime change from 
DEM to AUT 
regime change from 
AUT to DEM 
Geddes et al. 
2014 Wright and Escriba-Folch 2012   
Magaloni et al. 
2013 authors' coding of DEM and AUT 
regime change from 
DEM to AUT 
regime change from 
AUT to DEM 
Magaloni et al. 
2013     
Polity IV 
(AN=AUT) 
DEM: 6 to 10; AUT: 5 to -10 (anocracies = 
AUT) 
regime change from 
DEM to AUT 
regime change from 
AUT to DEM 
Marshall et al. 
2013 Maeda 2010   
Polity IV 
(AN=DEM) 
DEM: 10 to -5; AUT: -6 to -10 (anocracies = 
DEM) 
regime change from 
DEM to AUT 
regime change from 
AUT to DEM 
Marshall et al. 
2013     
Polity IV 
(threshold: 7) 
DEM: 7 to 10; AUT: 6 to -10 regime change from DEM to AUT 
regime change from 
AUT to DEM 
Marshall et al. 
2013 
Lai and Melkonian-Hoover 2005; 
Kadera et al. 2003 




(threshold: 1) DEM: 1 to 10; AUT: 0 to -10 
regime change from 
DEM to AUT 
regime change from 
AUT to DEM 
Marshall et al. 




DEM: exrec >=6 and parcomp >=3; AUT 
otherwise 
regime change from 
DEM to AUT 
regime change from 
AUT to DEM 
Marshall et al. 
2013 Ulfelder and Lustik 2007 Ulfelder and Lustik 2007 
Polity IV 
(hybrid: 6 & -
6) 
DEM: 6 to 10; HYB: 5 to -5; AUT: -5 to -10 regime change from DEM to AUT 
regime change from 
AUT to DEM 
Marshall et al. 
2013 Pevehouse 2002 Pevehouse 2002 
Polity IV 
(hybrid: 8 & 1) DEM: 8 to 10; HYB: 1 to 7; AUT: 0 to -10 
regime change from 
DEM to AUT 
regime change from 
AUT to DEM 
Marshall et al. 
2013    
Przeworski et 
al. 2000 
authors' coding of DEM and AUT regime change from DEM to AUT 
regime change from 
AUT to DEM 
Przeworski et 
al. 2000 
Przeworski et al. 2000; Houle 
2009; Shirah 2013; Lai and 
Melkonian-Hoover 2005 
Houle 2009; Lai and 
Melkonian-Hoover 2005 
Reich 2002 
DEM: democracy and semidemocracy; AUT: 
autocracy; regime change with transitions--> 
change takes place in the middle of a transition 
period; if odd number of transition years: regime 
change after ((1/2)n+1)/n) years 
regime change from 
DEM to AUT 
regime change from 
AUT to DEM Reich 2002    
Reich 2002 
(hybrid) 
DEM: democracy; HYB: semidemocracy; AUT: 
autocracy; regime change with transitions--> 
change takes place in the middle of a transition 
period; if odd number of transition years: regime 
change after ((1/2)n+1)/n) years 
regime change from 
DEM to AUT 
regime change from 
AUT to DEM Reich 2002 Reich 2002 Reich 2002 
Svolik 2012 author’s coding of DEM and AUT 
regime change from 
DEM to AUT 
regime change from 
AUT to DEM Svolik 2012 Svolik 2012 Svolik 2012 
Ulfelder 2012 author's coding of DEM and AUT 
regime change from 
DEM to AUT 
regime change from 
AUT to DEM Ulfelder 2012     
Wahman et al. 
2013 
authors' coding of DEM and AUT regime change from DEM to AUT 
regime change from 
AUT to DEM 
Hadenius et al. 










no definition of regime types applied any positive change on FIW score 




Brinks and Coppedge 2005; 
Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2010; 
Shirah 2013 





no definition of regime types applied 
any positive change 
on Political Rights 
scale 
any negative change 
on Political Rights 
scale 
Freedom House 




no definition of regime types applied 
a positive change of 
at least 1 point on 
FIW score 
a negative change of at 
least 1 point on FIW 
score 
Freedom House 
2015    
Freedom 
House (PR, 1+ 
points) 
no definition of regime types applied 
a positive change of 
at least 1 point on 
Political Rights scale 
a negative change of at 
least 1 point on 
Political Rights scale 
Freedom House 
2015 Erdmann 2011   
Gasiorowski 
(hybrid) 
DEM: democracy; HYB: semidemocracy; AUT: 
autocracy; regime change with transitions--> 
change takes place in the middle of a transition 
period; if odd number of transition years: regime 
change after ((1/2)n+1)/n) years 
regime change from 
DEM to AUT 
regime change from 
AUT to DEM 
Gasiorowski 
1996 Pevehouse 2002 Pevehouse 2002 
Gates et al. 
2006 (any 
change) 
no definition of regime types applied a positive change of at least 0.03 on SIP 
a positive change of at 
least 0.03 on SIP 
Gates et al. 
2006 
Fjelde and Hegre 2006; Gates et 
al. 2006 
Fjelde and Hegre 2006; 
Gates et al. 2006 
Polity IV (any 
change) no definition of regime types applied 
any negative change 
on polity2 variable 
any positive change on 
polity2 variable 
Marshall et al. 
2013 Gibler and Randazzo 2011   
Polity IV (3+ 
points) 
no definition of regime types applied 
a negative change of 
at least 3 points on 
the polity2 variable 
a positive change of at 
least 3 points on the 
polity2 variable 
Marshall et al. 
2013 
Alemán and Yang 2011; Burke 
and Leigh 2010; Gibler and 
Randazzo 2011 
Alemán and Yang 2011; 
Burke and Leigh 2010 
Polity IV (5+ 
points) 
no definition of regime types applied 
a negative change of 
at least 5 points on 
the polity2 variable 
a positive change of at 
least 5 points on the 
polity2 variable 
Marshall et al. 
2013 Goldstone et al. 2010   
Reich 2002 
(hybrid) 
DEM: democracy; HYB: semidemocracy; AUT: 
autocracy; regime change with transitions--> 
change takes place in the middle of a transition 
period; if odd number of transition years: regime 
change after ((1/2)n+1)/n) years 
any change from 
DEM to HYB or 
HYB to AUT 
regime change from 
AUT to HYB or HYB 
to DEM 
Reich 2002     
Skaaning et al. 
2015 
0: no elections; 6: minimally competitive, multiparty 
elections with universal suffrage for legislature and 
executive 
any negative change 
on the Lexical Index 
of Democracy 
any positive change on 
the Lexical Index of 
Democracy 
Skaaning et al. 




no definition of regime types applied 
any negative change 
by at least a standard 
deviation 
any positive change by 
at least a standard 
deviation 
Coppedge et al. 




no definition of regime types applied 
any negative change 
by at least a standard 
deviation 
any positive change by 
at least a standard 
deviation 
Coppedge et al. 





no definition of regime types applied 
any negative change 
by at least a standard 
deviation 
any positive change by 
at least a standard 
deviation 
Coppedge et al. 




no definition of regime types applied 
any negative change 
by at least a standard 
deviation 
any positive change by 
at least a standard 
deviation 
Coppedge et al. 




no definition of regime types applied 
any negative change 
by at least a standard 
deviation 
any positive change by 
at least a standard 
deviation 
Coppedge et al. 





no definition of regime types applied; 5 categories based 
on continuous V-Dem indicators, following Lindberg 
2015 
any decrease on the 
ordinal scale 
any increase on the 
ordinal scale 
Coppedge et al. 





no definition of regime types applied; 5 categories based 
on continuous V-Dem indicators, following Lindberg 
2015 
any decrease on the 
ordinal scale 
any increase on the 
ordinal scale 
Coppedge et al. 





no definition of regime types applied; 5 categories based 
on continuous V-Dem indicators, following Lindberg 
2015 
any decrease on the 
ordinal scale 
any increase on the 
ordinal scale 
Coppedge et al. 





no definition of regime types applied; 5 categories based 
on continuous V-Dem indicators, following Lindberg 
2015 
any decrease on the 
ordinal scale 
any increase on the 
ordinal scale 
Coppedge et al. 





no definition of regime types applied; 5 categories based 
on continuous V-Dem indicators, following Lindberg 
2015 
any decrease on the 
ordinal scale 
any increase on the 
ordinal scale 
Coppedge et al. 
2016     
Wahman et al. 
2013 (any 
change) 
no definition of regime types applied 
any negative change 
on ifhpol variable 
(imputed averaged 
FH and Polity score) 
any positive change on 
ifhpol variable 
(imputed averaged FH 
and Polity score) 
Hadenius et al. 
2013     
Wahman et al. 
2013 (1.5+ 
points) 
no definition of regime types applied 
a negative change of 
at least 1.5 points on 
ifhpol variable 
a positive change of at 
least 1.5 points on 
ifhpol variable 
Hadenius et al. 
2013     
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Table A2: Indicators of Regime Change – Extended Set 





events % obs 
# 
events % obs 
# 
events % obs 
# 
events % obs 
    TRANSITION BREAKDOWN 
Bernhard et al. 2005 1913-2005 NA NA NA NA 63 1.73% 54 1.69% 
Boix et al. 2013 1801-2007 134 0.83% 108 1.23% 83 0.52% 65 0.74% 
Cheibub et al. 2010 1947-2008 102 1.14% 102 1.14% 66 0.74% 66 0.74% 
Freedom House (FIW: free) 1973-2015 91 1.19% 91 1.19% 72 0.94% 72 0.94% 
Freedom House (FIW: partly free) 1973-2015 150 1.97% 150 1.97% 129 1.69% 129 1.69% 
Freedom House (PR: free) 1973-2015 99 1.30% 99 1.30% 79 1.04% 79 1.04% 
Freedom House (PR: partly free) 1973-2015 164 2.15% 164 2.15% 138 1.81% 138 1.81% 
Freedom House (FIW: hybrid) 1973-2015 3 0.04% 3 0.04% 7 0.09% 7 0.09% 
Freedom House (PR: hybrid) 1973-2015 7 0.09% 7 0.09% 13 0.17% 13 0.17% 
Gasiorowski 1996 1801-1992 84 1.27% 73 1.98% 72 1.09% 67 1.81% 
Gasiorowski 1996 (hybrid) 1801-1992 36 0.54% 33 0.89% 32 0.48% 31 0.84% 
Gates 2006 1801-2000 93 0.72% 71 1.09% 80 0.62% 60 0.92% 
Geddes et al. 2014 1946-2009 103 1.32% 103 1.32% 75 0.96% 75 0.96% 
Magaloni et al. 2013 1951-2012 83 0.98% 83 0.98% 49 0.58% 49 0.58% 
Polity IV (AN=AUT) 1801-2014 131 0.80% 106 1.17% 80 0.49% 64 0.71% 
Polity IV (AN=DEM) 1801-2014 188 1.15% 135 1.49% 159 0.97% 109 1.20% 
Polity IV (threshold: 7) 1801-2014 110 0.67% 88 0.97% 62 0.38% 49 0.54% 
Polity IV (threshold: 1) 1801-2014 183 1.12% 134 1.48% 137 0.83% 97 1.07% 
Polity IV (exrec & parcomp) 1801-2014 112 0.72% 83 0.96% 86 0.55% 67 0.77% 
Polity IV (hybrid: 6 & -6) 1801-2014 18 0.11% 17 0.19% 26 0.16% 20 0.22% 
Polity IV (hybrid: 8 & 1) 1801-2014 24 0.15% 18 0.20% 24 0.15% 19 0.21% 
Przeworski et al. 2000 1947-2002 93 1.21% 93 1.21% 58 0.76% 58 0.76% 
Reich 2002 1801-1998 131 1.22% 106 1.79% 92 0.86% 73 1.23% 
Reich 2002 (hybrid) 1801-1998 52 0.48% 44 0.74% 40 0.37% 33 0.56% 
Svolik 2012 1946-2007 89 1.07% 89 1.07% 57 0.69% 57 0.69% 
Ulfelder 2012 1956-2010 113 1.51% 113 1.51% 109 1.45% 109 1.45% 
Wahman et al. 2013 1973-2010 98 1.51% 98 1.51% 62 0.95% 62 0.95% 
    LIBERALIZATION BACKSLIDING 
Freedom House (FIW, any change) 1973-2015 919 12.04% 919 
12.04
% 738 9.67% 738 9.67% 
Freedom House (PR, any change) 1973-2015 581 7.61% 581 7.61% 469 6.15% 469 6.15% 
Freedom House (FIW, 1+ points) 1973-2015 247 3.24% 247 3.24% 175 2.29% 175 2.29% 
Freedom House (PR, 1+ points) 1973-2015 561 7.35% 561 7.35% 451 5.91% 451 5.91% 
Gasiorowski (hybrid) 1801-1992 56 0.84% 47 1.27% 42 0.65% 39 1.06% 
Gates et al. 2006 (any change) 1801-2000 418 3.25% 245 3.76% 302 2.35% 192 2.95% 
Polity IV (any change) 1801-2014 811 4.94% 556 6.13% 511 3.11% 341 3.76% 
Polity IV (3+ points) 1801-2014 368 2.24% 264 2.91% 266 1.62% 176 1.94% 
Polity IV (5+ points) 1801-2014 218 1.33% 162 1.79% 156 0.95% 112 1.24% 
Reich 2002 (hybrid) 1801-1998 104 0.97% 77 1.30% 60 0.56% 47 0.79% 
Skaaning et al. 2015 1801-2015 657 3.80% 379 3.66% 483 2.79% 261 2.52% 
V-Dem: Electoral Democracy 1901-2015 803 5.05% 669 6.50% 400 2.52% 302 2.93% 
V-Dem: Liberal Democracy 1901-2015 702 4.42% 596 5.79% 371 2.33% 294 2.85% 
V-Dem: Participatory Democracy 1901-2015 849 5.34% 748 7.27% 409 2.57% 328 3.19% 
V-Dem: Deliberative Democracy 1901-2015 737 4.67% 637 6.23% 398 2.52% 326 3.19% 
V-Dem: Egalitarian Democracy 1901-2015 729 4.59% 634 6.16% 323 2.03% 265 2.57% 
V-Dem: Electoral Democracy (ordinal) 1901-2015 586 3.68% 503 4.88% 350 2.20% 273 2.65% 
V-Dem: Liberal Democracy (ordinal) 1901-2015 381 2.40% 323 3.14% 198 1.25% 153 1.49% 
V-Dem: Participatory Democracy 1901-2015 330 2.08% 288 2.80% 155 0.98% 121 1.18% 
41  
(ordinal) 
V-Dem: Deliberative Democracy (ordinal) 1901-2015 416 2.63% 359 3.51% 234 1.48% 191 1.87% 
V-Dem: Egalitarian Democracy (ordinal) 1901-2015 381 2.40% 331 3.21% 187 1.18% 150 1.46% 












Table A3: Pairwise correlation coefficients between indicators of regime type 
















































































































































Boix et al. 2013 1.00 
             
  
Cheibub et al. 2010 0.92 1.00 
            
  
Freedom House (FIW: free) 0.81 0.74 1.00 
           
  
Geddes et al. 2014 0.89 0.92 0.76 1.00 
          
  
Magaloni et al. 2013 0.91 0.92 0.76 0.94 1.00 
         
  
Polity IV 0.84 0.79 0.78 0.85 0.86 1.00 
        
  
Reich 2002 0.75 0.82 0.72 0.84 0.83 0.70 1.00 
       
  
Skaaning et al. 2015 0.89 0.88 0.76 0.89 0.90 0.83 0.78 1.00 
      
  
Svolik 2012 0.91 0.92 0.77 0.93 0.93 0.84 0.85 0.91 1.00 
     
  
Ulfelder 2012 0.87 0.84 0.76 0.87 0.86 0.84 0.86 0.89 0.90 1.00 
    
  
Wahman et al. 2013 0.87 0.81 0.89 0.85 0.86 0.91 0.78 0.87 0.85 0.84 1.00 
   
  
Freedom House FIW 0.86 0.83 0.86 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.88 1.00       
Polity IV polity 2 score 0.82 0.84 0.75 0.87 0.86 0.85 0.75 0.83 0.88 0.87 0.85 0.89 1.00 
 
  
V-Dem: Electoral Democracy 0.84 0.83 0.81 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.81 0.83 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.91 0.87 1.00   
Wahman et al. 2013 ifhpol 0.88 0.85 0.84 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.97 0.97 0.93 1.00 




















































































































































Boix et al. 2013 1.00                             
Cheibub et al. 2010 0.92 1.00 
            
  
Freedom House (FIW: free) 0.81 0.74 1.00 
           
  
Geddes et al. 2014 0.89 0.92 0.76 1.00 
          
  
Magaloni et al. 2013 0.91 0.92 0.76 0.94 1.00 
         
  
Polity IV 0.84 0.79 0.78 0.85 0.86 1.00 
        
  
Reich 2002 0.75 0.82 0.72 0.84 0.83 0.70 1.00 
       
  
Skaaning et al. 2015 0.89 0.88 0.76 0.89 0.90 0.83 0.78 1.00 
      
  
Svolik 2012 0.91 0.92 0.77 0.93 0.93 0.84 0.85 0.91 1.00 
     
  
Ulfelder 2012 0.87 0.84 0.76 0.87 0.86 0.84 0.86 0.89 0.90 1.00 
    
  
Wahman et al. 2013 0.87 0.81 0.89 0.85 0.86 0.91 0.78 0.87 0.85 0.84 1.00 
   
  
Freedom House FIW 0.86 0.83 0.86 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.88 1.00       
Polity IV polity 2 score 0.82 0.84 0.75 0.87 0.86 0.85 0.75 0.83 0.88 0.87 0.85 0.89 1.00 
 
  
V-Dem: Electoral Democracy (ordinal) 0.83 0.82 0.80 0.84 0.83 0.82 0.80 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.90 0.85 1.00   
Wahman et al. 2013 ifhpol 0.88 0.85 0.84 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.97 0.97 0.92 1.00 
average 0.86 0.85 0.79 0.87 0.87 0.83 0.80 0.86 0.88 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.84 0.89 
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Boix et al. 2013 1.00 
                            
  
Cheibub et al. 2010 0.92 1.00 
                           
  
Freedom House (PR: free) 0.82 0.75 1.00 
                          
  
Freedom House (PR: partly free) 0.66 0.65 0.56 1.00 
                         
  
Freedom House (FIW: free) 0.81 0.74 0.97 0.56 1.00 
                        
  
Freedom House (FIW: partly free) 0.61 0.60 0.53 0.91 0.52 1.00 
                       
  
Gasiorowski 1996 0.67 0.75 0.73 0.56 0.71 0.50 1.00 
                      
  
Gates et al. 2006 0.85 0.83 0.81 0.68 0.78 0.62 0.63 1.00 
                     
  
Geddes et al. 2014 0.89 0.92 0.76 0.65 0.76 0.60 0.77 0.86 1.00 
                    
  
Magaloni et al. 2013 0.91 0.92 0.77 0.64 0.76 0.59 0.77 0.86 0.94 1.00 
                   
  
Polity IV (AN=AUT) 0.84 0.79 0.78 0.65 0.78 0.60 0.58 0.85 0.85 0.86 1.00 
                  
  
Polity IV (AN=DEM) 0.51 0.66 0.51 0.64 0.51 0.61 0.39 0.55 0.65 0.63 0.48 1.00 
                 
  
Polity IV (threshold 7) 0.82 0.76 0.78 0.58 0.78 0.54 0.54 0.82 0.81 0.82 0.93 0.45 1.00 
                
  
Polity IV (threshold 1) 0.76 0.82 0.68 0.71 0.68 0.66 0.60 0.85 0.84 0.83 0.76 0.63 0.71 1.00 
               
  
Polity IV (exrec & parcomp) 0.79 0.82 0.70 0.71 0.70 0.66 0.64 0.83 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.58 0.78 0.86 1.00 
              
  
Przeworski et al. 2000 0.92 0.96 0.80 0.65 0.78 0.59 0.75 0.84 0.92 0.92 0.80 0.67 0.76 0.83 0.82 1.00 
             
  
Reich 2002 0.75 0.82 0.73 0.70 0.72 0.64 0.99 0.73 0.84 0.83 0.70 0.52 0.66 0.70 0.71 0.83 1.00 
            
  
Skaaning et al. 2015 0.89 0.88 0.76 0.69 0.76 0.64 0.68 0.85 0.89 0.90 0.83 0.54 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.89 0.78 1.00 
           
  
Svolik 2012 0.91 0.92 0.78 0.68 0.77 0.62 0.77 0.87 0.93 0.93 0.84 0.68 0.79 0.86 0.85 0.94 0.85 0.91 1.00 
          
  
Ulfelder 2012 0.87 0.84 0.77 0.66 0.76 0.61 0.83 0.89 0.87 0.86 0.84 0.68 0.78 0.85 0.85 0.87 0.86 0.89 0.90 1.00 
         
  
Wahman et al. 2013 0.87 0.81 0.89 0.62 0.89 0.58 0.77 0.86 0.85 0.86 0.91 0.60 0.88 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.78 0.87 0.85 0.84 1.00 
        
  
Freedom House FIW 0.87 0.84 0.87 0.83 0.86 0.78 0.78 0.87 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.69 0.81 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.87 0.86 0.85 0.88 1.00                 
Freedom House PR  0.86 0.83 0.86 0.81 0.86 0.79 0.77 0.86 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.70 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.88 0.98 1.00 
      
  
Polity IV polity 2 score 0.82 0.84 0.76 0.73 0.75 0.69 0.64 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.85 0.78 0.81 0.91 0.87 0.85 0.75 0.83 0.88 0.87 0.85 0.89 0.89 1.00 
     
  
V-Dem: Electoral D. 0.84 0.83 0.81 0.70 0.81 0.66 0.74 0.82 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.63 0.81 0.77 0.79 0.84 0.81 0.83 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.90 0.91 0.87 1.00 
    
  
V-Dem: Liberal D. 0.83 0.81 0.83 0.65 0.84 0.62 0.73 0.80 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.58 0.83 0.74 0.76 0.81 0.79 0.82 0.83 0.81 0.85 0.89 0.91 0.84 0.97 1.00 
   
  
V-Dem: Participatory D. 0.82 0.80 0.80 0.65 0.81 0.62 0.69 0.78 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.58 0.81 0.73 0.76 0.81 0.77 0.81 0.82 0.79 0.83 0.88 0.89 0.83 0.97 0.97 1.00 
  
  
V-Dem: Deliberative D. 0.83 0.81 0.82 0.66 0.82 0.62 0.72 0.79 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.58 0.81 0.74 0.77 0.81 0.79 0.81 0.83 0.81 0.84 0.88 0.89 0.84 0.97 0.98 0.98 1.00 
 
  
V-Dem: Egalitarian D. 0.78 0.75 0.81 0.59 0.82 0.56 0.63 0.73 0.77 0.77 0.79 0.49 0.79 0.67 0.70 0.76 0.73 0.75 0.77 0.74 0.80 0.84 0.86 0.76 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.96 1.00   
Wahman et al. 2013 ifhpol 0.88 0.85 0.84 0.79 0.84 0.76 0.84 0.92 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.80 0.84 0.91 0.90 0.86 0.88 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.93 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.85 1.00 






















































































































































































































































































































































Boix et al. 2013 1.00                                                           
Cheibub et al. 2010 0.92 1.00 
                           
  
Freedom House (PR: free) 0.82 0.75 1.00 
                          
  
Freedom House (PR: partly free) 0.66 0.65 0.56 1.00 
                         
  
Freedom House (FIW: free) 0.81 0.74 0.97 0.56 1.00 
                        
  
Freedom House (FIW: partly free) 0.61 0.60 0.53 0.91 0.52 1.00 
                       
  
Gasiorowski 1996 0.67 0.75 0.73 0.56 0.71 0.50 1.00 
                      
  
Gates et al. 2006 0.85 0.83 0.81 0.68 0.78 0.62 0.63 1.00 
                     
  
Geddes et al. 2014 0.89 0.92 0.76 0.65 0.76 0.60 0.77 0.86 1.00 
                    
  
Magaloni et al. 2013 0.91 0.92 0.77 0.64 0.76 0.59 0.77 0.86 0.94 1.00 
                   
  
Polity IV (AN=AUT) 0.84 0.79 0.78 0.65 0.78 0.60 0.58 0.85 0.85 0.86 1.00 
                  
  
Polity IV (AN=DEM) 0.51 0.66 0.51 0.64 0.51 0.61 0.39 0.55 0.65 0.63 0.48 1.00 
                 
  
Polity IV (threshold 7) 0.82 0.76 0.78 0.58 0.78 0.54 0.54 0.82 0.81 0.82 0.93 0.45 1.00 
                
  
Polity IV (threshold 1) 0.76 0.82 0.68 0.71 0.68 0.66 0.60 0.85 0.84 0.83 0.76 0.63 0.71 1.00 
               
  
Polity IV (exrec & parcomp) 0.79 0.82 0.70 0.71 0.70 0.66 0.64 0.83 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.58 0.78 0.86 1.00 
              
  
Przeworski et al. 2000 0.92 0.96 0.80 0.65 0.78 0.59 0.75 0.84 0.92 0.92 0.80 0.67 0.76 0.83 0.82 1.00 
             
  
Reich 2002 0.75 0.82 0.73 0.70 0.72 0.64 0.99 0.73 0.84 0.83 0.70 0.52 0.66 0.70 0.71 0.83 1.00 
            
  
Skaaning et al. 2015 0.89 0.88 0.76 0.69 0.76 0.64 0.68 0.85 0.89 0.90 0.83 0.54 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.89 0.78 1.00 
           
  
Svolik 2012 0.91 0.92 0.78 0.68 0.77 0.62 0.77 0.87 0.93 0.93 0.84 0.68 0.79 0.86 0.85 0.94 0.85 0.91 1.00 
          
  
Ulfelder 2012 0.87 0.84 0.77 0.66 0.76 0.61 0.83 0.89 0.87 0.86 0.84 0.68 0.78 0.85 0.85 0.87 0.86 0.89 0.90 1.00 
         
  
Wahman et al. 2013 0.87 0.81 0.89 0.62 0.89 0.58 0.77 0.86 0.85 0.86 0.91 0.60 0.88 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.78 0.87 0.85 0.84 1.00 
        
  
Freedom House FIW 0.87 0.84 0.87 0.83 0.86 0.78 0.78 0.87 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.69 0.81 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.87 0.86 0.85 0.88 1.00                 
Freedom House PR  0.86 0.83 0.86 0.81 0.86 0.79 0.77 0.86 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.70 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.88 0.98 1.00 
      
  
Polity IV polity 2 score 0.82 0.84 0.76 0.73 0.75 0.69 0.64 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.85 0.78 0.81 0.91 0.87 0.85 0.75 0.83 0.88 0.87 0.85 0.89 0.89 1.00 
     
  
V-Dem: Electoral D. (ordinal) 0.83 0.82 0.80 0.69 0.80 0.65 0.72 0.81 0.84 0.83 0.82 0.62 0.80 0.76 0.78 0.83 0.80 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.89 0.90 0.85 1.00 
    
  
V-Dem: Liberal D. (ordinal) 0.82 0.80 0.83 0.63 0.83 0.59 0.73 0.78 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.55 0.82 0.72 0.75 0.81 0.78 0.81 0.82 0.80 0.84 0.87 0.89 0.82 0.94 1.00 
   
  
V-Dem: Participatory D. (ordinal) 0.81 0.78 0.80 0.62 0.80 0.58 0.64 0.75 0.80 0.80 0.79 0.53 0.79 0.69 0.73 0.78 0.74 0.78 0.79 0.77 0.82 0.85 0.86 0.79 0.93 0.94 1.00 
  
  
V-Dem: Deliberative D. (ordinal) 0.80 0.78 0.81 0.62 0.82 0.58 0.65 0.75 0.80 0.81 0.81 0.53 0.80 0.70 0.74 0.79 0.74 0.78 0.80 0.78 0.83 0.86 0.87 0.80 0.93 0.95 0.95 1.00 
 
  
V-Dem: Egalitarian D. (ordinal) 0.75 0.73 0.78 0.58 0.79 0.54 0.59 0.71 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.48 0.77 0.65 0.68 0.73 0.70 0.73 0.75 0.72 0.78 0.82 0.84 0.75 0.91 0.94 0.93 0.94 1.00   
Wahman et al. 2013 ifhpol 0.88 0.85 0.84 0.79 0.84 0.76 0.84 0.92 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.80 0.84 0.91 0.90 0.86 0.88 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.92 0.88 0.86 0.87 0.83 1.00 





Table A4: Pairwise correlation between measures of Breakdown 





































































































Bernhard et al. 2005 1.00 
         
  
Boix et al. 2013 0.56 1.00 
        
  
Cheibub et al. 2010 0.53 0.77 1.00 
       
  
Freedom House (FIW: free) 0.24 0.23 0.21 1.00 
      
  
Geddes et al. 2014 0.64 0.54 0.64 0.12 1.00 
     
  
Magaloni et al. 2013 0.57 0.59 0.66 0.24 0.58 1.00 
    
  
Polity IV (AN=AUT) 0.57 0.40 0.33 0.19 0.39 0.54 1.00 
   
  
Reich 2002 0.82 0.43 0.59 0.24 0.57 0.54 0.37 1.00 
  
  
Svolik 2012 0.82 0.43 0.59 0.24 0.57 0.54 0.37 0.55 1.00 
 
  
Ulfelder 2012 0.60 0.55 0.58 0.17 0.60 0.52 0.44 0.63 0.60 1.00   
Wahman et al. 2013 0.28 0.22 0.20 0.29 0.14 0.26 0.32 0.17 0.24 0.16 1.00 
average 0.56 0.47 0.51 0.22 0.48 0.50 0.39 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.23 
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Bernhard et al. 2005 1.00 
                         
  
Boix et al. 2013 0.56 1.00 
                        
  
Cheibub et al. 2010 0.53 0.77 1.00 
                       
  
Freedom House (FIW: free) 0.24 0.23 0.21 1.00 
                      
  
Freedom House (FIW: partly free) 0.33 0.18 0.22 0.06 1.00 
                     
  
Freedom House (PR: free) 0.19 0.26 0.24 0.66 0.07 1.00 
                    
  
Freedom House (PR: partly free) 0.42 0.24 0.30 0.11 0.56 0.11 1.00 
                   
  
Freedom House (FIW: hybrid) 0.21 0.34 0.28 0.31 0.23 0.30 0.22 1.00 
                  
  
Freedom House (PR: hybrid) 0.33 0.39 0.35 0.39 0.19 0.40 0.30 0.73 1.00 
                 
  
Gasiorowski 1996 0.92 0.45 0.58 0.33 0.15 0.31 0.34 0.22 0.42 1.00 
                
  
Gasiorowski 1996 (hybrid) 0.82 0.35 0.38 0.37 0.09 0.28 0.17 0.35 0.40 0.66 1.00 
               
  
Gates 2006 0.59 0.54 0.52 0.22 0.20 0.27 0.32 0.32 0.49 0.48 0.34 1.00 
              
  
Geddes et al. 2014 0.64 0.54 0.64 0.12 0.24 0.13 0.29 0.24 0.31 0.56 0.43 0.51 1.00 
             
  
Magaloni et al. 2013 0.57 0.59 0.66 0.24 0.22 0.27 0.29 0.44 0.44 0.53 0.43 0.58 0.58 1.00 
            
  
Polity IV (AN=AUT) 0.57 0.40 0.33 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.25 0.29 0.35 0.40 0.29 0.50 0.39 0.54 1.00 
           
  
Polity IV (AN=DEM) 0.54 0.30 0.36 0.10 0.23 0.11 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.21 0.42 0.34 0.32 0.23 1.00 
          
  
Polity IV (threshold: 7) 0.46 0.35 0.25 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.38 0.25 0.43 0.33 0.49 0.75 0.18 1.00 
         
  
Polity IV (threshold: 1) 0.63 0.43 0.51 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.35 0.36 0.43 0.47 0.37 0.66 0.53 0.57 0.46 0.38 0.41 1.00 
        
  
Polity IV (exrec & parcomp) 0.61 0.46 0.50 0.22 0.25 0.22 0.38 0.38 0.49 0.47 0.33 0.60 0.51 0.63 0.57 0.48 0.49 0.82 1.00 
       
  
Polity IV (hybrid: 6 & -6) 0.44 0.43 0.44 0.14 0.23 0.17 0.25 0.44 0.42 0.37 0.23 0.51 0.41 0.51 0.57 0.40 0.45 0.43 0.51 1.00 
      
  
Polity IV (hybrid: 8 & 1) 0.44 0.31 0.22 0.16 0.08 0.14 0.16 0.12 0.18 0.33 0.25 0.41 0.26 0.39 0.55 0.16 0.62 0.42 0.47 0.40 1.00 
     
  
Przeworski et al. 2000 0.50 0.80 0.96 0.22 0.20 0.26 0.26 0.31 0.33 0.55 0.36 0.52 0.64 0.65 0.30 0.35 0.24 0.46 0.45 0.42 0.18 1.00 
    
  
Reich 2002 0.82 0.43 0.59 0.24 0.15 0.22 0.33 0.20 0.38 1.00 0.66 0.47 0.57 0.54 0.37 0.33 0.33 0.45 0.46 0.41 0.31 0.57 1.00 
   
  
Reich 2002 (hybrid) 0.72 0.33 0.38 0.28 0.11 0.21 0.19 0.33 0.38 0.66 1.00 0.34 0.43 0.45 0.28 0.25 0.24 0.36 0.35 0.31 0.26 0.36 0.66 1.00 
  
  
Svolik 2012 0.52 0.63 0.71 0.25 0.23 0.26 0.34 0.32 0.45 0.54 0.40 0.56 0.60 0.66 0.38 0.34 0.34 0.53 0.55 0.38 0.29 0.69 0.55 0.43 1.00 
 
  
Ulfelder 2012 0.60 0.55 0.58 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.26 0.16 0.31 0.67 0.49 0.66 0.60 0.52 0.44 0.36 0.36 0.60 0.61 0.36 0.28 0.55 0.63 0.46 0.60 1.00   
Wahman et al. 2013 0.28 0.22 0.20 0.29 0.07 0.35 0.12 0.26 0.36 0.28 0.27 0.23 0.14 0.26 0.32 0.11 0.28 0.24 0.23 0.19 0.21 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.24 0.16 1.00 
average 0.52 0.43 0.45 0.24 0.19 0.24 0.27 0.30 0.37 0.48 0.39 0.45 0.42 0.48 0.39 0.29 0.34 0.45 0.46 0.38 0.29 0.44 0.46 0.38 0.47 0.43 0.23 
48  
Table A5: Pairwise correlation between measures of Backsliding 






















































Freedom House (FIW: free) 1.00 
   
  
Polity IV 0.27 1.00 
  
  
Skaaning et al. 2015 0.22 0.31 1.00 
 
  
V-Dem: Electoral Democracy 0.19 0.28 0.29 1.00   
Wahman et al. 2013 0.87 0.46 0.23 0.18 1.00 
average 0.39 0.33 0.26 0.23 0.43 
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Freedom House (FIW: free) 1.00         
Polity IV 0.27 1.00 
  
  
Skaaning et al. 2015 0.22 0.31 1.00 
 
  
V-Dem: Electoral Democracy (ordinal) 0.12 0.23 0.26 1.00   
Wahman et al. 2013 0.87 0.46 0.23 0.12 1.00 
































































































































































































































































Freedom House (FIW, any change) 1.00 
                
  
Freedom House (PR, any change) 0.73 1.00 
               
  
Freedom House (FIW, 1+ points) 0.47 0.57 1.00 
              
  
Freedom House (PR, 1+ points) 0.71 0.98 0.58 1.00 
             
  
Gasiorowski (hybrid) 0.15 0.20 0.22 0.16 1.00 
            
  
Gates et al. 2006 (any change) 0.25 0.31 0.32 0.30 0.25 1.00 
           
  
Polity IV (any change) 0.27 0.30 0.35 0.30 0.22 0.53 1.00 
          
  
Polity IV (3+ points) 0.27 0.32 0.37 0.32 0.27 0.56 0.72 1.00 
         
  
Polity IV (5+ points) 0.24 0.29 0.36 0.30 0.30 0.52 0.55 0.76 1.00 
        
  
Reich 2002 (hybrid) 0.14 0.19 0.20 0.16 0.99 0.23 0.21 0.26 0.29 1.00 
       
  
Skaaning et al. 2015 0.22 0.30 0.33 0.30 0.25 0.40 0.31 0.35 0.35 0.24 1.00 
      
  
V-Dem: Electoral Democracy 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.16 0.24 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.16 0.29 1.00 
     
  
V-Dem: Liberal Democracy 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.26 0.28 0.31 0.30 0.17 0.24 0.68 1.00 
    
  
V-Dem: Participatory Democracy 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.21 0.25 0.27 0.31 0.29 0.19 0.25 0.61 0.66 1.00 
   
  
V-Dem: Deliberative Democracy 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.17 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.15 0.25 0.65 0.66 0.59 1.00 
  
  
V-Dem: Egalitarian Democracy 0.17 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.25 0.25 0.29 0.29 0.17 0.25 0.70 0.76 0.67 0.69 1.00 
 
  
Wahman et al. 2013 (any change) 0.87 0.65 0.44 0.65 0.17 0.27 0.46 0.31 0.27 0.16 0.23 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.17 1.00   
Wahman et al. 2013 (1.5+ points) 0.30 0.37 0.50 0.38 0.34 0.50 0.57 0.79 0.81 0.29 0.43 0.31 0.32 0.30 0.27 0.33 0.33 1.00 
average 0.32 0.36 0.34 0.36 0.26 0.33 0.36 0.40 0.38 0.25 0.29 0.33 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.34 0.33 0.42 
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Freedom House (FIW, any change) 1.00                                   
Freedom House (PR, any change) 0.73 1.00 
               
  
Freedom House (FIW, 1+ points) 0.47 0.57 1.00 
              
  
Freedom House (PR, 1+ points) 0.71 0.98 0.58 1.00 
             
  
Gasiorowski (hybrid) 0.15 0.20 0.22 0.16 1.00 
            
  
Gates et al. 2006 (any change) 0.25 0.31 0.32 0.30 0.25 1.00 
           
  
Polity IV (any change) 0.27 0.30 0.35 0.30 0.22 0.53 1.00 
          
  
Polity IV (3+ points) 0.27 0.32 0.37 0.32 0.27 0.56 0.72 1.00 
         
  
Polity IV (5+ points) 0.24 0.29 0.36 0.30 0.30 0.52 0.55 0.76 1.00 
        
  
Reich 2002 (hybrid) 0.14 0.19 0.20 0.16 0.99 0.23 0.21 0.26 0.29 1.00 
       
  
Skaaning et al. 2015 0.22 0.30 0.33 0.30 0.25 0.40 0.31 0.35 0.35 0.24 1.00 
      
  
V-Dem: Electoral D. (ordinal) 0.12 0.16 0.20 0.16 0.14 0.21 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.14 0.26 1.00 
     
  
V-Dem: Liberal D. (ordinal) 0.12 0.15 0.19 0.15 0.21 0.27 0.24 0.30 0.33 0.19 0.25 0.38 1.00 
    
  
V-Dem: Participatory D. (ordinal) 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.11 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.15 0.17 0.29 0.41 1.00 
   
  
V-Dem: Deliberative D. (ordinal) 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.24 0.12 0.18 0.34 0.38 0.36 1.00 
  
  
V-Dem: Egalitarian D. (ordinal) 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.13 0.15 0.27 0.33 0.28 0.29 1.00 
 
  
Wahman et al. 2013 (any change) 0.87 0.65 0.44 0.65 0.17 0.27 0.46 0.31 0.27 0.16 0.23 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.10 1.00   
Wahman et al. 2013 (1.5+ points) 0.30 0.37 0.50 0.38 0.34 0.50 0.57 0.79 0.81 0.29 0.43 0.25 0.33 0.28 0.27 0.16 0.33 1.00 




Table A6: Pairwise correlation between measures of Transition 



























































































Boix et al. 2013 1.00 
        
  
Cheibub et al. 2010 0.66 1.00 
       
  
Freedom House (FIW: free) 0.33 0.24 1.00 
      
  
Geddes et al. 2014 0.47 0.60 0.28 1.00 
     
  
Magaloni et al. 2013 0.60 0.63 0.32 0.59 1.00 
    
  
Polity IV (AN=AUT) 0.37 0.33 0.25 0.40 0.54 1.00 
   
  
Reich 2002 0.34 0.41 0.26 0.42 0.43 0.29 1.00 
  
  
Svolik 2012 0.62 0.70 0.33 0.65 0.67 0.46 0.49 1.00 
 
  
Ulfelder 2012 0.63 0.63 0.31 0.63 0.57 0.42 0.51 0.70 1.00   
Wahman et al. 2013 0.38 0.28 0.42 0.34 0.44 0.55 0.34 0.42 0.40 1.00 
average 0.49 0.50 0.31 0.49 0.53 0.40 0.39 0.56 0.53 0.40 
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Boix et al. 2013 1.00 
                        
  
Cheibub et al. 2010 0.66 1.00 
                       
  
Freedom House (FIW: free) 0.33 0.24 1.00 
                      
  
Freedom House (FIW: partly free) 0.10 0.14 0.01 1.00 
                     
  
Freedom House (PR: free) 0.31 0.22 0.74 0.01 1.00 
                    
  
Freedom House (PR: partly free) 0.20 0.26 0.04 0.53 0.04 1.00 
                   
  
Freedom House (FIW: hybrid) 0.20 0.13 0.18 0.14 0.17 0.13 1.00 
                  
  
Freedom House (PR: hybrid) 0.26 0.21 0.28 0.09 0.26 0.20 0.65 1.00 
                 
  
Gasiorowski 1996 0.36 0.43 0.30 0.08 0.25 0.21 .  0.29 1.00 
                
  
Gasiorowski 1996 (hybrid) 0.33 0.33 0.39 -0.02 0.33 0.13 .  0.31 0.65 1.00 
               
  
Gates 2006 0.41 0.42 0.21 0.11 0.21 0.25 0.20 0.29 0.35 0.30 1.00 
              
  
Geddes et al. 2014 0.47 0.60 0.28 0.15 0.27 0.25 0.13 0.26 0.46 0.42 0.50 1.00 
             
  
Magaloni et al. 2013 0.60 0.63 0.32 0.06 0.31 0.15 0.13 0.22 0.47 0.42 0.57 0.59 1.00 
            
  
Polity IV (AN=AUT) 0.37 0.33 0.25 0.07 0.24 0.14 0.12 0.24 0.32 0.32 0.50 0.40 0.54 1.00 
           
  
Polity IV (AN=DEM) 0.12 0.16 0.05 0.25 0.04 0.20 0.16 0.18 0.13 0.07 0.26 0.17 0.13 0.11 1.00 
          
  
Polity IV (threshold: 7) 0.31 0.24 0.22 0.05 0.20 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.21 0.18 0.40 0.31 0.35 0.66 0.08 1.00 
         
  
Polity IV (threshold: 1) 0.29 0.38 0.14 0.17 0.13 0.30 0.17 0.26 0.33 0.30 0.53 0.46 0.39 0.34 0.27 0.27 1.00 
        
  
Polity IV (exrec & parcomp) 0.33 0.38 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.28 0.17 0.24 0.30 0.25 0.54 0.53 0.56 0.53 0.33 0.40 0.77 1.00 
       
  
Polity IV (hybrid: 6 & -6) 0.19 0.18 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.21 0.31 0.40 0.18 0.16 0.40 0.31 0.28 0.37 0.31 0.29 0.31 0.38 1.00 
      
  
Polity IV (hybrid: 8 & 1) 0.26 0.24 0.11 0.06 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.10 0.21 0.23 0.41 0.31 0.36 0.43 0.12 0.47 0.36 0.43 0.38 1.00 
     
  
Przeworski et al. 2000 0.73 0.85 0.34 0.10 0.33 0.24 0.20 0.31 0.47 0.41 0.53 0.63 0.70 0.41 0.19 0.31 0.43 0.48 0.34 0.32 1.00 
    
  
Reich 2002 0.34 0.41 0.26 0.16 0.23 0.27 0.20 0.30 0.93 0.60 0.31 0.42 0.43 0.29 0.15 0.20 0.31 0.26 0.25 0.21 0.45 1.00 
   
  
Reich 2002 (hybrid) 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.07 0.33 0.22 0.30 0.39 0.61 0.90 0.27 0.38 0.43 0.28 0.12 0.17 0.30 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.42 0.63 1.00 
  
  
Svolik 2012 0.62 0.70 0.33 0.12 0.34 0.26 0.20 0.30 0.49 0.46 0.51 0.65 0.67 0.46 0.20 0.30 0.42 0.48 0.35 0.33 0.75 0.49 0.49 1.00 
 
  
Ulfelder 2012 0.63 0.63 0.31 0.15 0.29 0.28 0.18 0.27 0.56 0.50 0.57 0.63 0.57 0.42 0.20 0.30 0.48 0.51 0.30 0.33 0.69 0.51 0.48 0.70 1.00   
Wahman et al. 2013 0.38 0.28 0.42 0.02 0.38 0.08 0.11 0.23 0.42 0.49 0.46 0.34 0.44 0.55 0.09 0.53 0.26 0.37 0.28 0.35 0.43 0.34 0.42 0.42 0.40 1.00 
average 0.37 0.38 0.26 0.12 0.24 0.20 0.19 0.27 0.38 0.35 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.35 0.16 0.27 0.34 0.37 0.27 0.27 0.44 0.36 0.36 0.44 0.44 0.34 
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Table A7: Pairwise correlation between measures of Liberalization 





















































Freedom House (FIW: free) 1.00         
Polity IV 0.33 1.00 
  
  
Skaaning et al. 2015 0.30 0.28 1.00 
 
  
V-Dem: Electoral Democracy 0.33 0.30 0.40 1.00   
Wahman et al. 2013 0.86 0.57 0.31 0.33 1.00 


























































Freedom House (FIW: free) 1.00         
Polity IV 0.33 1.00 
  
  
Skaaning et al. 2015 0.30 0.28 1.00 
 
  
V-Dem: Electoral Democracy (ordinal) 0.27 0.24 0.30 1.00   
Wahman et al. 2013 0.86 0.57 0.31 0.27 1.00 





























































































































































































































































Freedom House (FIW, any change) 1.00 
                
  
Freedom House (PR, any change) 0.74 1.00 
               
  
Freedom House (FIW, 1+ points) 0.49 0.60 1.00 
              
  
Freedom House (PR, 1+ points) 0.73 0.98 0.61 1.00 
             
  
Gasiorowski (hybrid) 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.14 1.00 
            
  
Gates et al. 2006 (any change) 0.24 0.27 0.31 0.27 0.13 1.00 
           
  
Polity IV (any change) 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.15 0.46 1.00 
          
  
Polity IV (3+ points) 0.30 0.33 0.40 0.33 0.15 0.50 0.66 1.00 
         
  
Polity IV (5+ points) 0.26 0.28 0.37 0.28 0.14 0.43 0.51 0.77 1.00 
        
  
Reich 2002 (hybrid) 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.90 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.15 1.00 
       
  
Skaaning et al. 2015 0.30 0.36 0.39 0.37 0.18 0.31 0.28 0.29 0.24 0.18 1.00 
      
  
V-Dem: Electoral Democracy 0.33 0.36 0.38 0.36 0.16 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.27 0.16 0.40 1.00 
     
  
V-Dem: Liberal Democracy 0.31 0.32 0.38 0.33 0.20 0.24 0.28 0.30 0.27 0.18 0.32 0.71 1.00 
    
  
V-Dem: Participatory Democracy 0.31 0.32 0.37 0.32 0.16 0.24 0.29 0.31 0.28 0.16 0.29 0.67 0.71 1.00 
   
  
V-Dem: Deliberative Democracy 0.27 0.28 0.31 0.28 0.17 0.21 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.17 0.29 0.66 0.71 0.65 1.00 
  
  
V-Dem: Egalitarian Democracy 0.28 0.30 0.34 0.30 0.17 0.23 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.16 0.29 0.70 0.77 0.69 0.68 1.00 
 
  
Wahman et al. 2013 (any change) 0.86 0.63 0.44 0.64 0.18 0.32 0.57 0.40 0.33 0.17 0.31 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.29 0.30 1.00   
Wahman et al. 2013 (1.5+ points) 0.36 0.41 0.59 0.42 0.18 0.50 0.54 0.77 0.80 0.17 0.39 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.34 0.37 0.38 1.00 





























































































































































































































































Freedom House (FIW, any change) 1.00                                   
Freedom House (PR, any change) 0.74 1.00 
               
  
Freedom House (FIW, 1+ points) 0.49 0.60 1.00 
              
  
Freedom House (PR, 1+ points) 0.73 0.98 0.61 1.00 
             
  
Gasiorowski (hybrid) 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.14 1.00 
            
  
Gates et al. 2006 (any change) 0.24 0.27 0.31 0.27 0.13 1.00 
           
  
Polity IV (any change) 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.15 0.46 1.00 
          
  
Polity IV (3+ points) 0.30 0.33 0.40 0.33 0.15 0.50 0.66 1.00 
         
  
Polity IV (5+ points) 0.26 0.28 0.37 0.28 0.14 0.43 0.51 0.77 1.00 
        
  
Reich 2002 (hybrid) 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.90 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.15 1.00 
       
  
Skaaning et al. 2015 0.30 0.36 0.39 0.37 0.18 0.31 0.28 0.29 0.24 0.18 1.00 
      
  
V-Dem: Electoral D. (ordinal) 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.29 0.15 0.21 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.16 0.30 1.00 
     
  
V-Dem: Liberal D. (ordinal) 0.24 0.25 0.30 0.25 0.17 0.15 0.19 0.22 0.22 0.12 0.22 0.40 1.00 
    
  
V-Dem: Participatory D. (ordinal) 0.21 0.23 0.27 0.24 0.06 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.11 0.20 0.38 0.43 1.00 
   
  
V-Dem: Deliberative D. (ordinal) 0.19 0.23 0.27 0.23 0.16 0.13 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.22 0.40 0.39 0.42 1.00 
  
  
V-Dem: Egalitarian D. (ordinal) 0.21 0.23 0.26 0.23 0.08 0.13 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.09 0.22 0.37 0.39 0.38 0.37 1.00 
 
  
Wahman et al. 2013 (any change) 0.86 0.63 0.44 0.64 0.18 0.32 0.57 0.40 0.33 0.17 0.31 0.27 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.19 1.00   
Wahman et al. 2013 (1.5+ points) 0.36 0.41 0.59 0.42 0.18 0.50 0.54 0.77 0.80 0.17 0.39 0.34 0.33 0.30 0.28 0.29 0.38 1.00 




Table A8: Agreement around focal points 
b) core indicators—V-Dem ordinal 
  Mean No coups Coups 
No 
Elections  Elections 
Breakdown 28.28% 17.53% 50.47% 29.05% 25.68% 
Backsliding 42.96% 40.12% 56.68% 42.43% 42.38% 
Backsliding & Breakdown 18.50% 15.36% 34.06% 17.71% 19.29% 
Transition 29.87% 29.32% 35.53% 17.94% 35.01% 
Liberalization 48.86% 48.67% 51.67% 42.16% 53.45% 
Liberalization & Transition 21.73% 21.53% 24.49% 16.51% 27.27% 
 
c) extended set of indicators—V-Dem continuous 
  Mean No coups Coups 
No 
Elections  Elections 
Breakdown 15.03% 9.17% 33.36% 14.64% 15.27% 
Backsliding 23.91% 20.79% 40.88% 23.75% 22.59% 
Backsliding & Breakdown 12.70% 9.97% 27.62% 12.42% 12.68% 
Transition 14.65% 14.37% 17.38% 8.75% 18.92% 
Liberalization 28.65% 28.55% 30.32% 22.62% 33.15% 
Liberalization & Transition 15.25% 15.08% 17.84% 11.58% 19.21% 
 
d) extended set of indicators—V-Dem ordinal  
  Mean No coups Coups 
No 
Elections  Elections 
Breakdown 15.03% 9.17% 33.36% 14.64% 15.27% 
Backsliding 21.06% 18.40% 36.07% 20.67% 20.21% 
Backsliding & Breakdown 11.55% 9.01% 26.17% 11.18% 11.71% 
Transition 14.65% 14.37% 17.38% 8.75% 18.92% 
Liberalization 23.37% 23.25% 25.20% 18.45% 27.51% 






Table A9: Agreement between regime change indicators, one-year period 
b) core indicators—V-Dem ordinal 
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6) 
  Breakdown Backsliding 
Breakdown & 
Backsliding Transition Liberalization 
Transition & 
Liberalization 
Successful coup in t 0.276*** 0.177*** 0.190*** -0.013 0.037 0.022    
  (0.06) (0.02) (0.03)    (0.10) (0.03) (0.02)    
Election in t 0.006 0.009 0.015    0.141*** 0.140*** 0.131*** 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)    (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)    
Population, ln (Ø t-3 to t-1) -3.818 0.561 -1.320    -7.547 1.223 -0.686    
  (4.32) (2.27) (1.11)    (4.77) (1.27) (0.73)    
GDP p.c., ln (Ø t-3 to t-1) -4.117 0.578 -1.354    -7.384 1.182 -0.698    
  (4.31) (2.28) (1.12)    (4.69) (1.29) (0.75)    
GDP, ln (Ø t-3 to t-1) 4.086 -0.544 1.364    7.455 -1.271 0.656    
  (4.32) (2.28) (1.11)    (4.75) (1.29) (0.75)    
Trade (Ø t-3 to t-1) -0.001 0.000 -0.000    -0.000 -0.001 -0.000    
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Aid p.c., ln (Ø t-3 to t-1) 0.000 0.008 0.006    0.019 -0.016 -0.011    
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)    (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)    
Member of GATT/WTO, t-1 -0.021 0.021 0.007    0.065 -0.001 0.011    
  (0.07) (0.02) (0.02)    (0.05) (0.03) (0.02)    
# measures available, ln 0.393 
 
0.685*** 0.431 -0.950 -0.267    
  (0.47) 
 
(0.23)    (0.74) (0.82) (0.20)    
N 223 810 833    276 1011 1024    
Adj. R2 0.456 0.182 0.229    0.163 0.133 0.148    
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All models include country- and time-fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by country. 
 
c) extended set of indicators—V-Dem continuous 
  (1') (2') (3')    (4') (5') (6') 
  Breakdown Backsliding 
Breakdown & 
Backsliding Transition Liberalization 
Transition & 
Liberalization 
Successful coup in t 0.194*** 0.217*** 0.185*** -0.008 0.013 0.018    
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)    (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)    
Election in t 0.002 0.017 0.021*   0.110*** 0.155*** 0.111*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)    (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)    
Population, ln (Ø t-3 to t-1) 0.029 2.210 0.423    -0.333 -0.892 -0.816    
  (4.01) (3.22) (1.63)    (0.77) (1.22) (0.79)    
GDP p.c., ln (Ø t-3 to t-1) -0.191 2.156 0.366    -0.331 -0.903 -0.844    
  (4.01) (3.23) (1.63)    (0.84) (1.23) (0.80)    
GDP, ln (Ø t-3 to t-1) 0.207 -2.134 -0.362    0.325 0.826 0.793    
  (4.01) (3.23) (1.63)    (0.86) (1.23) (0.80)    
Trade (Ø t-3 to t-1) -0.001 -0.000 -0.000    -0.000 -0.000 -0.000    
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Aid p.c., ln (Ø t-3 to t-1) 0.016 0.010 0.007    -0.002 -0.020** -0.013**  
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
Member of GATT/WTO, t-1 -0.041 0.018 0.006    0.034 0.013 0.012    
  (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)    (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)    
# measures available, ln 0.920** -0.558*** -0.027    -0.127 -1.317*** -0.534*** 
  (0.37) (0.20) (0.18)    (0.19) (0.30) (0.15)    
N 381 940 969    491 1215 1233    
Adj. R2 0.333 0.168 0.201   0.121 0.190 0.170    
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All models include country- and time-fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by country. 
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d) extended set of indicators—V-Dem ordinal 
  (1') (2') (3')    (4') (5') (6') 
  Breakdown Backsliding 
Breakdown & 
Backsliding Transition Liberalization 
Transition & 
Liberalization 
Successful coup in t 0.194*** 0.197*** 0.178*** -0.008 -0.003 0.007    
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)    (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)    
Election in t 0.002 0.016 0.018    0.110*** 0.135*** 0.102*** 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)    (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)    
Population, ln (Ø t-3 to t-1) 0.029 0.763 -0.011    -0.333 -0.197 -0.564    
  (4.01) (2.51) (1.54)    (0.77) (1.30) (0.98)    
GDP p.c., ln (Ø t-3 to t-1) -0.191 0.748 -0.053    -0.331 -0.250 -0.603    
  (4.01) (2.51) (1.54)    (0.84) (1.31) (0.99)    
GDP, ln (Ø t-3 to t-1) 0.207 -0.727 0.056    0.325 0.167 0.548    
  (4.01) (2.51) (1.54)    (0.86) (1.31) (0.99)    
Trade (Ø t-3 to t-1) -0.001 -0.000 -0.000    -0.000 0.000 -0.000    
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Aid p.c., ln (Ø t-3 to t-1) 0.016 0.002 0.003    -0.002 -0.025*** -0.018*** 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
Member of GATT/WTO, t-1 -0.041 0.016 0.004    0.034 0.017 0.014    
  (0.04) (0.02) (0.01)    (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)    
# measures available, ln 0.920** -0.516*** 0.005    -0.127 -1.256*** -0.529*** 
  (0.37) (0.14) (0.16)    (0.19) (0.26) (0.14)    
N 381 960 988    491 1232 1251    
Adj. R2 0.333 0.174 0.203    0.121 0.180 0.152    












Table A10: Agreement between regime change indicators, three-year period 
a) core indicators—V-Dem continuous 
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  Breakdown Backsliding 
Breakdown & 
Backsliding Transition Liberalization 
Transition & 
Liberalization 
Successful coup in t 0.096*** 0.155*** 0.132*** 0.082* 0.041* 0.063*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)    
Election in t 0.006 0.008 0.004    0.036** 0.071*** 0.056*** 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
Population, ln (Ø t-3 to t-1) 0.315 0.567 -2.748**  -5.544* -1.376 -2.126**  
  (2.15) (1.17) (1.10)    (2.81) (1.36) (0.97)    
GDP p.c., ln (Ø t-3 to t-1) 0.009 0.426 -2.941*** -5.374* -1.497 -2.207**  
  (2.17) (1.19) (1.11)    (2.87) (1.38) (0.98)    
GDP, ln (Ø t-3 to t-1) -0.109 -0.421 2.925*** 5.373* 1.406 2.137**  
  (2.17) (1.18) (1.11)    (2.86) (1.38) (0.98)    
Trade (Ø t-3 to t-1) -0.001 0.000 -0.000    -0.001 -0.001 -0.000    
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Aid p.c., ln (Ø t-3 to t-1) -0.012 -0.007 -0.002    -0.008 -0.006 -0.010    
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)    (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)    
Member of GATT/WTO, t-1 -0.036 0.005 0.010    -0.012 -0.040 -0.007    
  (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)    (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)    
# measures available, ln 0.031 -0.983*** 0.742**  0.272 0.042 0.019    
  (0.38) (0.24) (0.32)    (0.59) (0.58) (0.28)    
N 572 1782 1805    681 2072 2096    
Adj. R2 0.206 0.087 0.101    0.111 0.084 0.070    
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All models include country- and time-fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by country. 
 
b) core indicators—V-Dem ordinal 
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  Breakdown Backsliding 
Breakdown & 
Backsliding Transition Liberalization 
Transition & 
Liberalization 
Successful coup in t 0.096*** 0.171*** 0.143*** 0.082* 0.027 0.054*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)    
Election in t 0.006 -0.002 -0.000    0.036** 0.065*** 0.054*** 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
Population, ln (Ø t-3 to t-1) 0.315 0.968 -1.381    -5.544* -1.065 -2.052**  
  (2.15) (1.43) (1.01)    (2.81) (1.07) (0.90)    
GDP p.c., ln (Ø t-3 to t-1) 0.009 0.815 -1.586    -5.374* -1.211 -2.157**  
  (2.17) (1.45) (1.01)    (2.87) (1.10) (0.92)    
GDP, ln (Ø t-3 to t-1) -0.109 -0.807 1.570    5.373* 1.097 2.074**  
  (2.17) (1.44) (1.01)    (2.86) (1.10) (0.92)    
Trade (Ø t-3 to t-1) -0.001 0.000 -0.000    -0.001 -0.001* -0.000    
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Aid p.c., ln (Ø t-3 to t-1) -0.012 0.001 0.001    -0.008 -0.011 -0.011    
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)    (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)    
Member of GATT/WTO, t-1 -0.036 0.043* 0.027    -0.012 -0.005 0.008    
  (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)    (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)    
# measures available, ln 0.031 -0.886*** 0.697**  0.272 -0.054 0.020    
  (0.38) (0.25) (0.33)    (0.59) (0.70) (0.28)    
N 572 1831 1852    681 2111 2141    
Adj. R2 0.206 0.098 0.107    0.111 0.075 0.064    
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All models include country- and time-fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by country. 
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c) extended set of indicators—V-Dem continuous 
  (7') (8') (9') (10') (11') (12') 
  Breakdown Backsliding 
Breakdown & 
Backsliding Transition Liberalization 
Transition & 
Liberalization 
Successful coup in t 0.085*** 0.174*** 0.138*** 0.064** 0.043 0.009    
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    (0.03) (0.03) (0.01)    
Election in t -0.002 0.011 0.008    0.044*** 0.061*** 0.103*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
Population, ln (Ø t-3 to t-1) 1.302 1.014 -0.590    -1.612** -2.026 -0.552    
  (1.60) (1.36) (0.82)    (0.76) (1.28) (0.38)    
GDP p.c., ln (Ø t-3 to t-1) 0.989 0.875 -0.745    -1.577* -2.138* -0.593    
  (1.61) (1.38) (0.84)    (0.82) (1.29) (0.39)    
GDP, ln (Ø t-3 to t-1) -0.988 -0.875 0.731    1.520* 2.021 0.555    
  (1.61) (1.38) (0.84)    (0.81) (1.29) (0.39)    
Trade (Ø t-3 to t-1) -0.001 -0.000 -0.000    -0.000 0.000 -0.000    
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Aid p.c., ln (Ø t-3 to t-1) 0.002 -0.001 -0.001    -0.014 -0.020** -0.009**  
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)    
Member of GATT/WTO, t-1 -0.023 0.035 0.021    0.022 -0.002 0.004    
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)    (0.04) (0.03) (0.01)    
# measures available, ln 1.004*** -0.581* 0.030    -0.043 -0.252 0.006    
  (0.36) (0.31) (0.17)    (0.16) (0.37) (0.09)    
N 966 2032 2067    1145 2401 2423    
Adj. R2 0.162 0.077 0.083    0.084 0.070 0.158    
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All models include country- and time-fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by country. 
 
d) extended set of indicators—V-Dem ordinal 
  (7') (8') (9') (10') (11') (12') 
  Breakdown Backsliding 
Breakdown & 
Backsliding Transition Liberalization 
Transition & 
Liberalization 
Successful coup in t 0.085*** 0.157*** 0.131*** 0.064** 0.044* 0.008    
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)    
Election in t -0.002 0.007 0.006    0.044*** 0.063*** 0.096*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
Population, ln (Ø t-3 to t-1) 1.302 1.066 0.039    -1.612** -1.548 -0.423    
  (1.60) (1.46) (1.08)    (0.76) (1.24) (0.34)    
GDP p.c., ln (Ø t-3 to t-1) 0.989 0.922 -0.109    -1.577* -1.711 -0.461    
  (1.61) (1.47) (1.09)    (0.82) (1.25) (0.34)    
GDP, ln (Ø t-3 to t-1) -0.988 -0.925 0.092    1.520* 1.588 0.424    
  (1.61) (1.47) (1.09)    (0.81) (1.26) (0.34)    
Trade (Ø t-3 to t-1) -0.001 0.000 -0.000    -0.000 0.000 -0.000    
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Aid p.c., ln (Ø t-3 to t-1) 0.002 -0.009 -0.006    -0.014 -0.024*** -0.010*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)    
Member of GATT/WTO, t-1 -0.023 0.033 0.018    0.022 0.003 0.006    
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)    (0.04) (0.03) (0.01)    
# measures available, ln 1.004*** -0.506* 0.059    -0.043 -0.236 -0.020    
  (0.36) (0.27) (0.16)    (0.16) (0.34) (0.07)    
N 966 2100 2130    1145 2443 2467    
Adj. R2 0.162 0.066 0.075    0.084 0.073 0.158    
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All models include country- and time-fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by country. 
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Appendix III: Results of the Robustness Checks—Extended Set of Indicators 
a) Rupture 
  TRANSITION BREAKDOWN 
Indicator name scope Pevehouse 2002b Donno 2013 scope Andersen et al. 2014 Houle 2009 
    T2, M1 T2, M3 T1, M3 T1, M5   T1, M3 T1, M6 T4, M1 
Bernhard et al. 2001 AUT only NA NA NA NA DEM only       
Boix et al. 2013 AUT only         DEM only       
Cheibub et al. 2010 AUT only         DEM only       
Freedom House (FIW: free) AUT only         DEM only       
Freedom House (FIW: partly free) AUT only         DEM only       
Freedom House (PR: free) AUT only         DEM only       
Freedom House (PR: partly free) AUT only         DEM only       
Freedom House (FIW: hybrid) AUT only         DEM only       
Freedom House (PR: hybrid) AUT only         DEM only       
Gasiorowski 1996 AUT only         DEM only       
Gasiorowski 1996 (hybrid) AUT only         DEM only       
Gates 2006 AUT only         DEM only       
Geddes et al. 2014 AUT only         DEM only       
Magaloni et al. 2013 AUT only         DEM only       
Polity IV (AN=AUT) AUT only         DEM only       
Polity IV (AN=DEM) AUT only         DEM only       
Polity IV (threshold: 7) AUT only         DEM only       
Polity IV (threshold: 1) AUT only         DEM only       
Polity IV (exrec & parcomp) AUT only         DEM only       
Polity IV (hybrid: 6 & -6) AUT only         DEM only       
Polity IV (hybrid: 8 & 1) AUT only         DEM only       
Przeworski et al. 2000 AUT only         DEM only       
Reich 2002 AUT only         DEM only       
Reich 2002 (hybrid) AUT only         DEM only       
Svolik 2012 AUT only         DEM only       
Ulfelder 2012 AUT only         DEM only       
Wahman et al. 2013 AUT only         DEM only       
  % success 61.5% 46.2% 0.0% 0.0% % success 55.6% 18.5% 25.9% 





  LIBERALIZATION BACKSLIDING 
Coding DV scope 





Samuels 2010 scope  






et al. 2010 
    T3, M1 T3, M2 T1, M3 T3, MC T3, ME   T3, M3 T3, M4 T2 T1, M3 
Freedom House (FIW, any change) all           all         
Freedom House (PR, any change) all           all         
Freedom House (FIW, 1+ points) all           all         
Freedom House (PR, 1+ points) all           all         
Gasiorowski (hybrid) all           all         
Gates et al. 2006 (any change) all           all         
Polity IV (any change) all           all         
Polity IV (3+ points) all           all         
Polity IV (5+ points) all           all         
Reich 2002 (hybrid) all           all         
Skaaning et al. 2015 all           all         
Wahman et al. 2013 (any change) all           all         
Wahman et al. 2013 (1.5+ points) all           all         
Freedom House (FIW, any change) AUT only           AUT only         
Freedom House (PR, any change) AUT only           AUT only         
Freedom House (FIW, 1+ points) AUT only           AUT only         
Freedom House (PR, 1+ points) AUT only           AUT only         
Gasiorowski (hybrid) AUT only           AUT only         
Gates et al. 2006 (any change) AUT only           AUT only         
Polity IV (any change) AUT only           AUT only         
Polity IV (3+ points) AUT only           AUT only         
Polity IV (5+ points) AUT only           AUT only         
Reich 2002 (hybrid) AUT only           AUT only         
Skaaning et al. 2015 AUT only NA NA NA NA NA AUT only NA NA NA NA 
Wahman et al. 2013 (any change) AUT only           AUT only         
Wahman et al. 2013 (1.5+ points) AUT only           AUT only         
  % success 80% 72% 36% 0% 4% % success 36% 36% 56% 8% 
      
 
60% 16% 20%         40% 
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Appendix IV: Robustness Checks: Pevehouse 2002 
Boix et al. 2013 
 
Cheibub et al. 2010 
 
FH: free, FIW 
  Model 1 Model 3 
 
  Model 1 Model 3 
 
  Model 1 Model 3 
IOScoreit-1 0.058** 0.033    
 
IOScoreit-1 0.071*** 0.040    
 
IOScoreit-1 -0.019 -0.074    
  (0.03) (0.04)    
 
  (0.03) (0.04)    
 
  (0.04) (0.05)    
ΔIOScoreit-1 0.044 0.023    
 
ΔIOScoreit-1 0.032 -0.023    
 
ΔIOScoreit-1 0.172** -0.068    
  (0.06) (0.16)    
 
  (0.07) (0.20)    
 
  (0.08) (0.42)    
pcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
 
pcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
 
pcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
ΔpcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
 
ΔpcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
 
ΔpcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
Contagionit 0.023 0.025    
 
Contagionit 0.024 0.026    
 
Contagionit 0.049 0.049    
  (0.04) (0.04)    
 
  (0.04) (0.04)    
 
  (0.04) (0.04)    
PastDemit 1.579*** 1.705*** 
 
PastDemit 1.409*** 1.545*** 
 
PastDemit 1.815*** 1.832*** 
  (0.45) (0.44)    
 
  (0.45) (0.45)    
 
  (0.68) (0.68)    
RegConflictit -0.316* -0.328*   
 
RegConflictit -0.324* -0.332**  
 
RegConflictit -0.453 -0.454    
  (0.19) (0.18)    
 
  (0.17) (0.17)    
 
  (0.36) (0.35)    
IntViolenceit-1 2.109*** 2.109*** 
 
IntViolenceit-1 2.184*** 2.174*** 
 
IntViolenceit-1 2.248*** 2.103*** 
  (0.47) (0.47)    
 
  (0.51) (0.50)    
 
  (0.78) (0.68)    
MilRegit -2.214*** -2.293*** 
 
MilRegit -2.244*** -2.326*** 
 
MilRegit 0.000 0.000    
  (0.68) (0.71)    
 
  (0.76) (0.79)    
 
  (.) (.)    
Indepit 0.011** 0.012*** 
 
Indepit 0.011** 0.012*** 
 
Indepit 0.010* 0.012**  
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.01) (0.01)    
Constant -6.293*** -6.273*** 
 
Constant -6.365*** -6.326*** 
 
Constant -5.883*** -5.054*** 
  (0.61) (0.68)    
 
  (0.60) (0.70)    
 
  (0.81) (0.86)    
N 2554 2555    
 
N 2541 2542    
 
N 1120 1120    
Log Likelihood -196.384 -198.709    
 
Log Likelihood -200.496 -203.797    
 
Log Likelihood -91.830 -92.291    
Χ2 60.960 56.982    
 
Χ2 71.620 60.991    
 
Χ2 37.959 41.048    
Prob>Χ2 0.000 0.000    
 
Prob>Χ2 0.000 0.000    
 
Prob>Χ2 0.000 0.000    
Pseudo-R2 0.189 0.180    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.197 0.184    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.181 0.177    
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: 
including non-regional organizations and IFIs  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: 
including non-regional organizations and IFIs  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: 
including non-regional organizations and IFIs 




FH: partly free, FIW 
 
FH: free, PR 
 
FH: partly free, PR 
  Model 1 Model 3 
 
  Model 1 Model 3 
 
  Model 1 Model 3 
IOScoreit-1 0.066** 0.120*** 
 
IOScoreit-1 0.002 -0.054    
 
IOScoreit-1 0.086*** 0.146*** 
  (0.03) (0.05)    
 
  (0.04) (0.05)    
 
  (0.03) (0.04)    
ΔIOScoreit-1 -0.030 -0.044    
 
ΔIOScoreit-1 0.152* -0.106    
 
ΔIOScoreit-1 -0.027 -0.219    
  (0.06) (0.11)    
 
  (0.08) (0.42)    
 
  (0.06) (0.24)    
pcGDPit-1 0.000** 0.000**  
 
pcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
 
pcGDPit-1 0.000** 0.000**  
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
ΔpcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
 
ΔpcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
 
ΔpcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
Contagionit -0.010 -0.003    
 
Contagionit 0.033 0.037    
 
Contagionit -0.025 -0.016    
  (0.02) (0.02)    
 
  (0.05) (0.04)    
 
  (0.02) (0.02)    
PastDemit 0.778* 0.749    
 
PastDemit 1.680*** 1.707*** 
 
PastDemit 0.542 0.514    
  (0.47) (0.50)    
 
  (0.62) (0.62)    
 
  (0.49) (0.50)    
RegConflictit -0.167 -0.163    
 
RegConflictit -0.446 -0.445    
 
RegConflictit -0.148 -0.146    
  (0.20) (0.21)    
 
  (0.35) (0.34)    
 
  (0.20) (0.21)    
IntViolenceit-1 0.888*** 0.911*** 
 
IntViolenceit-1 2.165*** 2.047*** 
 
IntViolenceit-1 0.806*** 0.821*** 
  (0.30) (0.30)    
 
  (0.77) (0.70)    
 
  (0.25) (0.25)    
MilRegit -0.284 -0.259    
 
MilRegit 0.000 0.000    
 
MilRegit -0.462 -0.410    
  (0.36) (0.37)    
 
  (.) (.)    
 
  (0.33) (0.34)    
Indepit 0.001 0.000    
 
Indepit 0.010* 0.013**  
 
Indepit 0.000 0.001    
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.01) (0.01)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
Constant -3.468*** -4.419*** 
 
Constant -5.886*** -5.186*** 
 
Constant -3.552*** -4.685*** 
  (0.37) (0.59)    
 
  (0.79) (0.87)    
 
  (0.34) (0.53)    
N 867 867    
 
N 1121 1121    
 
N 998 998    
Log Likelihood -237.705 -235.826    
 
Log Likelihood -92.547 -93.089    
 
Log Likelihood -246.239 -244.027    
Χ2 28.047 32.269    
 
Χ2 34.300 37.633    
 
Χ2 33.894 38.791    
Prob>Χ2 0.002 0.000    
 
Prob>Χ2 0.000 0.000    
 
Prob>Χ2 0.000 0.000    
Pseudo-R2 0.069 0.076    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.175 0.170    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.066 0.075    
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: 
including non-regional organizations and IFIs  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: 
including non-regional organizations and IFIs  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: 
including non-regional organizations and IFIs 





FH: HYB, FIW 
 







  Model 1 Model 3 
 
  Model 1 Model 3 
    
IOScoreit-1 -0.221*** -0.272*** 
 
IOScoreit-1 0.054 0.108**  
    
  (0.07) (0.05)    
 
  (0.04) (0.05)    
    
ΔIOScoreit-1 0.341 -0.411    
 
ΔIOScoreit-1 0.009 -0.278    
    
  (0.23) (0.37)    
 
  (0.05) (0.28)    
    
pcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
 
pcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
    
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
    
ΔpcGDPit-1 0.000 0.001    
 
ΔpcGDPit-1 0.000 0.000    
    
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
    
Contagionit 0.157* 0.104    
 
Contagionit 0.218*** 0.223*** 
    
  (0.09) (0.10)    
 
  (0.07) (0.07)    
    
PastDemit 0.000 0.000    
 
PastDemit 1.227*** 1.279*** 
    
  (.) (.)    
 
  (0.38) (0.40)    
    
RegConflictit -0.942* -1.005*   
 
RegConflictit -0.247 -0.257    
    
  (0.55) (0.53)    
 
  (0.17) (0.17)    
    
IntViolenceit-1 0.000 0.000    
 
IntViolenceit-1 1.056*** 1.031*** 
    
  (.) (.)    
 
  (0.39) (0.39)    
    
MilRegit 0.000 0.000    
 
MilRegit -1.338*** -1.317*** 
    
  (.) (.)    
 
  (0.45) (0.46)    
    
Indepit 0.007 0.011    
 
Indepit 0.002 0.002    
    
  (0.01) (0.01)    
 
  (0.01) (0.00)    
    
Constant -3.423*** -1.706**  
 
Constant -5.351*** -6.255*** 
    
  (1.00) (0.72)    
 
  (0.46) (0.70)    
    
N 446 446    
 
N 1957 1958    
    
Log Likelihood -22.472 -21.022    
 
Log Likelihood -202.393 -200.460    
    
Χ2 55.149 87.105    
 
Χ2 63.143 55.670    
    
Prob>Χ2 0.000 0.000    
 
Prob>Χ2 0.000 0.000    
    
Pseudo-R2 0.181 0.234    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.116 0.125    
    
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: 
including non-regional organizations and IFIs  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: 
including non-regional organizations and IFIs 





Gasiorowski 1996: HYB 
 
Gates et al. 2006 
 
Geddes et al. 2014 
  Model 1 Model 3 
 
  Model 1 Model 3 
 
  Model 1 Model 3 
IOScoreit-1 -0.002 0.022    
 
IOScoreit-1 0.096*** 0.103**  
 
IOScoreit-1 0.078*** 0.069*   
  (0.06) (0.07)    
 
  (0.03) (0.05)    
 
  (0.03) (0.04)    
ΔIOScoreit-1 0.111** -0.473*   
 
ΔIOScoreit-1 0.038 0.014    
 
ΔIOScoreit-1 0.073 0.017    
  (0.05) (0.29)    
 
  (0.06) (0.09)    
 
  (0.05) (0.18)    
pcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
 
pcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
 
pcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
ΔpcGDPit-1 -0.000 0.000    
 
ΔpcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
 
ΔpcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
Contagionit 0.243*** 0.258*** 
 
Contagionit -0.025 -0.022    
 
Contagionit 0.040 0.043    
  (0.09) (0.10)    
 
  (0.05) (0.05)    
 
  (0.04) (0.04)    
PastDemit 2.460*** 2.534*** 
 
PastDemit 1.111*** 1.212*** 
 
PastDemit 1.641*** 1.762*** 
  (0.55) (0.51)    
 
  (0.41) (0.39)    
 
  (0.48) (0.48)    
RegConflictit -0.267 -0.240    
 
RegConflictit -0.187 -0.209    
 
RegConflictit -0.399** -0.399**  
  (0.28) (0.29)    
 
  (0.14) (0.14)    
 
  (0.19) (0.18)    
IntViolenceit-1 0.747 0.608    
 
IntViolenceit-1 1.804*** 1.832*** 
 
IntViolenceit-1 1.959*** 1.946*** 
  (0.59) (0.62)    
 
  (0.49) (0.48)    
 
  (0.50) (0.49)    
MilRegit -1.999*** -1.961*** 
 
MilRegit -1.565*** -1.605*** 
 
MilRegit -1.732*** -1.819*** 
  (0.55) (0.52)    
 
  (0.58) (0.58)    
 
  (0.61) (0.62)    
Indepit 0.004 0.004    
 
Indepit 0.009* 0.010**  
 
Indepit 0.007 0.009*   
  (0.01) (0.01)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.01) (0.00)    
Constant -6.150*** -6.440*** 
 
Constant -6.421*** -6.878*** 
 
Constant -6.478*** -6.696*** 
  (0.62) (0.89)    
 
  (0.54) (0.73)    
 
  (0.62) (0.78)    
N 2159 2160    
 
N 2435 2436    
 
N 2544 2544    
Log Likelihood -95.583 -94.582    
 
Log Likelihood -170.519 -173.305    
 
Log Likelihood -180.224 -183.228    
Χ2 49.489 50.160    
 
Χ2 69.625 48.448    
 
Χ2 64.090 40.547    
Prob>Χ2 0.000 0.000    
 
Prob>Χ2 0.000 0.000    
 
Prob>Χ2 0.000 0.000    
Pseudo-R2 0.158 0.167    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.164 0.151    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.174 0.160    
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: 
including non-regional organizations and IFIs  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: 
including non-regional organizations and IFIs  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: 
including non-regional organizations and IFIs 





Magaloni et al. 2013 
 
Polity IV: AN=AUT 
 
Polity IV: AN=DEM 
  Model 1 Model 3 
 
  Model 1 Model 3 
 
  Model 1 Model 3 
IOScoreit-1 0.098*** 0.100*** 
 
IOScoreit-1 0.089*** 0.102*** 
 
IOScoreit-1 0.093*** 0.133*** 
  (0.03) (0.04)    
 
  (0.03) (0.04)    
 
  (0.02) (0.04)    
ΔIOScoreit-1 0.011 -0.227    
 
ΔIOScoreit-1 0.093 -0.320    
 
ΔIOScoreit-1 -0.093 -0.117    
  (0.05) (0.27)    
 
  (0.06) (0.36)    
 
  (0.06) (0.12)    
pcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
 
pcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
 
pcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
ΔpcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
 
ΔpcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
 
ΔpcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
Contagionit 0.043 0.049    
 
Contagionit 0.058* 0.068**  
 
Contagionit 0.039 0.043    
  (0.04) (0.04)    
 
  (0.03) (0.03)    
 
  (0.03) (0.03)    
PastDemit 1.845*** 2.020*** 
 
PastDemit 1.821*** 1.937*** 
 
PastDemit 1.147** 1.175**  
  (0.40) (0.40)    
 
  (0.33) (0.33)    
 
  (0.48) (0.49)    
RegConflictit -0.431** -0.430**  
 
RegConflictit -0.476*** -0.475*** 
 
RegConflictit -0.521*** -0.524*** 
  (0.18) (0.17)    
 
  (0.17) (0.17)    
 
  (0.19) (0.18)    
IntViolenceit-1 2.025*** 1.992*** 
 
IntViolenceit-1 2.334*** 2.260*** 
 
IntViolenceit-1 1.093*** 1.108*** 
  (0.53) (0.51)    
 
  (0.60) (0.57)    
 
  (0.38) (0.38)    
MilRegit -2.383*** -2.474*** 
 
MilRegit -1.591*** -1.611*** 
 
MilRegit -0.090 -0.057    
  (0.80) (0.82)    
 
  (0.57) (0.58)    
 
  (0.40) (0.40)    
Indepit 0.008* 0.009**  
 
Indepit 0.004 0.005    
 
Indepit 0.000 0.001    
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
Constant -6.827*** -7.240*** 
 
Constant -7.075*** -7.541*** 
 
Constant -5.084*** -6.011*** 
  (0.56) (0.64)    
 
  (0.57) (0.66)    
 
  (0.38) (0.54)    
N 2646 2646    
 
N 2736 2737    
 
N 2009 2009    
Log Likelihood -181.012 -183.333    
 
Log Likelihood -188.289 -190.298    
 
Log Likelihood -215.090 -215.367    
Χ2 81.225 67.147    
 
Χ2 108.376 105.408    
 
Χ2 63.576 58.590    
Prob>Χ2 0.000 0.000    
 
Prob>Χ2 0.000 0.000    
 
Prob>Χ2 0.000 0.000    
Pseudo-R2 0.220 0.210    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.208 0.199    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.095 0.094    
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: 
including non-regional organizations and IFIs  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: 
including non-regional organizations and IFIs  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: 
including non-regional organizations and IFIs 
  




Polity IV: threshold 7 
 
Polity IV: threshold 1 
 
Polity IV: exrec & parcomp 
  Model 1 Model 3 
 
  Model 1 Model 3 
 
  Model 1 Model 3 
IOScoreit-1 0.123*** 0.133**  
 
IOScoreit-1 0.098*** 0.129*** 
 
IOScoreit-1 0.110*** 0.114**  
  (0.04) (0.06)    
 
  (0.03) (0.04)    
 
  (0.03) (0.05)    
ΔIOScoreit-1 0.109 -0.098    
 
ΔIOScoreit-1 0.013 -0.497**  
 
ΔIOScoreit-1 0.012 -0.055    
  (0.08) (0.35)    
 
  (0.06) (0.19)    
 
  (0.07) (0.11)    
pcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
 
pcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
 
pcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
ΔpcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
 
ΔpcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
 
ΔpcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.001    
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
Contagionit 0.064* 0.074*   
 
Contagionit 0.035 0.042    
 
Contagionit 0.009 0.015    
  (0.04) (0.04)    
 
  (0.04) (0.04)    
 
  (0.04) (0.04)    
PastDemit 2.013*** 2.087*** 
 
PastDemit 1.533*** 1.684*** 
 
PastDemit 1.991*** 2.111*** 
  (0.47) (0.47)    
 
  (0.42) (0.43)    
 
  (0.52) (0.52)    
RegConflictit -0.450** -0.433**  
 
RegConflictit -0.374 -0.404*   
 
RegConflictit -0.418 -0.411*   
  (0.19) (0.18)    
 
  (0.24) (0.23)    
 
  (0.26) (0.24)    
IntViolenceit-1 2.623*** 2.536*** 
 
IntViolenceit-1 1.607*** 1.580*** 
 
IntViolenceit-1 1.491*** 1.471*** 
  (0.84) (0.79)    
 
  (0.40) (0.39)    
 
  (0.48) (0.47)    
MilRegit -1.465** -1.524**  
 
MilRegit -1.486*** -1.505*** 
 
MilRegit -1.673** -1.758**  
  (0.64) (0.64)    
 
  (0.50) (0.52)    
 
  (0.72) (0.73)    
Indepit 0.004 0.005    
 
Indepit 0.004 0.005    
 
Indepit 0.008* 0.010**  
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
Constant -8.359*** -8.813*** 
 
Constant -5.725*** -6.529*** 
 
Constant -6.618*** -7.093*** 
  (0.91) (1.06)    
 
  (0.48) (0.63)    
 
  (0.53) (0.71)    
N 2741 2742    
 
N 2434 2435    
 
N 2469 2470    
Log Likelihood -134.691 -138.712    
 
Log Likelihood -209.384 -207.978    
 
Log Likelihood -147.979 -150.824    
Χ2 90.251 88.664    
 
Χ2 64.059 65.049    
 
Χ2 79.549 60.819    
Prob>Χ2 0.000 0.000    
 
Prob>Χ2 0.000 0.000    
 
Prob>Χ2 0.000 0.000    
Pseudo-R2 0.246 0.224    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.154 0.160    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.195 0.179    
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: 
including non-regional organizations and IFIs  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: 
including non-regional organizations and IFIs  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: 
including non-regional organizations and IFIs 





Polity IV: HYB; thresholds: 6 & -6 
 
Polity IV: HYB; thresholds: 8 & 1 
 
Przeworski et al. 2000 
  Model 1 Model 3 
 
  Model 1 Model 3 
 
  Model 1 Model 3 
IOScoreit-1 0.062 0.050    
 
IOScoreit-1 0.078 0.059    
 
IOScoreit-1 0.074*** 0.049    
  (0.08) (0.12)    
 
  (0.06) (0.09)    
 
  (0.03) (0.04)    
ΔIOScoreit-1 -0.020 0.031    
 
ΔIOScoreit-1 0.082 0.012    
 
ΔIOScoreit-1 0.066 0.044    
  (0.10) (0.08)    
 
  (0.10) (0.13)    
 
  (0.05) (0.14)    
pcGDPit-1 0.000 0.000    
 
pcGDPit-1 0.000 0.000    
 
pcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
ΔpcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
 
ΔpcGDPit-1 -0.001 -0.001    
 
ΔpcGDPit-1 0.000 -0.000    
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
Contagionit 0.157** 0.165**  
 
Contagionit 0.058 0.067    
 
Contagionit 0.030 0.031    
  (0.06) (0.06)    
 
  (0.07) (0.07)    
 
  (0.04) (0.04)    
PastDemit 2.214* 2.312*   
 
PastDemit 2.544*** 2.627*** 
 
PastDemit 1.436*** 1.567*** 
  (1.23) (1.21)    
 
  (0.90) (0.88)    
 
  (0.44) (0.43)    
RegConflictit -0.182 -0.185    
 
RegConflictit -0.227 -0.230    
 
RegConflictit -0.278 -0.293*   
  (0.25) (0.24)    
 
  (0.26) (0.25)    
 
  (0.17) (0.17)    
IntViolenceit-1 1.984* 2.014*   
 
IntViolenceit-1 2.079* 2.062*   
 
IntViolenceit-1 2.239*** 2.223*** 
  (1.09) (1.10)    
 
  (1.23) (1.18)    
 
  (0.50) (0.49)    
MilRegit -1.165 -1.239    
 
MilRegit -1.583 -1.699    
 
MilRegit -2.184*** -2.261*** 
  (1.86) (1.88)    
 
  (1.18) (1.19)    
 
  (0.64) (0.66)    
Indepit -0.001 0.000    
 
Indepit 0.009 0.010    
 
Indepit 0.009** 0.011**  
  (0.01) (0.01)    
 
  (0.01) (0.01)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
Constant -9.145*** -9.311*** 
 
Constant -9.031*** -9.062*** 
 
Constant -6.387*** -6.416*** 
  (1.09) (1.07)    
 
  (1.27) (1.50)    
 
  (0.56) (0.65)    
N 2736 2737    
 
N 2749 2750    
 
N 2552 2553    
Log Likelihood -47.999 -48.333    
 
Log Likelihood -64.621 -65.689    
 
Log Likelihood -204.812 -208.697    
Χ2 65.358 40.925    
 
Χ2 39.236 30.032    
 
Χ2 85.377 63.183    
Prob>Χ2 0.000 0.000    
 
Prob>Χ2 0.000 0.001    
 
Prob>Χ2 0.000 0.000    
Pseudo-R2 0.206 0.200    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.217 0.205    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.193 0.178    
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: 
including non-regional organizations and IFIs  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: 
including non-regional organizations and IFIs  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: 
including non-regional organizations and IFIs 







Reich 2002: HYB 
 
Svolik 2012 
  Model 1 Model 3 
 
  Model 1 Model 3 
 
  Model 1 Model 3 
IOScoreit-1 0.062** 0.101*** 
 
IOScoreit-1 0.027 0.030    
 
IOScoreit-1 0.069** 0.070    
  (0.03) (0.04)    
 
  (0.04) (0.04)    
 
  (0.03) (0.05)    
ΔIOScoreit-1 0.007 -0.184    
 
ΔIOScoreit-1 0.065 -0.341    
 
ΔIOScoreit-1 0.038 0.027    
  (0.04) (0.20)    
 
  (0.05) (0.21)    
 
  (0.08) (0.17)    
pcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
 
pcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
 
pcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
ΔpcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
 
ΔpcGDPit-1 -0.001** -0.001    
 
ΔpcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
Contagionit 0.032 0.037    
 
Contagionit 0.067* 0.074*   
 
Contagionit 0.037 0.040    
  (0.03) (0.03)    
 
  (0.04) (0.04)    
 
  (0.04) (0.04)    
PastDemit 1.136*** 1.214*** 
 
PastDemit 2.534*** 2.661*** 
 
PastDemit 1.770*** 1.889*** 
  (0.33) (0.33)    
 
  (0.55) (0.51)    
 
  (0.48) (0.46)    
RegConflictit -0.452*** -0.461*** 
 
RegConflictit -0.679* -0.696*   
 
RegConflictit -0.374 -0.383    
  (0.17) (0.18)    
 
  (0.35) (0.37)    
 
  (0.25) (0.24)    
IntViolenceit-1 1.456*** 1.436*** 
 
IntViolenceit-1 1.225** 1.138*   
 
IntViolenceit-1 1.558*** 1.557*** 
  (0.38) (0.37)    
 
  (0.59) (0.60)    
 
  (0.45) (0.45)    
MilRegit -0.971** -0.944**  
 
MilRegit -2.139*** -2.178*** 
 
MilRegit -2.838*** -2.911*** 
  (0.44) (0.45)    
 
  (0.72) (0.71)    
 
  (0.89) (0.90)    
Indepit 0.002 0.002    
 
Indepit 0.005 0.006    
 
Indepit 0.011** 0.012**  
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.01) (0.01)    
Constant -5.086*** -5.817*** 
 
Constant -6.130*** -6.338*** 
 
Constant -6.166*** -6.465*** 
  (0.49) (0.62)    
 
  (0.69) (0.77)    
 
  (0.58) (0.73)    
N 2309 2310    
 
N 2533 2534    
 
N 2507 2508    
Log Likelihood -239.775 -238.608    
 
Log Likelihood -109.570 -108.794    
 
Log Likelihood -175.119 -176.859    
Χ2 47.353 44.927    
 
Χ2 70.044 75.330    
 
Χ2 84.646 66.137    
Prob>Χ2 0.000 0.000    
 
Prob>Χ2 0.000 0.000    
 
Prob>Χ2 0.000 0.000    
Pseudo-R2 0.103 0.107    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.164 0.170    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.195 0.187    
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: 
including non-regional organizations and IFIs  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: 
including non-regional organizations and IFIs  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: 
including non-regional organizations and IFIs 







Wahman et al. 2013 
  Model 1 Model 3 
 
  Model 1 Model 3 
IOScoreit-1 0.050* 0.045    
 
IOScoreit-1 0.049 0.042    
  (0.03) (0.05)    
 
  (0.04) (0.05)    
ΔIOScoreit-1 0.046 -0.269    
 
ΔIOScoreit-1 0.058 -0.473    
  (0.05) (0.26)    
 
  (0.06) (0.38)    
pcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
 
pcGDPit-1 -0.000 -0.000    
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
ΔpcGDPit-1 -0.001 -0.000    
 
ΔpcGDPit-1 0.000 0.000    
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
Contagionit 0.028 0.032    
 
Contagionit 0.069* 0.083**  
  (0.04) (0.04)    
 
  (0.04) (0.04)    
PastDemit 1.646*** 1.785*** 
 
PastDemit 2.145*** 2.251*** 
  (0.40) (0.38)    
 
  (0.50) (0.54)    
RegConflictit -0.241 -0.260    
 
RegConflictit -0.668** -0.695**  
  (0.16) (0.16)    
 
  (0.34) (0.34)    
IntViolenceit-1 1.559*** 1.524*** 
 
IntViolenceit-1 1.759*** 1.673*** 
  (0.40) (0.40)    
 
  (0.52) (0.51)    
MilRegit -2.606*** -2.661*** 
 
MilRegit -3.729*** -3.791*** 
  (0.81) (0.85)    
 
  (0.84) (0.86)    
Indepit 0.012** 0.013*** 
 
Indepit 0.010** 0.013*** 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
 
  (0.00) (0.00)    
Constant -5.677*** -5.842*** 
 
Constant -5.757*** -5.911*** 
  (0.51) (0.65)    
 
  (0.61) (0.80)    
N 2436 2436    
 
N 1589 1589    
Log Likelihood -199.846 -200.137    
 
Log Likelihood -124.929 -123.762    
Χ2 73.690 87.448    
 
Χ2 71.663 61.878    
Prob>Χ2 0.000 0.000    
 
Prob>Χ2 0.000 0.000    
Pseudo-R2 0.180 0.179    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.257 0.264    
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: 
including non-regional organizations and IFIs  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Model 3: 





Appendix V: Robustness Checks: Donno 2013 
Boix et al. 2013 
 
Cheibub et al. 2010 
 
FH: free, FIW 
  Model 3 Model 5 
 
  Model 3 Model 5 
 
  Model 3 Model 5 
Competitive Authoritarian 
Regime (CAR) 
-0.3806 -1.2232*   
 
Competitive Authoritarian Regime 
(CAR) 
0.1308 -0.2269    
 
Competitive Authoritarian Regime 
(CAR) 
-0.5328 -31.3667 
(0.4692) (0.6816)    
 





 Opposition Coalition 
-3.8858*** -3.7273*** 
 Opposition Coalition 
0.0000 0.0000 
(0.3498) (0.6374)    
 
(0.4105) (0.7145)    
 
(.) (.) 
CAR * Opp. Coalition 
4.7133*** 6.7091*** 
 CAR * Opp. Coalition 
4.1618*** 4.6038*** 
 CAR * Opp. Coalition 
0.0000 0.0000 
(0.7758) (1.1145)    
 





 International Conditionality 
0.0000 0.0000    
 International Conditionality 
-5.1090*** -12.2400 
(0.5935) (1.3695)    
 
(.) (.)    
 
(0.7091) (.) 
CAR * Conditionality 
5.0154*** 11.5480*** 
 CAR * Conditionality 
0.0000 0.0000    
 CAR * Conditionality 
6.6558*** 203.2266 
(1.1086) (1.6645)    
 




0.0000 0.0000    
 Main Election 
0.0000 0.0000    
 Main Election 
0.0000 0.0000 
(.) (.)    
 





 Incumbent running 
-0.6908 -0.9230*   
 Incumbent running 
-1.5014*** -118.4691 
(0.3988) (0.8941)    
 
(0.4279) (0.5583)    
 
(0.4835) (.) 
# Previous elections 
0.0438 -0.1498**  
 # Previous elections 
0.0687 -0.0080    
 # Previous elections 
0.1725*** 10.7278 
(0.0412) (0.0726)    
 
(0.0476) (0.0820)    
 
(0.0662) (.) 
GDP per capita (lagged 1 year) 
-0.4149 -0.3513    
 GDP per capita (lagged 1 year) 
-0.3892 -0.4627    
 GDP per capita (lagged 1 year) 
-0.9531** -91.6948 
(0.2630) (0.3488)    
 
(0.2578) (0.4205)    
 
(0.3946) (.) 
GDP growth (lagged 1 year) 
-0.0182 0.1212*   
 GDP growth (lagged 1 year) 
-0.0155 0.0778    
 GDP growth (lagged 1 year) 
0.0638 9.7749 
(0.0392) (0.0672)    
 
(0.0487) (0.0558)    
 
(0.0816) (.) 
Central and Eastern Europe 
0.0000 0.0000    
 Central and Eastern Europe 
0.0000 0.0000    
 Central and Eastern Europe 
0.0000 0.0000 
(.) (.)    
 






0.4058 1.3189*   
 Americas 
1.7829** 263.1907 
(0.7472) (1.2917)    
 
(0.6367) (0.7792)    
 
(0.8223) (.) 
Alternation, Previous Elec. 
  7.4721*** 
 Alternation, Previous Elec. 
  0.0000    
 Alternation, Previous Elec. 
  0.0000 
  (0.5948)    
 
  (.)    
 
  (.) 
Misconduct Intensity 
  -3.1344*** 
 Misconduct Intensity 
  -1.1863**  
 Misconduct Intensity 
  -101.8379 
  (0.9188)    
 
  (0.4753)    
 
  (.) 
Prior Liberalization 
  0.8238**  
 Prior Liberalization 
  1.1603**  
 Prior Liberalization 
  21.3266 
  (0.3839)    
 
  (0.5542)    
 
  (.) 
Regime Openness 
  -0.4232    
 Regime Openness 
  -0.0168    
 Regime Openness 
  -53.7516 
  (0.4520)    
 
  (0.3356)    
 
  (.) 
Constant 1.7530 6.0051**  
 
Constant 0.9856 2.4630    
 
Constant 3.3470 642.6951 
  (1.8799) (2.9161)    
 
  (1.8294) (2.3511)    
 
  (2.2857) (.) 
N 92 92    
 
N 79 78    
 
N 77 75 
Pseudo-R2 0.235 0.565    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.139 0.372    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.318 1.000 
Log Likelihood -22.546 -12.819    
 
Log Likelihood -20.360 -13.276    
 
Log Likelihood -10.731 0.000 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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FH: partly free, FIW 
 
FH: free, PR 
 
FH: partly free, PR 
  Model 3 Model 5 
 
  Model 3 Model 5 
 
  Model 3 Model 5 
Competitive Authoritarian Regime 
(CAR) 
-0.0424 0.0187    
 




Competitive Authoritarian Regime 
(CAR) 
-0.2359 -0.2431    




(0.4073) (0.4644)    
Opposition Coalition 
-3.8412*** -3.9728*** 
 Opposition Coalition 
0.0000 0.0000 
 Opposition Coalition 
-4.1556*** -4.3760*** 




(0.3566) (0.4405)    
CAR * Opp. Coalition 
4.3555*** 4.6558*** 
 CAR * Opp. Coalition 
0.0000 0.0000 
 CAR * Opp. Coalition 
4.6137*** 5.0183*** 




(0.6456) (0.7114)    
International Conditionality 
0.0000 0.0000    
 International Conditionality 
-5.3405*** -73.2702 
 International Conditionality 
0.0000 0.0000    




(.) (.)    
CAR * Conditionality 
0.0000 0.0000    
 CAR * Conditionality 
6.8312*** 200.8569 
 CAR * Conditionality 
0.0000 0.0000    




(.) (.)    
Main Election 
0.2372 0.5636    
 Main Election 
0.0000 0.0000 
 Main Election 
0.4409 0.7044*   




(0.3718) (0.4144)    
Incumbent running 
-0.6128 -0.8257*   
 Incumbent running 
-1.8898*** -72.1978 
 Incumbent running 
-0.8299** -0.9498**  




(0.3833) (0.3974)    
# Previous elections 
-0.0003 -0.0326    
 # Previous elections 
0.2188*** 7.8973 
 # Previous elections 
0.0051 -0.0412    




(0.0395) (0.0432)    
GDP per capita (lagged 1 year) 
-0.6586*** -0.6227**  
 GDP per capita (lagged 1 year) 
-1.3584** -63.6061 
 GDP per capita (lagged 1 year) 
-0.4497** -0.3815**  




(0.1905) (0.1728)    
GDP growth (lagged 1 year) 
0.0078 0.0206    
 GDP growth (lagged 1 year) 
0.0085 6.6888 
 GDP growth (lagged 1 year) 
-0.0113 0.0026    




(0.0230) (0.0259)    
Central and Eastern Europe 
0.0000 0.0000    
 Central and Eastern Europe 
0.0000 0.0000 
 Central and Eastern Europe 
0.0000 0.0000    




(.) (.)    
Americas 




0.0000 0.0000    




(.) (.)    
Alternation, Previous Elec.  
0.0000    
 Alternation, Previous Elec. 
  71.6246 
 Alternation, Previous Elec. 
  0.0000    
 
(.)    
 
  (.) 
 
  (.)    
Misconduct Intensity  
-0.3457    
 Misconduct Intensity 
  -65.9759 
 Misconduct Intensity 
  -0.5963**  
 
(0.2313)    
 
  (.) 
 
  (0.2497)    
Prior Liberalization  
0.0535    
 Prior Liberalization 
  13.0388 
 Prior Liberalization 
  -0.0379    
 
(0.1160)    
 
  (.) 
 
  (0.1484)    
Regime Openness  
-0.5613**  
 Regime Openness 
  -33.3844 
 Regime Openness 
  -0.3913*   
 
(0.2519)    
 
  (.) 
 
  (0.2101)    
Constant 2.6856 4.5059**  
 
Constant 5.9028* 422.1852 
 
Constant 1.6757 3.1483**  
  (1.6393) (1.9602)    
 
  (3.0246) (.) 
 
  (1.3014) (1.4786)    
N 144 142    
 
N 77 77 
 
N 144 142    
Pseudo-R2 0.181 0.261    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.371 1.000 
 
Pseudo-R2 0.137 0.249    
Log Likelihood -31.823 -28.590    
 
Log Likelihood -11.638 0.000 
 
Log Likelihood -37.666 -32.631    
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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FH: HYB, FIW 
 
FH: HYB, PR 
 
Gasiorowski 1996 
  Model 3 Model 5 
 
  Model 3 Model 5 
 
  Model 3 Model 5 
 
gdpgrowth_lag1 > 6.7 predicts 
data perfectly 
gdpgrowth_lag1 > 6.7 predicts 
data perfectly 
  
gdpgrowth_lag1 > 6.7 predicts 
data perfectly 
gdpgrowth_lag1 > 6.7 predicts 
data perfectly 
  
hm_incrun_fill <= 0 predicts 
data perfectly 
hm_incrun_fill <= 0 predicts 
data perfectly      




























Gasiorowski 1996: HYB 
 
Gates et al. 2006 
 
Geddes et al. 2014 
  Model 3 Model 5 
 
  Model 3 Model 5 
 
  Model 3 Model 5 
 hm_incrun_fill > 0 predicts 
data perfectly 









0.0826    




(0.5866)    
  Opposition Coalition 
0.0000 
  Opposition Coalition 
-4.2539*** 
 
    
(.) 
  
(0.3782)    
 
    CAR * Opp. Coalition 
0.0000 
  CAR * Opp. Coalition 
5.0252*** 
 
    
(.) 
  
(0.7732)    
 
    International Conditionality 
-4.6306*** 
  International Conditionality 
-5.0203*** 
 
    
(0.9303) 
  
(0.6932)    
 
    CAR * Conditionality 
7.5594*** 
  CAR * Conditionality 
4.7606*** 
 
    
(1.5910) 
  
(1.2528)    
 
    Main Election 
0.0000 
  Main Election 
0.0000    
 
    
(.) 
  
(.)    
 
    Incumbent running 
-0.9451 
  Incumbent running 
-1.2762*** 
 
    
(0.7074) 
  
(0.4009)    
 
    # Previous elections 
-0.1072 
  # Previous elections 
0.0636    
 
    
(0.1008) 
  
(0.0397)    
 
    GDP per capita (lagged 1 year) 
-1.5946*** 
  GDP per capita (lagged 1 year) 
-0.4507    
 
    
(0.4669) 
  
(0.3013)    
 
    GDP growth (lagged 1 year) 
-0.1169* 
  GDP growth (lagged 1 year) 
-0.0278    
 
    
(0.0682) 
  
(0.0429)    
 
    Central and Eastern Europe 
0.0000 
  Central and Eastern Europe 
0.0000    
 
    
(.) 
  
(.)    
 
    Americas 
3.2860*** 
  
Americas 1.5621**  
 
    
(1.0697) 
  
  (0.7794)    
 
    Alternation, Previous Elec. 
  
  
Constant 1.7752    
 
    
  
  
  (2.1500)    
 
    Misconduct Intensity 
  
  
N 91    
 
    
  
  
Pseudo-R2 0.351    
 
    Prior Liberalization 
  
  
Log Likelihood -21.770    
 
    
  
  
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
    Regime Openness 
  
     
    
  
     
    
Constant 9.7355*** 
     
    
  (3.1050) 
     
    
N 47 
     
    
Pseudo-R2 0.495 
     
    
Log Likelihood -9.059 
     
    
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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Magaloni et al. 2013 
 
Polity IV: AN=AUT 
 
Polity IV: AN=DEM 
  Model 3 Model 5 
 
  Model 3 Model 5 
 
  Model 3 Model 5 
Competitive Authoritarian Regime 
(CAR) 
-0.3325 -0.6307    
 
Competitive Authoritarian Regime 
(CAR) 
-0.3756 -0.3961    
 
Competitive Authoritarian Regime 
(CAR) 
-0.6659** -1.0775*** 
(0.4184) (0.4425)    
 
(0.4833) (0.5252)    
 
(0.3220) (0.4013)    
Opposition Coalition 
-4.0928*** -3.6537*** 
 Opposition Coalition 
-3.7593*** -2.4852*** 
 Opposition Coalition 
0.5090 1.3156*   
(0.4059) (0.6722)    
 
(0.4459) (0.9409)    
 
(0.6860) (0.7980)    
CAR * Opp. Coalition 
5.0548*** 5.4350*** 
 CAR * Opp. Coalition 
5.3161*** 4.6425*** 
 CAR * Opp. Coalition 
-0.1428 -0.3166    
(0.7099) (0.9616)    
 
(0.8983) (1.1400)    
 
(0.9539) (1.0431)    
International Conditionality 
-4.7637*** -6.1311*** 
 International Conditionality 
0.0000 0.0000    
 International Conditionality 
0.2849 -1.5283**  
(0.5777) (1.1299)    
 
(.) (.)    
 
(0.4960) (0.7263)    
CAR * Conditionality 
4.8935*** 6.8362*** 
 CAR * Conditionality 
0.0000 0.0000    
 CAR * Conditionality 
0.3558 2.1147**  
(1.0729) (1.4828)    
 
(.) (.)    
 
(0.7042) (1.0659)    
Main Election 
1.4452** 1.7811*   
 Main Election 
1.1666 1.5350    
 Main Election 
0.0498 -0.1819    
(0.6591) (1.0271)    
 
(0.7782) (1.0904)    
 
(0.3672) (0.4627)    
Incumbent running 
-0.7419* -0.7227    
 Incumbent running 
-0.2017 -0.3461    
 Incumbent running 
0.0146 0.6496*   
(0.4168) (0.5504)    
 
(0.6172) (0.6738)    
 
(0.3571) (0.3697)    
# Previous elections 
0.0749** 0.0191    
 # Previous elections 
0.1060** 0.0969*   
 # Previous elections 
0.0335 0.0291    
(0.0309) (0.0556)    
 
(0.0452) (0.0573)    
 
(0.0372) (0.0512)    
GDP per capita (lagged 1 year) 
-0.4698* -0.3940*   
 GDP per capita (lagged 1 year) 
-0.7925** -0.9762*** 
 GDP per capita (lagged 1 year) 
-0.4948*** -0.5460**  
(0.2597) (0.2382)    
 
(0.3193) (0.3572)    
 
(0.1859) (0.2494)    
GDP growth (lagged 1 year) 
-0.0346 0.0096    
 GDP growth (lagged 1 year) 
-0.0583 -0.0486    
 GDP growth (lagged 1 year) 
0.0168 0.0644**  
(0.0316) (0.0323)    
 
(0.0370) (0.0400)    
 
(0.0226) (0.0300)    
Central and Eastern Europe 
0.0000 0.0000    
 Central and Eastern Europe 
0.0000 0.0000    
 Central and Eastern Europe 
0.0000 0.0000    
(.) (.)    
 
(.) (.)    
 






1.0191 1.8600**  
(0.6218) (0.6951)    
 
(0.7024) (0.9616)    
 
(0.6397) (0.9443)    
Alternation, Previous Elec.  
2.6826*** 
 Alternation, Previous Elec.  
0.0000    
 Alternation, Previous Elec.  
2.3504*** 
 
(0.7256)    
  
(.)    
  
(0.6850)    
Misconduct Intensity  
-1.3154*** 
 Misconduct Intensity  
-0.9583**  
 Misconduct Intensity  
-0.0967    
 
(0.4336)    
  
(0.3926)    
  
(0.2344)    
Prior Liberalization  
0.2839    
 Prior Liberalization  
0.2138    
 Prior Liberalization  
-0.5855*** 
 
(0.2587)    
  
(0.2488)    
  
(0.1601)    
Regime Openness  
-0.1322    
 Regime Openness  
-0.1046    
 Regime Openness  
-0.7089**  
 
(0.2526)    
  
(0.2795)    
  
(0.3211)    
Constant 0.1281 0.8686    
 
Constant 1.7466 3.6119    
 
Constant 1.4052 3.1517    
  (1.8392) (1.9328)    
 
  (1.9716) (2.2031)    
 
  (1.2110) (2.2275)    
N 173 173    
 
N 154 152    
 
N 173 173    
Pseudo-R2 0.342 0.528    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.394 0.495    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.129 0.400    
Log Likelihood -25.158 -18.047    
 
Log Likelihood -20.780 -17.248    
 
Log Likelihood -33.288 -22.931    
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 




Polity IV: threshold 7 
 
Polity IV: threshold 1 
 
Polity IV: exrec & parcomp 
  Model 3 Model 5 
 
  Model 3 Model 5 
 




Competitive Authoritarian Regime 
(CAR) 
-0.1833 -0.0989    
 
Competitive Authoritarian Regime 
(CAR) 
-0.4707 -0.3676    
    
(0.3479) (0.3303)    
 
(0.3542) (0.3577)    
    Opposition Coalition 
-4.6030*** -4.2777*** 
 Opposition Coalition 
-4.1179*** -4.8795*** 
    
(0.6204) (0.4918)    
 
(0.3794) (0.4934)    
    CAR * Opp. Coalition 
tm 5.6920*** 
 CAR * Opp. Coalition 
5.2090*** 6.1896*** 
    
(0.7422) (0.6348)    
 
(0.5897) (0.7412)    
    International Conditionality 
1.1722** 1.3763    
 International Conditionality 
-4.6774*** -4.8516*** 
    
(0.5926) (0.8551)    
 
(0.4987) (0.4895)    
    CAR * Conditionality 
-0.9772 -0.8809    
 CAR * Conditionality 
4.7569*** 5.1871*** 
    
(0.8380) (1.0948)    
 
(0.8914) (1.0729)    
    Main Election 
1.1363*** 1.3906*** 
 Main Election 
1.1386*** 1.5887*** 
    
(0.3937) (0.3692)    
 
(0.4152) (0.3985)    
    Incumbent running 
-0.3023 -0.3125    
 Incumbent running 
-0.7959** -1.0300**  
    
(0.3460) (0.3824)    
 
(0.3727) (0.4269)    
    # Previous elections 
0.0138 -0.0292    
 # Previous elections 
-0.0229 -0.0706*   
    
(0.0355) (0.0408)    
 
(0.0402) (0.0400)    
    GDP per capita (lagged 1 year) 
-0.2431 -0.1422    
 GDP per capita (lagged 1 year) 
-0.3085* -0.2063    
    
(0.1608) (0.1647)    
 
(0.1776) (0.1761)    
    GDP growth (lagged 1 year) 
0.0088 0.0180    
 GDP growth (lagged 1 year) 
-0.0064 -0.0033    
    
(0.0321) (0.0315)    
 
(0.0257) (0.0252)    
    Central and Eastern Europe 
0.0000 0.0000    
 Central and Eastern Europe 
0.0000 0.0000    
    
(.) (.)    
 
(.) (.)    




    
(0.4721) (0.5472)    
 
(0.5179) (0.6254)    
    Alternation, Previous Elec.  
0.2495    
 Alternation, Previous Elec.  
0.0000    
     
(0.8990)    
  
(.)    
    Misconduct Intensity  
-0.6512*** 
 Misconduct Intensity  
-0.6057**  
     
(0.2014)    
  
(0.2418)    
    Prior Liberalization  
0.0790    
 Prior Liberalization  
0.0110    
     
(0.1413)    
  
(0.1312)    
    Regime Openness  
-0.3613    
 Regime Openness  
-0.4856*   
     
(0.2529)    
  
(0.2618)    
    
Constant -0.6365 0.4611    
 
Constant 0.3311 1.7548    
    
  (1.1107) (1.3944)    
 
  (1.1729) (1.5803)    
    
N 173 173    
 
N 168 165    
    
Pseudo-R2 0.260 0.337    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.281 0.371    
    
Log Likelihood -42.768 -38.286    
 
Log Likelihood -32.907 -28.641    
    
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 




Polity IV: HYB; thresholds: 6 & -6 
 
Polity IV: HYB; thresholds: 8 & 1 
 
Przeworski et al. 2000 
  Model 3 Model 5 
 
  Model 3 Model 5 
 
  Model 3 Model 5 
 gdpgrowth_lag1 > 6.7 
predicts data perfectly 
gdpgrowth_lag1 > 6.7 
predicts data perfectly 
  hm_incrun_fill > 0 
predicts data perfectly 
hm_incrun_fill > 0 




-0.3919    convergence not 
achieved 
    
(0.4759)    
    Opposition Coalition 
-4.1547*** 
 
        
(0.3827)    
 
        CAR * Opp. Coalition 
4.5298*** 
 
        
(0.9083)    
 
        
International 
Conditionality 
0.8757    
 
        
(1.2394)    
 
        CAR * Conditionality 
0.0218    
 
        
(1.4795)    
 
        Main Election 
0.0000    
 
        
(.)    
 
        Incumbent running 
-0.7156*   
 
        
(0.4283)    
 
        # Previous elections 
0.1091**  
 
        
(0.0444)    
 
        
GDP per capita (lagged 1 
year) 
-0.5540*   
 
        
(0.2830)    
 
        
GDP growth (lagged 1 
year) 
-0.0156    
 
        
(0.0446)    
 
        
Central and Eastern 
Europe 
0.0000    
 
        
(.)    
 
        
Americas 1.1935    
 
        
  (0.7486)    
 
        
Constant 2.0889    
 
        
  (1.9708)    
 
        
N 66    
 
        
Pseudo-R2 0.221    
 
        
Log Likelihood -20.486    
 
        








Reich 2002: HYB 
 
Svolik 2012 
  Model 3 Model 5 
 
  Model 3 Model 5 
 
  Model 3 Model 5 
Competitive Authoritarian Regime 
(CAR) 
-0.3792 -0.3047    
  convergence not achieved convergence not achieved  
Competitive Authoritarian Regime 
(CAR) 
0.0072 -0.0884    
(0.4845) (0.5460)    
   
(0.4830) (0.6107)    
Opposition Coalition 
-4.2329*** -3.6964*** 
     Opposition Coalition 
-3.9916*** -4.5643*** 
(0.5704) (0.7781)    
     
(0.4157) (0.5320)    
CAR * Opp. Coalition 
4.3979*** 3.9795*** 
     CAR * Opp. Coalition 
3.8106*** 5.1688*** 
(0.9271) (1.0140)    
     
(0.7655) (0.9728)    
International Conditionality 
-4.9293*** 1.6078    
     International Conditionality 
-5.1135*** -9.6924*** 
(0.6888) (0.9992)    
     
(0.6064) (1.3058)    
CAR * Conditionality 
6.2633*** 0.0000    
     CAR * Conditionality 
5.3903*** 10.6809*** 
(1.2283) (.)    
     
(1.0303) (1.5577)    
Main Election 
1.0218* 1.6159**  
     Main Election 
0.0000 0.0000    
(0.5459) (0.7962)    
     
(.) (.)    
Incumbent running 
-0.0713 0.0010    
     Incumbent running 
-1.4072*** -1.9563*** 
(0.6348) (0.5603)    
     
(0.4108) (0.6597)    
# Previous elections 
0.0406 0.0175    
     # Previous elections 
0.0195 -0.1200*   
(0.0626) (0.0651)    
     
(0.0413) (0.0675)    
GDP per capita (lagged 1 year) 
-0.7431** -0.7546*   
     GDP per capita (lagged 1 year) 
-0.6795** -0.5775*   
(0.3703) (0.4544)    
     
(0.3307) (0.3476)    
GDP growth (lagged 1 year) 
-0.0255 -0.0358    
     GDP growth (lagged 1 year) 
-0.0312 0.0205    
(0.0316) (0.0296)    
     
(0.0361) (0.0393)    
Central and Eastern Europe 
0.0000 0.0000    
     Central and Eastern Europe 
0.0000 0.0000    
(.) (.)    
     
(.) (.)    
Americas 
2.0665** 2.6546*** 
     Americas 
2.4353*** 3.8184*** 
(0.8617) (0.9480)    
     
(0.7465) (1.0283)    
Alternation, Previous Elec.  
0.0000    
     Alternation, Previous Elec. 
  5.8354*** 
 
(.)    
     
  (0.5918)    
Misconduct Intensity  
-0.7699    
     Misconduct Intensity 
  -1.6414*** 
 
(0.4905)    
     
  (0.5640)    
Prior Liberalization  
0.0211    
     Prior Liberalization 
  0.5385*   
 
(0.2469)    
     
  (0.3011)    
Regime Openness  
-0.3381    
     Regime Openness 
  -0.3907    
 
(0.3053)    
     
  (0.2660)    
Constant 2.4620 3.8715    
     
Constant 3.6620* 6.4152**  
  (2.3452) (2.5028)    
     
  (2.2029) (2.5311)    
N 74 71    
     
N 91 91    
Pseudo-R2 0.284 0.374    
     
Pseudo-R2 0.356 0.551    
Log Likelihood -18.138 -15.643    
     
Log Likelihood -22.849 -15.934    
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
     





Wahman et al. 2013 
  Model 3 Model 5 
 
  Model 3 Model 5 
Competitive Authoritarian Regime 
(CAR) 
-0.0691 -0.1284    
 
Competitive Authoritarian Regime 
(CAR) 
0.0856 0.0081    
(0.3687) (0.3502)    
 
(0.4985) (0.6806)    
Opposition Coalition 
-4.6724*** -4.6314*** 
 Opposition Coalition 
-3.5641*** -2.8459*** 
(0.3692) (0.4876)    
 
(0.3593) (0.7823)    
CAR * Opp. Coalition 
4.7194*** 4.9534*** 
 CAR * Opp. Coalition 
4.0089*** 3.5964*** 
(0.7502) (0.7699)    
 
(0.8048) (1.1469)    
International Conditionality 
-5.3721*** -6.7157*** 
 International Conditionality 
-3.7319*** -3.5255*** 
(0.4812) (1.0108)    
 
(0.6143) (0.6236)    
CAR * Conditionality 
5.3474*** 6.8603*** 
 CAR * Conditionality 
4.0905*** 4.9939*** 
(0.8697) (1.2130)    
 
(1.0243) (1.1552)    
Main Election 
1.9384*** 2.1973**  
 Main Election 
0.0000 0.0000    
(0.6290) (0.8660)    
 
(.) (.)    
Incumbent running 
-1.2494*** -1.1915**  
 Incumbent running 
0.0280 0.0361    
(0.4049) (0.4654)    
 
(0.4826) (0.5974)    
# Previous elections 
-0.0002 -0.0399    
 # Previous elections 
0.0550** -0.0324    
(0.0272) (0.0324)    
 
(0.0273) (0.0539)    
GDP per capita (lagged 1 year) 
-0.4435** -0.3824**  
 GDP per capita (lagged 1 year) 
-0.4058 -0.5021    
(0.2026) (0.1762)    
 
(0.2750) (0.3245)    
GDP growth (lagged 1 year) 
0.0152 0.0510    
 GDP growth (lagged 1 year) 
-0.0315 -0.0014    
(0.0354) (0.0392)    
 
(0.0388) (0.0567)    
Central and Eastern Europe 
0.0000 0.0000    
 Central and Eastern Europe 
0.0000 0.0000    
(.) (.)    
 





(0.5092) (0.5847)    
 
(0.6077) (0.6914)    
Alternation, Previous Elec.  
1.9139*** 
 Alternation, Previous Elec.  
0.0000    
 
(0.6620)    
  
(.)    
Misconduct Intensity  
-0.7169**  
 Misconduct Intensity  
-1.2308**  
 
(0.3131)    
  
(0.5270)    
Prior Liberalization  
0.0643    
 Prior Liberalization  
0.5246    
 
(0.1567)    
  
(0.3220)    
Regime Openness  
0.1039    
 Regime Openness  
0.0070    
 
(0.2403)    
  
(0.2297)    
Constant 0.3989 0.1559    
 
Constant 0.5328 2.3752    
  (1.4169) (1.7168)    
 
  (1.8768) (2.3105)    
N 173 173    
 
N 92 90    
Pseudo-R2 0.365 0.448    
 
Pseudo-R2 0.280 0.432    
Log Likelihood -32.415 -28.167    
 
Log Likelihood -21.220 -16.617    
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix VI: Robustness Checks: Andersen et al. 2014 
 
Bernhard et al. 2001 
 
Boix et al. 2013 
 
Cheibub et al. 2010 
  Model 3 Model 6 
 
  Model 3 Model 6 
 
















































(0.0176) (0.0224)    
Armed conflict 
1.7265* 1.6740 
 Armed conflict 
0.2671 0.1835 
 Armed conflict 





(0.3046) (0.3144)    
International war 
0.0000 0.0000 
 International war 
0.2323 -0.0738 
 International war 


























































































(0.0183) (0.0171)    
GDP/cap. (log) 
  -0.8596 
 GDP/cap. (log)  
-0.3206 
 GDP/cap. (log)  
-0.4356**  




(0.2151)    
Constant 238.1597 315.4434 
 
Constant -118.3003 -112.2736 
 
Constant -32.8555 -28.8868    
  (266.3380) (300.8187) 
 
  (105.1184) (103.8744) 
 
  (89.5133) (89.7624)    
N 1080 1080 
 
N 1296 1296 
 
N 1396 1396    
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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FH: free, FIW 
 
FH: partly free, FIW 
 
FH: free, PR 
  Model 3 Model 6 
 
  Model 3 Model 6 
 
  Model 3 Model 6 
Bureaucratic 
quality 








-0.3212*** -0.0659    




(0.1079) (0.1301)    
Growth in 
GDP/cap. 








-0.2517 0.4781    















0.0219** 0.0299**  




(0.0109) (0.0130)    
Armed 
conflict 
0.6350** 0.2820    
 Armed conflict 
0.5189 0.5099 
 Armed conflict 
0.5733** 0.2996    




(0.2442) (0.2620)    
International 
war 
0.3516 -0.0971    





-0.1661 -0.7046    


















-0.4648 -0.5617    





















0.1898 0.1782    










5.8306* 5.8321*   










-0.1020* -0.1039*   










0.0006 0.0006    




(0.0004) (0.0004)    
spellcount 




-0.0118** -0.0055    








 GDP/cap. (log)  
-0.0660 
 GDP/cap. (log)  
-0.5105*** 
 




(0.1546)    
Constant -200.2292*** -221.3576*** 
 
Constant 9.0718 9.5586 
 
Constant -110.4410** -104.8760*   
  (67.8404) (72.5656)    
 
  (112.8492) (111.9404) 
 
  (56.0490) (55.9456)    
N 1173 1173    
 
N 1583 1583 
 
N 1199 1199    
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 




FH: partly free, PR 
 
FH: HYB, FIW 
 
FH: HYB, PR 
  Model 3 Model 6 
 
not able to replicate (outcome does not 
vary) 
 




        (0.1691) (0.2017) 
        Growth in 
GDP/cap. 
-1.8984 -1.7723 
        (2.1610) (2.2250) 
        
Oil value/cap. (log 
-0.0082 0.0053 
        (0.0171) (0.0207) 
        
Armed conflict 
0.4272 0.3902 
        (0.3159) (0.3197) 
        
International war 
0.5404 0.2382 
        (0.5586) (0.5921) 




        
(0.3739) (0.3873) 





        
(0.4020) (0.4055) 
        
time 
3.3609 3.3457 
        (4.2986) (4.2593) 
        
time2 
-0.0629 -0.0636 
        (0.0809) (0.0803) 
        
time3 
0.0004 0.0004 
        (0.0005) (0.0005) 
        
spellcount 
-0.0326 -0.0251 
        (0.0220) (0.0190) 
        
GDP/cap. (log)  
-0.3207 
        
 
(0.2105) 
        Constant -60.5010 -56.9141 
          (75.5163) (74.7169) 
        N 1583 1583 
        * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 





Gasiorowski 1996: HYB 
 
Gates et al. 2006 
not able to replicate (not convave)     
 
not able to replicate (outcome does not 
vary) 
 
  Model 3 Model 6 




        
(0.1828) (0.2109) 




        
(2.2614) (2.2917) 




        
(0.0192) (0.0209) 
        Armed conflict 
0.3249 0.2503 
        
(0.3816) (0.3827) 
        International war 
0.3683 0.2236 
        
(0.5963) (0.6147) 





        
(0.4479) (0.4616) 






        
(0.4079) (0.4259) 
        time 
-5.4925 -3.3017 
        
(20.9792) (20.8642) 
        time2 
0.1243 0.0766 
        
(0.4317) (0.4297) 
        time3 
-0.0009 -0.0006 
        
(0.0030) (0.0029) 
        spellcount 
-0.0512 -0.0370 
        
(0.0415) (0.0368) 
        GDP/cap. (log)  
-0.3185 
         
(0.2343) 
        
Constant 77.4029 46.6894 
        
  (338.7462) (336.4159) 
        
N 797 797 
        




Geddes et al. 2014 
 
Magaloni et al. 2013 
 
Polity IV: AN=AUT 
  Model 3 Model 6 
 
  Model 3 Model 6 
 




































 Oil value/cap. (log 
0.0030 0.0111    









 Armed conflict 
0.7717** 0.7144**  









 International war 
0.6925 0.4836    

























































































(0.0097) (0.0103)    
 
(0.0142) (0.0135) 
GDP/cap. (log)  
-0.3732* 
 GDP/cap. (log)  
-0.2224    





(0.2129)    
  
(0.1552) 
Constant -97.2371 -89.5458 
 
Constant -53.7043 -52.1045    
 
Constant 25.1760 27.9510 
  (84.2229) (83.1395) 
 
  (95.9465) (91.9659)    
 
  (53.3956) (52.7161) 
N 1480 1480 
 
N 1505 1505    
 
N 1465 1465 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 




Polity IV: AN=DEM 
 
Polity IV: threshold 7 
 
Polity IV: threshold 1 
  Model 3 Model 6 
 
  Model 3 Model 6 
 











-0.2999* -0.0810    
(0.2635) (0.3212) 
 
(0.2600) (0.2720)    
 











-0.1729 -0.0037    
(3.7332) (4.0757) 
 
(2.9086) (3.0103)    
 











-0.0074 0.0131    
(0.0248) (0.0337) 
 
(0.0176) (0.0221)    
 
(0.0159) (0.0204)    
Armed conflict 
0.2663 0.1282 
 Armed conflict 
0.0554 -0.0283    
 Armed conflict 
0.6294** 0.5872**  
(0.4629) (0.5036) 
 
(0.3629) (0.3736)    
 
(0.2848) (0.2971)    
International war 
0.7911 0.4213 
 International war 
0.5836 0.2554    
 International war 
0.3062 -0.0806    
(0.6267) (0.6625) 
 
(0.6153) (0.6926)    
 














-0.2402 -0.2468    
(0.4759) (0.5046) 
 
(0.4782) (0.5274)    
 

















-0.9965*** -0.9278**  
(.) (.) 
 
(0.4275) (0.4422)    
 




2.9849 3.3680    
 time 
4.8885 4.8368    
(6.4699) (6.3755) 
 
(5.0159) (5.0561)    
 




-0.0495 -0.0570    
 time2 
-0.0908 -0.0915    
(0.1221) (0.1209) 
 
(0.0929) (0.0937)    
 




0.0003 0.0003    
 time3 
0.0006 0.0006    
(0.0008) (0.0008) 
 
(0.0006) (0.0006)    
 




-0.0004 0.0037    
 spellcount 
-0.0342* -0.0260    
(0.0273) (0.0262) 
 
(0.0106) (0.0114)    
 
(0.0206) (0.0169)    
GDP/cap. (log)  
-0.5029 
 GDP/cap. (log)  
-0.3141    





(0.2686)    
  
(0.2027)    
Constant -33.6989 -20.4095 
 
Constant -59.6979 -63.7101    
 
Constant -88.0789 -82.1845    
  (113.4273) (111.5043) 
 
  (89.5593) (90.1260)    
 
  (77.7538) (75.6634)    
N 957 957 
 
N 1345 1345    
 
N 1551 1551    
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 




Polity IV: exrec & parcomp 
 
Polity IV: HYB; thresholds: 6 & -6 
 
Polity IV: HYB; thresholds: 8 & 1 
  Model 3 Model 6 
 
not able to replicate (not concave) 
 
  Model 3 Model 6 
Bureaucratic 
quality 
-0.3143** -0.0893    




(0.1558) (0.1867)    




6.4026** 6.8778**  




(2.5510) (2.7145)    




-0.0077 0.0146    




(0.0160) (0.0211)    
     
(0.0409) (0.0522) 
Armed conflict 
0.5788* 0.5287*   
     Armed conflict 
1.2333 1.0970 
(0.3051) (0.3197)    
     
(0.7942) (0.7810) 
International war 
0.4084 0.0209    
     International war 
0.0000 0.0000 
(0.5380) (0.5630)    





-0.0860 -0.0533    





(0.3432) (0.3724)    






-0.9950** -0.8635**  






(0.3983) (0.4075)    
     
(1.0722) (0.9339) 
time 
6.9568 5.8914    
     time 
5.7132 5.1124 
(4.6382) (4.4480)    
     
(14.4152) (12.9796) 
time2 
-0.1306 -0.1121    
     time2 
-0.0993 -0.0903 
(0.0866) (0.0834)    
     
(0.2660) (0.2406) 
time3 
0.0008 0.0007    
     time3 
0.0006 0.0005 
(0.0005) (0.0005)    
     
(0.0016) (0.0015) 
spellcount 
-0.0317 -0.0246    
     spellcount 
-0.0087 -0.0111 
(0.0201) (0.0165)    
     
(0.0341) (0.0337) 
GDP/cap. (log)  
-0.4955**  
     GDP/cap. (log)  
-0.3849 
 
(0.2065)    
      
(0.5216) 
Constant -123.7668 -100.0024    
     
Constant -109.3787 -93.8902 
  (82.1855) (78.6234)    
     
  (258.7611) (232.1322) 
N 1533 1533    
     
N 1156 1156 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
     








Reich 2002: HYB 
  Model 3 Model 6 
 
  Model 3 Model 6 
 
  Model 3 Model 6 
Bureaucratic 
quality 















































0.1811 0.0997    
 Armed conflict 
0.7401 0.7337 
 Armed conflict 
0.9778 0.7513 









































































































GDP/cap. (log)  
-0.5127*   
 GDP/cap. (log)  
-0.8318* 
 GDP/cap. (log)  
-1.6590 
 





Constant 14.9618 -4.9848    
 
Constant -1268.1653 -1731.3989 
 
Constant -834.5399 -1681.3797 
  (198.6181) (204.1642)    
 
  (984.6730) (1164.8090) 
 
  (2905.6308) (3505.3085) 
N 953 953    
 
N 621 621 
 
N 327 327 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 








Wahman et al. 2013 
  Model 3 Model 6 
 
  Model 3 Model 6 
 











-0.3212** -0.0606    
(0.2323) (0.2633) 
 
(0.1105) (0.1335)    
 











-2.3730 -1.6732    
(3.0296) (3.1294) 
 
(1.6194) (1.7043)    
 











-0.0017 0.0150    
(0.0240) (0.0325) 
 
(0.0103) (0.0121)    
 
(0.0123) (0.0148)    
Armed conflict 
0.3168 0.2632 
 Armed conflict 
0.4281** 0.2806    
 Armed conflict 
0.5159* 0.3658    
(0.4471) (0.4613) 
 
(0.2167) (0.2261)    
 
(0.2744) (0.2991)    
International war 
0.5432 0.3199 
 International war 




0.6383 0.0110    
(0.6341) (0.6815) 
 
(0.5004) (0.5111)    
 














-0.4051 -0.5919    
(0.5381) (0.5995) 
 
(0.2724) (0.2949)    
 

















-0.1739 -0.1675    
(0.5112) (0.5524) 
 
(0.2369) (0.2500)    
 




3.8823 4.4816    
 time 
10.0368** 10.7524**  
(7.4849) (7.6290) 
 
(3.1487) (3.1275)    
 




-0.0725 -0.0857    
 time2 
-0.1834** -0.1984**  
(0.1440) (0.1468) 
 
(0.0585) (0.0583)    
 




0.0005 0.0005    
 time3 
0.0011** 0.0012**  
(0.0009) (0.0009) 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004)    
 




-0.0122 -0.0042    
 spellcount 
-0.0155* -0.0074    
(0.0187) (0.0197) 
 
(0.0080) (0.0077)    
 
(0.0084) (0.0086)    
GDP/cap. (log)  
-0.3843 
 GDP/cap. (log)  
-0.4783*** 





(0.1281)    
  
(0.1883)    
Constant -57.4425 -57.0029 
 
Constant -70.5121 -75.6263    
 
Constant -182.6619** -189.1906**  
  (128.9828) (131.4416) 
 
  (56.0883) (55.4517)    
 
  (79.7948) (81.8194)    
N 1309 1309 
 
N 1425 1425    
 
N 1395 1395    
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Capital share 1.8185 3.2668*   convergence 
not achieved (1.2569) (1.7682)    
Log GDP pc -2.9407*** -1.8399**    
(0.7269) (0.8685)      
Growth 0.0028 -0.0080      
(0.0046) (0.0189)      
Oil -0.3467 -1.5851      
(0.6011) (0.9896)      
Muslim 0.0018 0.0079      
(0.0066) (0.0082)      
Catholic 0.0125 0.0210**    
(0.0077) (0.0087)      
Protestant -0.0053 0.0155      
(0.0170) (0.0169)      
Ethnic fractionalization 0.0067 -0.0176      
(0.0077) (0.0125)      
Religious fractionalization -0.0194* -0.0270**    
(0.0105) (0.0112)      
British colony 0.1462 -1.5224***   
(0.3792) (0.5616)      
New country -0.6351 -0.1482      
(0.5924) (0.4945)      
Past transitions 0.4270*** 1.2705***   
(0.1521) (0.2397)      
% democracies in the world -0.2056 -3.4395      
(3.4327) (4.2568)      
Presidentialism -1.2566*** 0.0000      
(0.3802) (.)      
Latin America -0.1704 0.1691      
(0.6940) (0.6687)      
Eastern Europe -0.8570 -0.1152      
(0.9623) (0.8228)      
Western Europe 0.0000 -1.8853*     
(.) (0.9935)      
Africa 0.3048 0.4924      
(0.4291) (0.4963)      
Middle East 0.8717 0.0280      
(0.9011) (0.8453)      
Decade: 60ies -0.1606 0.5035      
(0.7851) (1.0785)      
Decade: 70ies 0.3329 0.1727      
(0.9587) (1.2413)      
Decade: 80ies -0.1133 0.1537      
(0.7523) (0.9120)      
Constant 7.8642** 6.0484      
(3.2862) (4.1392)      
N 856 1215      
Pseudo-R2 0.331 0.632      
Log Likelihood -82.489 -51.701      

























Capital share 3.4348*** 1.6267* 3.3438*** 1.2776    outcome 
does not vary 
outcome 
does not vary (1.1849) (0.8422) (1.0799) (0.7794)    
Log GDP pc -2.1449*** -0.7358** -1.8226*** -0.8368*** 
 
  
(0.5272) (0.3346) (0.4890) (0.3086)    
 
  
Growth -0.0502*** -0.0224* -0.0669*** -0.0085    
 
  
(0.0195) (0.0124) (0.0195) (0.0140)    
 
  
Oil 0.1040 0.0974 -0.1915 0.7441**  
 
  
(0.4122) (0.3154) (0.4073) (0.3026)    
 
  
Muslim -0.0037 0.0058 0.0037 0.0000    
 
  
(0.0065) (0.0044) (0.0059) (0.0038)    
 
  
Catholic 0.0089 0.0098 0.0118 0.0008    
 
  
(0.0081) (0.0062) (0.0079) (0.0056)    
 
  
Protestant 0.0052 0.0103 -0.0025 0.0066    
 
  
(0.0097) (0.0073) (0.0101) (0.0061)    
 
  
Ethnic fractionalization -0.0001 -0.0066 0.0054 0.0012    
 
  
(0.0074) (0.0048) (0.0067) (0.0044)    
 
  
Religious fractionalization 0.0063 -0.0066 -0.0104 -0.0009    
 
  
(0.0105) (0.0068) (0.0107) (0.0064)    
 
  
British colony -0.4971 -0.3784* 0.2768 -0.3320*   
 
  
(0.4672) (0.2101) (0.4510) (0.1961)    
 
  
New country 0.3931 -0.1166 -0.9270* 0.1140    
 
  
(0.4784) (0.2544) (0.5344) (0.2557)    
 
  
Past transitions 0.2237* 0.1370 0.1517 0.2496**  
 
  
(0.1359) (0.1032) (0.1116) (0.0973)    
 
  
% democracies in the world 0.6972 0.9005 1.6032 1.8264    
 
  
(2.8480) (2.3572) (2.5673) (2.2507)    
 
  
Presidentialism -1.0899** -0.9259*** -0.8771** -1.6234*** 
 
  
(0.4320) (0.3165) (0.3849) (0.3932)    
 
  
Latin America -0.5108 -0.3441 -1.0206* 0.2944    
 
  
(0.4983) (0.4727) (0.5290) (0.4071)    
 
  
Eastern Europe -0.7028 -0.1438 -1.8764** 0.0000    
 
  
(0.6614) (0.5365) (0.7570) (.)    
 
  
Western Europe -1.0737 0.0000 -1.8466** 0.0000    
 
  
(0.7987) (.) (0.8056) (.)    
 
  
Africa -0.3245 0.1741 -0.4442 0.3895    
 
  
(0.4258) (0.3101) (0.4036) (0.2513)    
 
  
Middle East 0.2650 0.9938*** -0.2203 0.7904**  
 
  
(0.8745) (0.3662) (0.7508) (0.3329)    
 
  
Decade: 60ies 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000    
 
  
(.) (.) (.) (.)    
 
  
Decade: 70ies 0.3004 0.2845 0.2117 0.6724    
 
  
(0.7892) (0.6577) (0.7206) (0.6355)    
 
  
Decade: 80ies -0.3661 0.2387 -0.2128 0.6927    
 
  
(0.5959) (0.4873) (0.5271) (0.4669)    
 
  
Constant 3.3319 -0.5967 3.3167 -1.2550    
 
  
(3.0270) (2.0026) (2.8436) (1.8775)    
 
  
N 1053 1399 1076 1162    
 
  
Pseudo-R2 0.385 0.164 0.367 0.181    
 
  
Log Likelihood -96.434 -151.823 -116.322 -173.928    
 
  














Capital share -2.4295    outcome 
does not vary 
2.5702** 3.7883*** 2.2646    
(1.6703)    (1.2655) (1.4261) (2.2411)    
Log GDP pc -2.5460*** 
 
-2.7784*** -3.3556*** -2.5689**  
(0.6820)    
 
(0.6330) (0.8923) (1.0390)    
Growth -0.0193    
 
-0.0150 0.0042 -0.0470    
(0.0229)    
 
(0.0127) (0.0038) (0.0300)    
Oil 1.0701**  
 
-1.0099 -0.0078 -1.8087*   
(0.5021)    
 
(0.6687) (0.7331) (1.0982)    
Muslim -0.0030    
 
0.0068 -0.0177** 0.0130    
(0.0064)    
 
(0.0050) (0.0073) (0.0096)    
Catholic 0.0045    
 
0.0158** -0.0110 0.0291*** 
(0.0079)    
 
(0.0073) (0.0067) (0.0110)    
Protestant 0.0084    
 
0.0043 0.0033 -0.0092    
(0.0155)    
 
(0.0092) (0.0097) (0.0219)    
Ethnic fractionalization 0.0127    
 
-0.0028 0.0148 -0.0111    
(0.0084)    
 
(0.0070) (0.0111) (0.0170)    
Religious fractionalization -0.0070    
 
-0.0263*** 0.0103 -0.0502**  
(0.0104)    
 
(0.0102) (0.0126) (0.0246)    
British colony -0.5735    
 
-0.1487 -0.4204 -1.3843*   
(0.3872)    
 
(0.3807) (0.4714) (0.8349)    
New country -1.4560**  
 
-1.3046** 0.3016 -1.2781    
(0.6786)    
 
(0.5825) (0.5063) (1.3374)    
Past transitions 0.6647*** 
 
0.4750*** 0.7652*** 0.6428*** 
(0.2224)    
 
(0.1321) (0.1922) (0.2060)    
% democracies in the world -3.5385    
 
0.0645 -2.6208 9.0762    
(4.2470)    
 
(3.2647) (4.0010) (5.6153)    
Presidentialism 0.0000    
 
-1.6761*** -2.4442*** -3.8918*** 
(.)    
 
(0.3830) (0.5493) (0.8811)    
Latin America -0.7063    
 
-0.6398 1.6748** -1.4477    
(0.6850)    
 
(0.5952) (0.7155) (0.9231)    
Eastern Europe 0.0000    
 
-1.3876 1.6190* 0.0000    
(.)    
 
(1.0050) (0.8654) (.)    
Western Europe 0.0000    
 
-0.8282 0.9394 0.0000    
(.)    
 
(0.7820) (0.8838) (.)    
Africa 0.2625    
 
0.2050 1.3758*** -0.3603    
(0.4264)    
 
(0.3224) (0.4858) (0.5173)    
Middle East 0.1223    
 
0.1945 1.8614*** -0.9202    
(0.7367)    
 
(0.6194) (0.7134) (1.1456)    
Decade: 60ies -0.3129    
 
0.2897 0.0053 3.7227**  
(0.8592)    
 
(0.7906) (0.9813) (1.5126)    
Decade: 70ies 0.0871    
 
0.6266 0.3955 4.5169**  
(1.0196)    
 
(0.9353) (1.1718) (1.8063)    
Decade: 80ies -0.2698    
 
0.2535 -0.2126 3.6178*** 
(0.8006)    
 
(0.7011) (0.9062) (1.3973)    
Constant 10.8912*** 
 
8.0911** 5.7026 4.7111    
(3.9693)    
 
(3.3642) (3.7302) (5.5580)    
N 394    
 
1773 1483 735    
Pseudo-R2 0.309    
 
0.408 0.546 0.531    
Log Likelihood -83.192    
 
-94.752 -68.428 -47.984    





















6 & -6) 
Polity IV 
(8 & 1) 





vary (1.4984) (0.9499) (2.0491) (1.0844) (1.3584)    
Log GDP pc -3.5152*** -1.1087*** -3.0869*** -2.6645*** -2.9542*** 
 
  
(0.8242) (0.4280) (1.0691) (0.5960) (0.7462)    
 
  
Growth -0.0322 -0.0030 -0.0596* -0.0122 -0.0064    
 
  
(0.0255) (0.0100) (0.0304) (0.0102) (0.0129)    
 
  
Oil -1.0787 0.9174*** -0.5642 -0.6033 -0.6649    
 
  
(0.7329) (0.3480) (0.7702) (0.6017) (0.6846)    
 
  
Muslim 0.0030 -0.0024 0.0172* 0.0015 0.0018    
 
  
(0.0071) (0.0042) (0.0103) (0.0045) (0.0054)    
 
  
Catholic 0.0176* -0.0010 0.0367*** 0.0089 0.0091    
 
  
(0.0102) (0.0058) (0.0137) (0.0062) (0.0082)    
 
  
Protestant 0.0052 -0.0017 -0.0083 0.0017 0.0186*   
 
  
(0.0160) (0.0079) (0.0195) (0.0079) (0.0113)    
 
  
Ethnic fractionalization 0.0142 0.0030 0.0091 0.0015 0.0092    
 
  
(0.0097) (0.0048) (0.0117) (0.0062) (0.0079)    
 
  
Religious fractionalization -0.0300* 0.0026 -0.0460** -0.0156* -0.0161    
 
  
(0.0159) (0.0074) (0.0190) (0.0082) (0.0119)    
 
  
British colony -0.0695 -0.3721 -0.2991 -0.1836 -0.0404    
 
  
(0.5118) (0.2364) (0.6096) (0.3285) (0.4584)    
 
  
New country -0.6927 0.3676 -0.6238 -0.8069* -1.5750**  
 
  
(0.8246) (0.3743) (1.0148) (0.4796) (0.7301)    
 
  
Past transitions 0.4495*** 0.5207*** 0.2209 0.3984*** 0.3587**  
 
  
(0.1631) (0.1248) (0.1681) (0.1247) (0.1451)    
 
  
% democracies in the world -0.3366 -5.0656* 2.9215 -0.8390 0.7025    
 
  
(3.6632) (2.9088) (4.0929) (3.0413) (3.6200)    
 
  
Presidentialism -1.2182*** 0.0000 -2.0336*** -1.3404*** -1.2809*** 
 
  
(0.4399) (.) (0.5573) (0.3430) (0.3807)    
 
  
Latin America -0.8412 0.2173 -0.9647 -0.1840 -0.8119    
 
  
(0.6626) (0.4866) (0.7332) (0.5140) (0.7153)    
 
  
Eastern Europe 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.4411 -1.1501    
 
  
(.) (.) (.) (0.8845) (1.2424)    
 
  
Western Europe -0.5135 -0.2317 -1.6591 -0.1065 0.0000    
 
  
(1.0092) (0.6435) (1.0542) (0.6513) (.)    
 
  
Africa 0.0490 0.4941* -0.6762 0.3132 0.5583    
 
  
(0.4063) (0.2796) (0.5157) (0.3063) (0.3733)    
 
  
Middle East 0.7756 0.8089** 0.2515 0.5155 0.1003    
 
  
(0.8384) (0.4078) (0.9033) (0.5835) (0.6799)    
 
  
Decade: 60ies 0.2471 -0.3075 0.6549 0.4518 0.1715    
 
  
(0.8552) (0.6939) (0.9994) (0.7464) (0.8977)    
 
  
Decade: 70ies 0.5889 -0.0987 0.9595 0.8315 1.0511    
 
  
(1.0596) (0.8092) (1.2358) (0.8838) (1.0373)    
 
  
Decade: 80ies 0.3641 -0.0279 0.5967 0.3613 0.4000    
 
  
(0.7827) (0.6421) (0.8905) (0.6862) (0.7932)    
 
  
Constant 9.7107** 2.3025 9.0909* 7.2263** 6.8936*   
 
  
(4.2709) (2.5867) (5.4112) (2.9813) (3.8103)    
 
  
N 1496 1680 1388 1879 989    
 
  
Pseudo-R2 0.413 0.306 0.438 0.377 0.344    
 
  
Log Likelihood -69.806 -136.247 -58.770 -115.832 -85.862        






et al. 2000 Reich 2002 
Reich 2002 





Capital share convergence 
not achieved 
-2.5996*   outcome 
does not vary 
0.3813 1.2198 1.7559    
(1.5091)    (2.1519) (1.0589) (1.2451)    




-2.7036** -2.2950*** -2.1621*** 
 
(0.6469)    
 
(1.1742) (0.4974) (0.6578)    
Growth 
 
-0.0150    
 
0.0000 0.0111** -0.0439*   
 
(0.0215)    
 





-0.9851 -0.3149 -0.0597    
 
(0.4931)    
 
(0.9406) (0.5656) (0.4951)    
Muslim 
 
-0.0054    
 
0.0294** 0.0001 0.0133**  
 
(0.0059)    
 
(0.0124) (0.0045) (0.0063)    
Catholic 
 
0.0035    
 
0.0290** 0.0056 0.0214**  
 
(0.0071)    
 
(0.0115) (0.0055) (0.0096)    
Protestant 
 
-0.0015    
 
0.0189 -0.0017 -0.0044    
 
(0.0118)    
 





-0.0230* 0.0053 -0.0074    
 
(0.0080)    
 
(0.0124) (0.0057) (0.0080)    
Religious fractionalization 
 
-0.0065    
 
-0.0318 -0.0095 -0.0249*   
 
(0.0096)    
 
(0.0213) (0.0071) (0.0135)    
British colony 
 
-0.5073    
 
-1.0409 -0.1112 -0.0758    
 
(0.3515)    
 





-2.3255* -0.5898 -0.6243    
 
(0.5977)    
 





0.9076*** 0.3614*** 0.0243    
 
(0.1992)    
 
(0.2165) (0.1214) (0.1501)    
% democracies in the world 
 
-6.9307*   
 
-6.6763 -3.2714 3.5490    
 
(3.6705)    
 
(4.5636) (2.8794) (3.2937)    
Presidentialism 
 
0.0000    
 
-4.3208*** -1.3539*** -1.1501*** 
 
(.)    
 
(0.9233) (0.3076) (0.3840)    
Latin America 
 
-0.4524    
 
-0.0083 -0.0931 -0.8672    
 
(0.6389)    
 
(0.9158) (0.4694) (0.5588)    
Eastern Europe 
 
0.0000    
 
0.0000 -0.1632 -1.3752*   
 
(.)    
 





-2.6665* -0.5348 0.0000    
 
(0.9066)    
 
(1.4097) (0.6315) (.)    
Africa 
 
0.4456    
 
-0.3336 0.4814* -0.9780**  
 
(0.3996)    
 
(0.6099) (0.2822) (0.4852)    
Middle East 
 
0.5731    
 
-1.6319 0.4783 0.2531    
 
(0.6334)    
 
(1.2720) (0.5255) (0.8154)    
Decade: 60ies 
 
-0.4575    
 
-0.1640 -0.0479 0.0000    
 
(0.8577)    
 
(1.1435) (0.6999) (.)    
Decade: 70ies 
 
-0.3191    
 
-0.1270 0.2919 0.3805    
 
(1.0110)    
 
(1.3252) (0.8382) (0.9462)    
Decade: 80ies 
 
-0.4539    
 
-0.3999 -0.0364 0.4022    
 
(0.8270)    
 





13.9903** 7.1125*** 5.5765    
 
(3.7799)    
 
(5.7093) (2.7501) (3.5079)    
N 
 
1145    
 
1513 1677 606    
Pseudo-R2 
 
0.456    
 
0.594 0.387 0.282    
Log Likelihood 
 
-92.525    
 
-48.334 -126.963 -81.446    






Appendix VIII: Robustness Checks: Burke and Leigh 2010 
a) all potential reformers 
Freedom House (FIW, any change) 
  T3, M1 T3, M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 
GDP per capita growth (t-2) 0.9710*** 0.9705*** 0.9880 0.9949 
  (0.0079) (0.0092) (0.0096) (0.0108) 
Country-specific development level (t-
2)   1.1882 
 
0.9912 
    (0.1727) 
 
(0.1488) 
Polity score (t-2)   0.9106*** 
 
1.0247 
    (0.0182) 
 
(0.0160) 
Tenure of regime (t-1)   0.9879* 
 
1.0043 
    (0.0064) 
 
(0.0058) 
Democracy in the region (t-1)   1.0060 
 
1.0014 
    (0.0069) 
 
(0.0076) 
N 3678 3072 3577 3050 
Pseudo-R2 0.040 0.057 0.063 0.069 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Freedom House PR, any change) 
  T3, M1 T3, M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 
GDP per capita growth (t-2) 0.9684*** 0.9706** 0.9840 0.9959 
  (0.0107) (0.0116) (0.0106) (0.0132) 
Country-specific development level (t-
2)   1.0645 
 
1.0352 
    (0.2420) 
 
(0.2120) 
Polity score (t-2)   0.9213*** 
 
1.0201 
    (0.0201) 
 
(0.0209) 
Tenure of regime (t-1)   0.9791** 
 
1.0088 
    (0.0100) 
 
(0.0087) 
Democracy in the region (t-1)   1.0043 
 
0.9979 
    (0.0084) 
 
(0.0105) 
N 3146 2575 2883 2425 
Pseudo-R2 0.040 0.055 0.067 0.062 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 





M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 
GDP per capita growth (t-2) 0.9667 0.9699 0.9578** 0.9617*   
  (.) (.) (0.0207) (0.0211)    
Country-specific development level (t-2)   1.1469 
 
1.1186    
    (.) 
 
(0.4007)    
Polity score (t-2)   0.8983 
 
1.0894**  
    (.) 
 
(0.0402)    
Tenure of regime (t-1)   0.9667 
 
1.0350    
    (.) 
 
(0.0481)    
Democracy in the region (t-1)   1.0011 
 
0.9722*   
    (.) 
 
(0.0161)    
N 2354 1869 1802 1488    
Pseudo-R2 0.100 0.139 0.154 0.185    
Prob > F . . 0.000 0.000    
 
98  
Freedom House (PR, 1+ points) 
  T3, M1 T3, M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 
GDP per capita growth (t-2) 0.9703*** 0.9742** 0.9797* 0.9915 
  (0.0112) (0.0122) (0.0114) (0.0138) 
Country-specific development level (t-
2)   0.9664 
 
0.9999 
    (0.2156) 
 
(0.1997) 
Polity score (t-2)   0.9209*** 
 
1.0161 
    (0.0210) 
 
(0.0214) 
Tenure of regime (t-1)   0.9766** 
 
1.0108 
    (0.0097) 
 
(0.0089) 
Democracy in the region (t-1)   1.0054 
 
0.9981 
    (0.0082) 
 
(0.0106) 
N 3130 2561 2882 2424 
Pseudo-R2 0.050 0.066 0.088 0.081 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Gasiorowski (hybrid) 
  T3, M1 T3, M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 
GDP per capita growth (t-2) 0.9498* 0.9560 0.9817 1.0111    
  (0.0263) (0.0810) (0.0226) (0.0450)    
Country-specific development level (t-
2)   14.2190*** 
 
1.1061    
    (11.1110) 
 
(0.7188)    
Polity score (t-2)   0.7732 
 
1.3848*** 
    (0.1277) 
 
(0.1519)    
Tenure of regime (t-1)   1.1511 
 
1.2358    
    (0.1386) 
 
(0.1675)    
Democracy in the region (t-1)   1.0963* 
 
0.9216*** 
    (0.0523) 
 
(0.0283)    
N 410 271 498 413    
Pseudo-R2 0.286 0.461 0.241 0.455    
Prob > F . . . .    
 
Gates et al. 2006 (any change) 
  T3, M1 T3, M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 
GDP per capita growth (t-2) 0.9662** 0.9610** 0.9551*** 0.9553**  
  (0.0157) (0.0180) (0.0162) (0.0203)    
Country-specific development level (t-
2)   1.1450 
 
0.6982    
    (0.2706) 
 
(0.1917)    
Polity score (t-2)   0.8078*** 
 
1.1448*** 
    (0.0281) 
 
(0.0459)    
Tenure of regime (t-1)   0.9928 
 
1.0561**  
    (0.0099) 
 
(0.0272)    
Democracy in the region (t-1)   0.9993 
 
0.9874    
    (0.0135) 
 
(0.0166)    
N 2587 1985 1739 1460    
Pseudo-R2 0.075 0.166 0.105 0.161    





Polity IV (any change) 
  T3, M1 T3, M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 
GDP per capita growth (t-2) 0.9621*** 0.9571*** 0.9783 0.9804    
  (0.0085) (0.0105) (0.0131) (0.0182)    
Country-specific development level (t-
2)   0.8920 
 
0.7842    
    (0.1855) 
 
(0.1592)    
Polity score (t-2)   0.7846*** 
 
1.2088*** 
    (0.0267) 
 
(0.0484)    
Tenure of regime (t-1)   0.9928 
 
1.0768*** 
    (0.0089) 
 
(0.0286)    
Democracy in the region (t-1)   1.0070 
 
0.9922    
    (0.0108) 
 
(0.0131)    
N 3752 2959 3083 2598    
Pseudo-R2 0.072 0.163 0.070 0.150    
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
 
Polity IV (3+ points) 
  T3, M1 T3, M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 
GDP per capita growth (t-2) 0.9499*** 0.9490** 0.9562** 0.9486*   
  (0.0161) (0.0213) (0.0195) (0.0262)    
Country-specific development level (t-
2)   0.9404 
 
0.8387    
    (0.4043) 
 
(0.2650)    
Polity score (t-2)   0.6191*** 
 
1.3767*** 
    (0.0469) 
 
(0.0651)    
Tenure of regime (t-1)   1.0003 
 
1.0554    
    (0.0209) 
 
(0.0377)    
Democracy in the region (t-1)   1.0322** 
 
0.9606*** 
    (0.0158) 
 
(0.0138)    
N 2392 1734 1757 1757    
Pseudo-R2 0.141 0.318 0.138 0.304    
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
 
Polity IV (5+ points) 
  T3, M1 T3, M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 
GDP per capita growth (t-2) 0.9387** 0.9512* 0.9522* 0.9312*   
  (0.0246) (0.0244) (0.0279) (0.0376)    
Country-specific development level (t-
2)   1.2159 
 
0.5334    
    (0.5128) 
 
(0.2353)    
Polity score (t-2)   0.6435*** 
 
1.2434*** 
    (0.0559) 
 
(0.0937)    
Tenure of regime (t-1)   0.9884 
 
1.1903*** 
    (0.0232) 
 
(0.0615)    
Democracy in the region (t-1)   1.0466* 
 
0.9438*** 
    (0.0280) 
 
(0.0211)    
N 1632 1123 1066 1066    
Pseudo-R2 0.232 0.351 0.249 0.349    





Reich 2002 (hybrid) 
  T3, M1 T3, M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 
GDP per capita growth (t-2) 0.9463** 0.9409 0.9851 1.0422    
  (0.0261) (0.0467) (0.0224) (0.0399)    
Country-specific development level (t-2)   1.1262 
 
0.8606    
    (0.3968) 
 
(0.4923)    
Polity score (t-2)   0.8258* 
 
1.3340*** 
    (0.0838) 
 
(0.0767)    
Tenure of regime (t-1)   0.9301 
 
1.0545    
    (0.0413) 
 
(0.0615)    
Democracy in the region (t-1)   1.0679* 
 
0.8905*** 
    (0.0398) 
 
(0.0303)    
N 706 449 716 619    
Pseudo-R2 0.265 0.352 0.202 0.375    
Prob > F . . . .    
 
Skaaning et al. 2015 
  T3, M1 T3, M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 
GDP per capita growth (t-2) 0.9751* 0.9704** 0.9288*** 0.9089*** 
  (0.0136) (0.0143) (0.0191) (0.0189)    
Country-specific development level (t-
2)   0.9159 
 
0.6234*   
    (0.2879) 
 
(0.1703)    
Polity score (t-2)   1.0144 
 
1.0954**  
    (0.0357) 
 
(0.0430)    
Tenure of regime (t-1)   0.9971 
 
1.0375    
    (0.0153) 
 
(0.0356)    
Democracy in the region (t-1)   1.0370** 
 
0.9666**  
    (0.0155) 
 
(0.0144)    
N 2272 1511 2021 1560    
Pseudo-R2 0.121 0.176 0.146 0.202    
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
 
Wahman et al. 2013 (any change) 
  T3, M1 T3, M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 
GDP per capita growth (t-2) 0.9673*** 0.9658*** 0.9876 0.9892    
  (0.0072) (0.0084) (0.0093) (0.0119)    
Country-specific development level (t-
2)   1.1335 
 
1.0797    
    (0.1574) 
 
(0.1599)    
Polity score (t-2)   0.8986*** 
 
1.0601*** 
    (0.0176) 
 
(0.0184)    
Tenure of regime (t-1)   0.9861** 
 
1.0082    
    (0.0056) 
 
(0.0083)    
Democracy in the region (t-1)   1.0007 
 
1.0014    
    (0.0072) 
 
(0.0074)    
N 3729 3123 3771 3178    
Pseudo-R2 0.050 0.070 0.062 0.069    






Wahman et al. 2013 (1.5+ points) 
  T3, M1 T3, M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 
GDP per capita growth (t-2) 0.9613** 0.9562* 0.9551** 0.9369**  
  (0.0181) (0.0257) (0.0181) (0.0264)    
Country-specific development level (t-
2)   0.6817 
 
0.8880    
    (0.3111) 
 
(0.5175)    
Polity score (t-2)   0.6296*** 
 
1.3003*** 
    (0.0620) 
 
(0.0772)    
Tenure of regime (t-1)   0.9596 
 
1.0748    
    (0.0241) 
 
(0.0528)    
Democracy in the region (t-1)   1.0272 
 
0.9416**  
    (0.0257) 
 
(0.0229)    
N 1823 1426 1202 1058    
Pseudo-R2 0.147 0.392 0.145 0.292    
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 .    
 
V-Dem: Electoral Democracy (continuous) 
  T3, M1 T3, M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 
GDP per capita growth (t-2) 0.9754* 0.9739** 0.9456*** 0.9446*** 
  (0.0128) (0.0131) (0.0156) (0.0173)    
Country-specific development level (t-
2)   1.1290   0.9977    
    (0.1975)   (0.2517)    
Polity score (t-2)   0.9712   1.0016    
    (0.0203)   (0.0261)    
Tenure of regime (t-1)   0.9596***   0.9987    
    (0.0136)   (0.0160)    
Democracy in the region (t-1)   0.9908   0.9805    
    (0.0096)   (0.0158)    
N 3574 3034 2763 2311    
Pseudo-R2 0.093 0.113 0.085 0.093    
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
 
V-Dem: Liberal Democracy (continuous) 
  T3, M1 T3, M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 
GDP per capita growth (t-2) 0.9819 0.9910 0.9567*** 0.9589**  
  (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0155) (0.0171)    
Country-specific development level (t-
2)   1.2225   0.8262    
    (0.2451)   (0.2047)    
Polity score (t-2)   0.9814   1.0442*   
    (0.0204)   (0.0264)    
Tenure of regime (t-1)   0.9432***   1.0223    
    (0.0129)   (0.0172)    
Democracy in the region (t-1)   0.9866   0.9816    
    (0.0088)   (0.0165)    
N 3522 3021 2532 2155    
Pseudo-R2 0.119 0.139 0.076 0.089    





V-Dem: Participatory Democracy (continuous) 
  T3, M1 T3, M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 
GDP per capita growth (t-2) 0.9732** 0.9815 0.9698** 0.9760    
  (0.0119) (0.0120) (0.0151) (0.0173)    
Country-specific development level (t-
2)   1.4330**   0.9860    
    (0.2412)   (0.1884)    
Polity score (t-2)   1.0073   1.0512**  
    (0.0208)   (0.0252)    
Tenure of regime (t-1)   0.9646***   1.0042    
    (0.0098)   (0.0141)    
Democracy in the region (t-1)   0.9891   0.9800    
    (0.0076)   (0.0132)    
N 4163 3645 2990 2656    
Pseudo-R2 0.097 0.106 0.061 0.071    
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
 
V-Dem: Deliberative Democracy (continuous) 
  T3, M1 T3, M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 
GDP per capita growth (t-2) 0.9815 0.9819 0.9633** 0.9560*** 
  (0.0133) (0.0122) (0.0155) (0.0164)    
Country-specific development level (t-
2)   1.0425   0.5705**  
    (0.1669)   (0.1314)    
Polity score (t-2)   1.0042   1.0243    
    (0.0203)   (0.0277)    
Tenure of regime (t-1)   0.9739***   1.0213    
    (0.0099)   (0.0145)    
Democracy in the region (t-1)   0.9894   0.9806    
    (0.0083)   (0.0127)    
N 3886 3432 2282 2134    
Pseudo-R2 0.095 0.095 0.066 0.080    
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
 
V-Dem: Egalitarian Democracy (continuous) 
  T3, M1 T3, M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 
GDP per capita growth (t-2) 0.9758* 0.9856 0.9351*** 0.9379*** 
  (0.0137) (0.0134) (0.0184) (0.0213)    
Country-specific development level (t-
2)   1.2597   0.9434    
    (0.2198)   (0.2246)    
Polity score (t-2)   1.0024   1.0648**  
    (0.0206)   (0.0281)    
Tenure of regime (t-1)   0.9466***   1.0094    
    (0.0154)   (0.0161)    
Democracy in the region (t-1)   0.9972   0.9830    
    (0.0088)   (0.0159)    
N 3729 3250 2500 2274    
Pseudo-R2 0.103 0.125 0.080 0.094    





V-Dem: Electoral Democracy (ordinal) 
  T3, M1 T3, M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 
GDP per capita growth (t-2) 0.9889 0.9821 1.0106 1.0065 
  (0.0125) (0.0123) (0.0170) (0.0169) 
Country-specific development level (t-2)   1.0520   0.6699 
    (0.1662)   (0.2570) 
Polity score (t-2)   0.9753   1.0012 
    (0.0214)   (0.0593) 
Tenure of regime (t-1)   0.9680***   1.0531 
    (0.0098)   (0.0343) 
Democracy in the region (t-1)   0.9969   1.0103 
    (0.0091)   (0.0195) 
N 3606 3047 1221 1175 
Pseudo-R2 0.064 0.070 0.132 0.162 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 
 
V-Dem: Liberal Democracy (ordinal) 
  T3, M1 T3, M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 
GDP per capita growth (t-2) 0.9729* 0.9767 0.9631 0.9516*   
  (0.0152) (0.0169) (0.0258) (0.0255)    
Country-specific development level (t-2)   1.3803   0.6807    
    (0.3627)   (0.1971)    
Polity score (t-2)   1.0150   0.8143*** 
    (0.0294)   (0.0390)    
Tenure of regime (t-1)   0.9571**   1.0946*** 
    (0.0173)   (0.0305)    
Democracy in the region (t-1)   0.9795*   1.0095    
    (0.0121)   (0.0164)    
N 2817 2501 1138 1108    
Pseudo-R2 0.136 0.156 0.148 0.232    
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 .    
 
V-Dem: Participatory Democracy (ordinal) 
  T3, M1 T3, M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 
GDP per capita growth (t-2) 0.9834 0.9865 1.0235 1.0162 
  (0.0164) (0.0171) (0.0364) (0.0374) 
Country-specific development level (t-2)   1.1365   0.4804 
    (0.2476)   (0.2371) 
Polity score (t-2)   1.0268   0.9293 
    (0.0276)   (0.0457) 
Tenure of regime (t-1)   0.9545**   1.0341 
    (0.0190)   (0.0279) 
Democracy in the region (t-1)   0.9906   0.9856 
    (0.0112)   (0.0224) 
N 3055 2717 1016 1014 
Pseudo-R2 0.096 0.116 0.171 0.206 







V-Dem: Deliberative Democracy (ordinal) 
  T3, M1 T3, M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 
GDP per capita growth (t-2) 0.9889 0.9866 0.9819 0.9680    
  (0.0168) (0.0170) (0.0270) (0.0269)    
Country-specific development level (t-2)   0.9448   0.5340**  
    (0.2120)   (0.1356)    
Polity score (t-2)   1.0488*   1.0150    
    (0.0274)   (0.0962)    
Tenure of regime (t-1)   0.9608**   1.0655**  
    (0.0174)   (0.0340)    
Democracy in the region (t-1)   0.9702***   0.9828    
    (0.0092)   (0.0147)    
N 3117 2816 1408 1407    
Pseudo-R2 0.117 0.130 0.144 0.173    
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
 
V-Dem: Egalitarian Democracy (ordinal) 
  T3, M1 T3, M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 
GDP per capita growth (t-2) 0.9973 0.9944 0.9782 0.9620    
  (0.0174) (0.0192) (0.0234) (0.0230)    
Country-specific development level (t-2)   1.1580   0.9761    
    (0.2985)   (0.4186)    
Polity score (t-2)   0.9799   0.7969*** 
    (0.0334)   (0.0525)    
Tenure of regime (t-1)   0.9600**   1.0178    
    (0.0163)   (0.0329)    
Democracy in the region (t-1)   0.9891   1.0381*   
    (0.0106)   (0.0198)    
N 3184 2731 1209 1145    
Pseudo-R2 0.120 0.142 0.160 0.238    
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
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b) DEM/ AUT only 
Freedom House (FIW, any change) 
  T3, M1 T3, M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 
GDP per capita growth (t-2) 0.9677*** 0.9700** 1.0015 1.0106    
  (0.0106) (0.0124) (0.0220) (0.0225)    
Country-specific development level (t-
2)   1.3411 
 
1.0319    
    (0.2675) 
 
(0.2327)    
Polity score (t-2)   1.0010 
 
0.9003**  
    (0.0312) 
 
(0.0454)    
Tenure of regime (t-1)   0.9903 
 
1.0320    
    (0.0094) 
 
(0.0266)    
Democracy in the region (t-1)   1.0051 
 
1.0191*   
    (0.0124) 
 
(0.0105)    
N 2174 1577 1539 1532    
Pseudo-R2 0.060 0.068 0.107 0.125    
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
 
Freedom House PR, any change) 
  T3, M1 T3, M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 
GDP per capita growth (t-2) 0.9625*** 0.9693** 0.9826 0.9960    
  (0.0132) (0.0150) (0.0221) (0.0243)    
Country-specific development level (t-
2)   1.3905 
 
1.0032    
    (0.3498) 
 
(0.3057)    
Polity score (t-2)   1.0276 
 
0.8670*   
    (0.0318) 
 
(0.0655)    
Tenure of regime (t-1)   0.9802 
 
1.1096**  
    (0.0125) 
 
(0.0449)    
Democracy in the region (t-1)   1.0057 
 
1.0096    
    (0.0112) 
 
(0.0150)    
N 2128 1562 1197 1194    
Pseudo-R2 0.064 0.080 0.073 0.131    
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
 
 





M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 
GDP per capita growth (t-2) 0.9523 0.9496 0.8788*** 0.8351*** 
  (.) (.) (0.0344) (0.0421)    
Country-specific development level (t-2)   1.3026 
 
0.9670    
    (.) 
 
(0.2992)    
Polity score (t-2)   1.0387 
 
0.8057*** 
    (.) 
 
(0.0614)    
Tenure of regime (t-1)   0.9798 
 
1.1708*** 
    (.) 
 
(0.0551)    
Democracy in the region (t-1)   1.0145 
 
1.0134    
    (.) 
 
(0.0194)    
N 1462 1053 647 642    
Pseudo-R2 0.141 0.173 0.244 0.365    
Prob > F . . 0.000 .    
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Freedom House (PR, 1+ points) 
  T3, M1 T3, M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 
GDP per capita growth (t-2) 0.9643** 0.9732* 0.9821 0.9964    
  (0.0136) (0.0156) (0.0224) (0.0248)    
Country-specific development level (t-2)   1.2926 
 
1.0622    
    (0.3275) 
 
(0.3319)    
Polity score (t-2)   1.0315 
 
0.8504**  
    (0.0331) 
 
(0.0664)    
Tenure of regime (t-1)   0.9767* 
 
1.1209*** 
    (0.0128) 
 
(0.0451)    
Democracy in the region (t-1)   1.0077 
 
1.0130    
    (0.0104) 
 
(0.0157)    
N 2128 1554 1194 1191    
Pseudo-R2 0.075 0.097 0.090 0.158    
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
 
Gasiorowski (hybrid) 
      T3, M3   
GDP per capita growth (t-2)     0.9458   
      (0.1527)   
Country-specific development level (t-2)     
 
  
      
 
  
Polity score (t-2)     
 
  
      
 
  
Tenure of regime (t-1)     
 
  
      
 
  
Democracy in the region (t-1)     
 
  
      
 
  
N     95   
Pseudo-R2     
 
  





Gates et al. 2006 (any change) 
  T3, M1 T3, M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 
GDP per capita growth (t-2) 0.9621 0.9628 0.9814 0.9579    
  (0.0227) (0.0273) (0.0342) (0.0386)    
Country-specific development level (t-2)   0.8427 
 
0.3052**  
    (0.2902) 
 
(0.1774)    
Polity score (t-2)   0.9680 
 
1.0228    
    (0.0629) 
 
(0.1911)    
Tenure of regime (t-1)   1.0162 
 
1.3049*** 
    (0.0132) 
 
(0.1056)    
Democracy in the region (t-1)   1.0136 
 
0.9589    
    (0.0169) 
 
(0.0282)    
N 1687 1121 658 658    
Pseudo-R2 0.163 0.171 0.253 0.446    




Polity IV (any change) 
  T3, M1 T3, M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 
GDP per capita growth (t-2) 0.9468*** 0.9587** 0.9913 0.9895    
  (0.0131) (0.0163) (0.0162) (0.0226)    
Country-specific development level (t-
2)   0.8623 
 
0.6652*   
    (0.3049) 
 
(0.1603)    
Polity score (t-2)   0.6535*** 
 
1.0662    
    (0.0656) 
 
(0.1055)    
Tenure of regime (t-1)   1.0092 
 
1.1796*** 
    (0.0176) 
 
(0.0461)    
Democracy in the region (t-1)   1.0662*** 
 
0.9836    
    (0.0177) 
 
(0.0131)    
N 2149 1358 1360 1360    
Pseudo-R2 0.167 0.247 0.106 0.188    
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
 
Polity IV (3+ points) 
  T3, M1 T3, M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 
GDP per capita growth (t-2) 0.9406*** 0.9497* 0.9550 0.9319**  
  (0.0195) (0.0265) (0.0283) (0.0317)    
Country-specific development level (t-
2)   1.1757 
 
0.3641*   
    (0.5365) 
 
(0.2022)    
Polity score (t-2)   0.8951 
 
0.9568    
    (0.1125) 
 
(0.1656)    
Tenure of regime (t-1)   1.0757** 
 
1.3221*** 
    (0.0355) 
 
(0.0826)    
Democracy in the region (t-1)   1.0615*** 
 
0.9317*** 
    (0.0216) 
 
(0.0238)    
N 1732 1118 834 834    
Pseudo-R2 0.258 0.315 0.210 0.352    




Polity IV (5+ points) 
  T3, M1 T3, M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 
GDP per capita growth (t-2) 0.9380*** 0.9491* 0.9494* 0.9211**  
  (0.0217) (0.0277) (0.0295) (0.0338)    
Country-specific development level (t-
2)   0.8872 
 
0.4264*   
    (0.4300) 
 
(0.2092)    
Polity score (t-2)   0.9762 
 
1.0605    
    (0.1412) 
 
(0.1883)    
Tenure of regime (t-1)   1.0429 
 
1.2871*** 
    (0.0469) 
 
(0.0874)    
Democracy in the region (t-1)   1.0662** 
 
0.9220*** 
    (0.0335) 
 
(0.0269)    
N 1336 873 774 774    
Pseudo-R2 0.298 0.334 0.257 0.390    
Prob > F 0.000 . . .    
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Reich 2002 (hybrid) 
  T3, M1 T3, M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 







concave   
Country-specific development level (t-
2)     
 
  
      
 
  
Polity score (t-2)     
 
  
      
 
  
Tenure of regime (t-1)     
 
  
      
 
  
Democracy in the region (t-1)     
 
  
      
 
  
N     
 
  
Pseudo-R2     
 
  
Prob > F         
 
 
Skaaning et al. 2015 
 
T3, M1 T3, M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 
 














Wahman et al. 2013 (any change) 
  T3, M1 T3, M2 T3, M3 T3, M4 
GDP per capita growth (t-2) 0.9625*** 0.9643*** 1.0022 1.0056    
  (0.0094) (0.0109) (0.0216) (0.0219)    
Country-specific development level (t-
2)   1.1286 
 
1.1130    
    (0.1928) 
 
(0.2314)    
Polity score (t-2)   0.9369** 
 
0.8606    
    (0.0304) 
 
(0.0936)    
Tenure of regime (t-1)   0.9948 
 
1.0956*** 
    (0.0081) 
 
(0.0323)    
Democracy in the region (t-1)   1.0040 
 
1.0139    
    (0.0109) 
 
(0.0108)    
N 2402 1792 1383 1383    
Pseudo-R2 0.080 0.086 0.119 0.138    
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
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Wahman et al. 2013 (1.5+ points) 
  T3, M1 T3, M2 
T3, 
M3 T3, M4 
GDP per capita growth (t-2) 0.9507** 0.9531* 0.9654 not 
concave   (0.0232) (0.0277) (.) 
Country-specific development level (t-
2)   0.6352 
 
  
    (0.3304) 
 
  
Polity score (t-2)   0.7003*** 
 
  
    (0.0765) 
 
  
Tenure of regime (t-1)   0.9688 
 
  
    (0.0249) 
 
  
Democracy in the region (t-1)   1.0241 
 
  
    (0.0270) 
 
  
N 1325 980 230   
Pseudo-R2 0.191 0.308 0.393   




Appendix IX: Robustness Checks: Cornell 2013 

















Democracy aid 61.1950*** 20.6502 57.9976*** 21.9191    
  (15.1009) (18.4736) (9.1796) (18.9972)    
Other aid 0.1495 -0.0973 -0.0128 -0.1532    
  (0.1477) (0.1269) (0.1365) (0.1622)    
GDP per capita 0.0085 0.0069 0.0038 0.0059    
  (0.0064) (0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0065)    
Trade openness -0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001    
  (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)    
Economic growth -0.0046*** -0.0030*** -0.0021*** -0.0030*** 
  (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0011)    
Religious fractionalization 0.0267 -0.0003 -0.0031 -0.0086    
  (0.0428) (0.0451) (0.0252) (0.0487)    
Ethnic fractionalization 0.0367 0.0439 0.0383 0.0587    
  (0.0263) (0.0347) (0.0256) (0.0412)    
Monarchy 0.0591 0.0557 -0.0041 0.0593    
  (0.0597) (0.0459) (0.0301) (0.0501)    
Military regime 0.1217*** 0.0958** 0.0501* 0.0955**  
  (0.0453) (0.0388) (0.0273) (0.0404)    
Limited multi-party regime 0.0600 0.0554 -0.0021 0.0548    
  (0.0412) (0.0376) (0.0268) (0.0425)    
Other regimes 0.1652*** 0.1568*** 0.0912** 0.1539*** 
  (0.0567) (0.0483) (0.0365) (0.0495)    
Democracy -0.0358 -0.0401 -0.0558* 0.0564    
  (0.0530) (0.0456) (0.0308) (0.0663)    
Monarchy * democracy aid -66.0467*** -25.0233 -61.2776*** -25.5857    
  (15.6662) (18.7889) (9.8595) (19.1735)    
Military regime * democracy aid -62.9894*** -18.6355 -62.0312*** -19.7996    
  (17.8179) (21.4002) (9.3744) (21.6946)    
Limited multi-party regime * democracy aid -61.1811*** -20.7037 -58.3444*** -21.9384    
  (15.0922) (18.5144) (9.2185) (19.0116)    
Other regimes * democracy aid -44.9823*** -2.3659 -58.9861*** -3.5342    
  (15.6906) (18.6366) (10.2038) (18.9767)    
Democracy * democracy aid -62.2346*** -20.5991 -57.7519*** -23.6436    
  (15.0788) (18.4754) (9.4681) (19.0114)    
Constant 0.0888 0.0998 0.1350** 0.1723*   
  (0.0803) (0.0704) (0.0571) (0.0939)    
N 1915 1775 1638 1419    
R2 0.053 0.053 0.055 0.049    






















Democracy aid 121.9018 32.4767 46.2489** 33.9180* 42.5880**  
  (.) (24.7706) (19.8624) (17.4925) (17.2859)    
Other aid -0.3117 -0.0824 0.1246 0.0894 0.0669    
  (.) (0.1462) (0.1584) (0.1623) (0.2078)    
GDP per capita -0.0005 -0.0046 0.0105* 0.0066 0.0018    
  (.) (0.0040) (0.0057) (0.0045) (0.0044)    
Trade openness 0.0007 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002** -0.0000    
  (.) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)    
Economic growth 0.0008 -0.0023** -0.0024* -0.0013 -0.0010    
  (.) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0008)    
Religious fractionalization 0.1461 -0.0151 -0.0102 -0.0266 -0.0412    
  (.) (0.0316) (0.0375) (0.0296) (0.0334)    
Ethnic fractionalization -0.0002 -0.0088 -0.0624* -0.0152 0.0091    
  (.) (0.0401) (0.0377) (0.0252) (0.0262)    
Monarchy -0.0979 -0.0933** -0.0100 -0.0115 0.0305    
  (.) (0.0435) (0.0545) (0.0303) (0.0368)    
Military regime 0.0724 0.0304 0.0692 0.0695** 0.0725**  
  (.) (0.0423) (0.0432) (0.0321) (0.0349)    
Limited multi-party regime 0.0383 -0.0316 -0.0410 -0.0077 0.0262    
  (.) (0.0384) (0.0425) (0.0270) (0.0286)    
Other regimes 0.3391 0.1481 0.0001 -0.0065 0.0295    
  (.) (0.0927) (0.0573) (0.0400) (0.0454)    
Democracy -0.0282 -0.1000** -0.1199** -0.0770** -0.0197    
  (.) (0.0418) (0.0489) (0.0340) (0.0505)    
Monarchy * democracy aid -190.8728 -32.0736 -49.7729** -32.6033* -43.1492**  
  (.) (24.8162) (21.6189) (18.9991) (18.8325)    
Military regime * democracy aid -122.2822 -33.3651 -35.8808* -38.5111** -44.2851**  
  (.) (26.2464) (20.9977) (17.9173) (18.6834)    
Limited multi-party regime * democracy aid -130.2216 -29.4172 -46.2592** -35.9448** -45.5534*** 
  (.) (25.1250) (19.8797) (17.6739) (17.3604)    
Other regimes * democracy aid -397.8828 -188.1423** 11.6637 -31.1485 -47.2561**  
  (.) (90.2452) (27.4382) (20.5571) (20.4675)    
Democracy * democracy aid -121.1696 -34.5063 -46.2308** -34.7763** -43.5461**  
  (.) (24.4170) (19.8112) (17.4695) (17.2398)    
Constant -0.1181 0.1546*** 0.2044*** 0.1872*** 0.1113    
  (.) (0.0555) (0.0638) (0.0601) (0.0705)    
N 161 901 1709 1368 1089    
R2 0.173 0.060 0.078 0.046 0.035    























Democracy aid 35.4970 32.0170 67.5590*** 53.7257*** 
  (36.8065) (24.5775) (16.3281) (9.0427)    
Other aid 0.1637 0.0188 0.0651 0.0350    
  (0.1932) (0.1638) (0.1499) (0.0869)    
GDP per capita -0.0019 -0.0028 0.0087 0.0012    
  (0.0054) (0.0051) (0.0071) (0.0024)    
Trade openness -0.0003* -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000    
  (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)    
Economic growth 0.0012 0.0005 -0.0054*** -0.0015**  
  (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0007)    
Religious fractionalization 0.1441*** -0.0142 0.0255 0.0024    
  (0.0508) (0.0369) (0.0534) (0.0266)    
Ethnic fractionalization -0.1354 -0.0269 0.0443 0.0019    
  (0.0854) (0.0350) (0.0308) (0.0182)    
Monarchy 0.1501** -0.0195 0.0436 0.0054    
  (0.0697) (0.0515) (0.0698) (0.0239)    
Military regime 0.0517 0.0561 0.1567*** 0.0606**  
  (0.0383) (0.0436) (0.0474) (0.0273)    
Limited multi-party regime 0.0802** -0.0096 0.0580 0.0075    
  (0.0344) (0.0416) (0.0473) (0.0222)    
Other regimes 0.2298*** 0.0577 0.1295** 0.0656**  
  (0.0752) (0.0516) (0.0590) (0.0333)    
Democracy 0.0122 0.0000 -0.0529 -0.0289    
  (0.0302) (.) (0.0605) (0.0266)    
Monarchy * democracy aid -43.2982 -38.8568 -72.1734*** -55.3920*** 
  (36.0790) (23.6331) (17.5600) (9.0603)    
Military regime * democracy aid -35.2628 -22.5489 -58.1747*** -56.8549*** 
  (36.5699) (25.9439) (19.2091) (10.4651)    
Limited multi-party regime * democracy aid -36.9539 -32.3468 -65.9406*** -54.0792*** 
  (37.5993) (24.4883) (16.4120) (9.0517)    
Other regimes * democracy aid -133.3476* -15.9485 -49.3876*** -53.1112*** 
  (73.3240) (24.3394) (17.1713) (9.8640)    
Democracy * democracy aid -37.7711 0.0000 -68.5522*** -53.4936*** 
  (36.4500) (.) (16.3272) (9.0448)    
Constant 0.0182 0.2553** 0.1053 0.0900**  
  (0.0997) (0.1065) (0.0847) (0.0457)    
N 502 1008 1921 1766    
R2 0.078 0.070 0.072 0.058    




























Democracy aid 55.4172*** 54.9099*** 45.3655*** 58.7193*** 22.8969*   
  (10.9996) (10.9203) (10.9893) (19.4848) (13.2004)    
Other aid 0.2273** 0.2771*** 0.2465** 0.2303** 0.1509    
  (0.1020) (0.1063) (0.1201) (0.1153) (0.1270)    
GDP per capita -0.0049 0.0020 0.0032 0.0011 0.0013    
  (0.0039) (0.0050) (0.0048) (0.0052) (0.0060)    
Trade openness -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003** 0.0000 -0.0000    
  (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)    
Economic growth -0.0016 -0.0030*** -0.0023** -0.0031*** -0.0012    
  (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0010)    
Religious fractionalization 0.0455 0.0403 0.0001 0.0227 0.0045    
  (0.0300) (0.0405) (0.0385) (0.0425) (0.0419)    
Ethnic fractionalization 0.0112 0.0491 0.0343 0.0441 0.0219    
  (0.0290) (0.0300) (0.0282) (0.0296) (0.0315)    
Monarchy -0.0358 -0.0447 -0.0526 0.0117 -0.0579    
  (0.0386) (0.0380) (0.0365) (0.0447) (0.0393)    
Military regime 0.0743** 0.0588 0.0584* 0.0947** 0.0401    
  (0.0349) (0.0404) (0.0338) (0.0378) (0.0371)    
Limited multi-party regime -0.0050 0.0031 -0.0049 0.0109 -0.0026    
  (0.0319) (0.0347) (0.0365) (0.0391) (0.0381)    
Other regimes 0.0392 0.0510 0.0049 0.0845 0.0416    
  (0.0476) (0.0515) (0.0515) (0.0529) (0.0469)    
Democracy -0.0403 -0.0293 -0.0359 -0.0200 -0.0296    
  (0.0413) (0.0427) (0.0458) (0.0468) (0.0482)    
Monarchy * democracy aid -58.3717*** -57.5409*** -48.1295*** -65.5507*** -25.1992*   
  (11.1596) (10.6820) (10.8086) (19.5131) (13.0572)    
Military regime * democracy aid -51.9919*** -54.7381*** -27.8017** -62.0812*** -25.4132*   
  (12.7010) (11.8519) (12.5607) (20.4947) (14.4037)    
Limited multi-party regime * democracy aid -56.0982*** -55.3541*** -45.9776*** -57.9744*** -23.6271*   
  (11.0104) (10.9082) (11.0015) (19.5300) (13.2210)    
Other regimes * democracy aid -36.8792*** -35.0166*** -24.1956* -38.9844* -3.8585    
  (12.2680) (13.3692) (12.4529) (20.2939) (13.7083)    
Democracy * democracy aid -55.4553*** -54.9511*** -45.0944*** -58.2532*** -21.9561*   
  (10.9682) (10.8713) (10.9514) (19.4807) (13.2055)    
Constant 0.0477 0.0424 0.0889 0.0007 0.0496    
  (0.0472) (0.0574) (0.0606) (0.0625) (0.0539)    
N 1841 1841 1841 1824 1841    
R2 0.063 0.054 0.060 0.051 0.032    




























Democracy aid 7.5750 60.7241*** 14.8081* 8.7264 11.8757 
  (17.4345) (7.5063) (7.5847) (7.8748) (9.9313) 
Other aid 0.2338* 0.1194* 0.0052 0.1544 0.1448 
  (0.1211) (0.0678) (0.0688) (0.1053) (0.0994) 
GDP per capita 0.0045 0.0019 0.0032 0.0035 0.0000 
  (0.0052) (0.0026) (0.0039) (0.0044) (0.0030) 
Trade openness -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001* 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Economic growth -0.0014 -0.0009 -0.0006 -0.0015* -0.0004 
  (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) 
Religious fractionalization -0.0179 0.0362 0.0110 0.0522** -0.0042 
  (0.0291) (0.0254) (0.0311) (0.0206) (0.0328) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.0000 -0.0106 0.0095 -0.0098 -0.0248 
  (0.0377) (0.0284) (0.0233) (0.0244) (0.0227) 
Monarchy -0.0436 0.0430* -0.0038 -0.0031 -0.0338 
  (0.0294) (0.0236) (0.0249) (0.0315) (0.0379) 
Military regime 0.0456** 0.0827*** 0.0478* 0.0708** 0.0189 
  (0.0191) (0.0277) (0.0248) (0.0305) (0.0240) 
Limited multi-party regime -0.0333 0.0425** 0.0291 0.0218 -0.0121 
  (0.0275) (0.0217) (0.0233) (0.0254) (0.0265) 
Other regimes 0.0072 0.0892*** 0.0399 0.0673* 0.0220 
  (0.0391) (0.0339) (0.0286) (0.0363) (0.0340) 
Democracy -0.0315 0.0242 -0.0016 -0.0187 -0.0324 
  (0.0299) (0.0284) (0.0246) (0.0322) (0.0307) 
Monarchy * democracy aid -11.7935 -63.5962*** -14.2581* -11.0130 7.1912 
  (17.3680) (7.4713) (7.5996) (7.9007) (13.2524) 
Military regime * democracy aid -7.3528 -63.0368*** -15.1791* -9.2568 -9.7018 
  (17.7538) (8.5029) (9.0477) (9.1142) (10.7093) 
Limited multi-party regime * democracy aid -7.8139 -61.0266*** -15.1812** -7.4535 -12.1202 
  (17.3909) (7.5156) (7.5708) (7.8410) (9.9462) 
Other regimes * democracy aid 5.1790 -43.4810*** 3.6678 7.4389 8.2251 
  (17.9805) (7.6761) (7.5948) (9.2103) (10.0115) 
Democracy * democracy aid -7.9400 -61.4672*** -15.1459** -6.0113 -11.1670 
  (17.3258) (7.5123) (7.5430) (7.9391) (9.9296) 
Constant 0.0961** -0.0214 0.0354 -0.0140 0.0776* 
  (0.0432) (0.0382) (0.0433) (0.0468) (0.0419) 
N 1712 1802 1841 1780 1816 
R2 0.030 0.055 0.032 0.040 0.042 




























Democracy aid 62.2380*** 19.2872 57.9110*** 19.2872    
  (15.4711) (21.8863) (12.7137) (21.8863)    
Other aid 0.2215 0.1420 0.0259 0.1420    
  (0.3195) (0.2085) (0.2110) (0.2085)    
GDP per capita -0.0030 0.0012 0.0025 0.0012    
  (0.0106) (0.0081) (0.0073) (0.0081)    
Trade openness 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001    
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)    
Economic growth -0.0046*** -0.0030** -0.0022** -0.0030**  
  (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0012)    
Religious fractionalization 0.0462 0.0131 0.0036 0.0131    
  (0.0581) (0.0530) (0.0334) (0.0530)    
Ethnic fractionalization 0.1117*** 0.0643* 0.0626** 0.0643*   
  (0.0392) (0.0368) (0.0294) (0.0368)    
Monarchy 0.0739 0.0633 -0.0159 0.0633    
  (0.0815) (0.0570) (0.0470) (0.0570)    
Military regime 0.1102** 0.1018** 0.0431 0.1018**  
  (0.0561) (0.0402) (0.0391) (0.0402)    
Limited multi-party regime 0.0582 0.0702 0.0007 0.0702    
  (0.0576) (0.0462) (0.0370) (0.0462)    
Other regimes 0.1514** 0.1680*** 0.0818 0.1680*** 
  (0.0695) (0.0528) (0.0499) (0.0528)    
Democracy 0.0000 -0.2389 0.0000 -0.2389    
  (.) (0.7665) (.) (0.7665)    
Monarchy * democracy aid -64.8148*** -25.4021 -63.4593*** -25.4021    
  (16.4438) (21.0521) (14.0561) (21.0521)    
Military regime * democracy aid -63.1326*** -17.3253 -62.6574*** -17.3253    
  (19.3258) (23.6924) (12.9608) (23.6924)    
Limited multi-party regime * democracy aid -55.8983*** -19.3321 -56.7759*** -19.3321    
  (15.3659) (21.8020) (12.9078) (21.8020)    
Other regimes * democracy aid -47.0343*** -2.6987 -59.4919*** -2.6987    
  (15.9694) (21.3729) (13.6634) (21.3729)    
Democracy * democracy aid 0.0000 -14.5390 0.0000 -14.5390    
  (.) (100.0123) (.) (100.0123)    
Constant 0.1358 0.1335 0.2193** 0.1335    
  (0.1240) (0.1067) (0.1091) (0.1067)    
N 1090 1137 1090 1137    
R2 0.061 0.054 0.061 0.054    























Democracy aid no 
observations 
32.9746 41.4601 32.9637 40.8277*   
  (34.1309) (32.0147) (24.8707) (22.2834)    
Other aid 
 
0.0895 0.1342 0.1579 0.1500    
  
 
(0.3832) (0.3686) (0.2774) (0.2944)    
GDP per capita 
 
-0.0217* 0.0137 0.0038 0.0004    
  
 
(0.0126) (0.0110) (0.0051) (0.0039)    
Trade openness 
 
-0.0001 -0.0003* -0.0002 -0.0000    
  
 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)    
Economic growth 
 
-0.0024** -0.0018 -0.0013 -0.0007    
  
 
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0009)    
Religious fractionalization 
 
0.0285 -0.0372 -0.0135 -0.0183    
  
 
(0.0533) (0.0595) (0.0477) (0.0414)    
Ethnic fractionalization 
 
-0.0718 -0.0417 -0.0164 0.0323    
  
 
(0.0794) (0.0647) (0.0541) (0.0437)    
Monarchy 
 
-0.0496 -0.0671 -0.0093 0.0213    
  
 
(0.0596) (0.0808) (0.0431) (0.0463)    
Military regime 
 
0.0450 0.0162 0.0707 0.0649    
  
 
(0.0539) (0.0611) (0.0487) (0.0437)    
Limited multi-party regime 
 
0.0360 -0.0696 0.0273 0.0320    
  
 
(0.0450) (0.0688) (0.0387) (0.0400)    
Other regimes 
 
0.1752* -0.0819 -0.0352 0.0073    
  
 
(0.1063) (0.0908) (0.0628) (0.0575)    
Democracy 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000    
  
 
(.) (.) (.) (.)    
Monarchy * democracy aid 
 
-39.0597 -45.4738 -36.1656 -44.4556*   
  
 
(33.5176) (33.0960) (25.6349) (23.3946)    
Military regime * democracy aid 
 
-35.6304 -31.7010 -37.2769 -41.0856*   
  
 
(35.7912) (32.9681) (25.4740) (23.7065)    
Limited multi-party regime * democracy aid 
 
-39.7544 -38.3341 -33.6378 -41.6847*   
  
 
(35.7083) (33.6305) (26.0811) (23.5843)    
Other regimes * democracy aid 
 
-191.2576* -4.3093 -19.0090 -42.1004    
  
 
(107.8575) (40.0045) (28.3047) (25.9513)    
Democracy * democracy aid 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000    
  
 
(.) (.) (.) (.)    
Constant 
 
0.1974 0.5512*** 0.3869** 0.2001*   
  
 
(0.1414) (0.1623) (0.1636) (0.1158)    
N 
 
470 799 799 799    
R2 
 
0.059 0.072 0.056 0.043    























Democracy aid no 
observations 
no thresholds 
for DEM/  
AUT 
67.5590*** 53.7257*** 
  (16.3281) (9.0427)    
Other aid 
 
0.0651 0.0350    
  
  
(0.1499) (0.0869)    
GDP per capita 
  
0.0087 0.0012    
  
  
(0.0071) (0.0024)    
Trade openness 
  
-0.0000 -0.0000    
  
  
(0.0002) (0.0001)    
Economic growth 
  
-0.0054*** -0.0015**  
  
  
(0.0013) (0.0007)    
Religious fractionalization 
  
0.0255 0.0024    
  
  
(0.0534) (0.0266)    
Ethnic fractionalization 
  
0.0443 0.0019    
  
  
(0.0308) (0.0182)    
Monarchy 
  
0.0436 0.0054    
  
  
(0.0698) (0.0239)    
Military regime 
  
0.1567*** 0.0606**  
  
  
(0.0474) (0.0273)    
Limited multi-party regime 
  
0.0580 0.0075    
  
  
(0.0473) (0.0222)    
Other regimes 
  
0.1295** 0.0656**  
  
  
(0.0590) (0.0333)    
Democracy 
  
-0.0529 -0.0289    
  
  
(0.0605) (0.0266)    





(17.5600) (9.0603)    





(19.2091) (10.4651)    





(16.4120) (9.0517)    





(17.1713) (9.8640)    





(16.3272) (9.0448)    
Constant 
  
0.1053 0.0900**  
  
  
(0.0847) (0.0457)    
N 
  
1921 1766    
R2 
  
0.072 0.058    











Appendix X: Robustness Checks: Ansell and Samuels 2010 
a) all potential reformers 
 
  
Freedom House (FIW, any 
change) 
Freedom House (PR, any 
change) 
Freedom House (FIW, 1+ 
points) 
Freedom House (PR, 1+ 
points) 
  T3, MC T3, ME T3, MC T3, ME T3, MC T3, ME T3, MC T3, ME 
Lag Democracy Score 0.0854*** 0.0898*** 0.0622*** 0.0642*** 0.0299*** 0.0246** 0.0416*** 0.1021 
  (0.0111) (0.0093) (0.0079) (0.0073) (0.0077) (0.0098) (0.0142) (0.0801) 
Gini -0.2351 6.6289** -0.2820 7.5098* 0.4285 10.5823 -0.0679 -86.9676 
  (0.5252) (3.2298) (0.4178) (3.9553) (0.4768) (9.7770) (0.6214) (96.8753) 
GDP per capita -0.0000** -0.0000* -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
Rural inequality -0.1046 -0.0868 -0.0571 -0.0327 -0.0923 -0.0502 -0.0668 -0.4442 
  (0.1540) (0.1431) (0.1319) (0.1324) (0.1086) (0.1215) (0.1351) (0.7051) 
Vanhanen Knowledge -0.0075** -0.0065*** -0.0102*** -0.0092*** -0.0054** -0.0053*** -0.0109*** -0.0078 
  (0.0031) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0035) (0.0105) 
Year 0.0090*** 0.0066** 0.0109*** 0.0075*** 0.0046** 0.0012 0.0121*** 0.0244 
  (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0019) (0.0038) (0.0027) (0.0172) 
Constant -17.5376*** -15.8858*** -21.2548*** -18.1433*** -9.1126** -7.1304 -23.7043*** -8.8248 
  (5.1626) (4.7781) (4.7606) (4.7370) (3.7953) (4.4212) (5.3742) (26.3605) 







0.035   











  Gasiorowski 1996 (hybrid) 
Gates et al. 2006 (any 
change) Polity IV (any change) Polity IV (3+ points) Polity IV (5+ points) 
  T3, MC T3, ME T3, MC T3, ME T3, MC T3, ME T3, MC T3, ME T3, MC T3, ME 
Lag Democracy Score -0.0224** -0.0243*** -0.1610*** -0.1606*** -0.0099*** -0.0103*** -0.0058*** -0.0057*** -0.0025 -0.0025*   
  (0.0085) (0.0063) (0.0211) (0.0162) (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0022) (0.0015)    
Gini 0.2866 -1.4650 0.1197 1.1520* 0.0446 0.8302 0.1723 1.0149 0.1799 0.4370    
  (0.2122) (1.6875) (0.1711) (0.6888) (0.1545) (0.8912) (0.1945) (0.9478) (0.1802) (0.8511)    
GDP per capita -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000*** -0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)    
Rural inequality 0.0167 -0.0277 -0.0960** -0.0888* -0.1010* -0.0743 -0.0661 -0.0320 -0.0696 -0.0587    
  (0.0289) (0.0574) (0.0477) (0.0469) (0.0510) (0.0737) (0.0518) (0.0693) (0.0485) (0.0624)    
Vanhanen Knowledge 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0027*** -0.0024*** -0.0031** -0.0030** -0.0035** -0.0031** -0.0043*** -0.0042*** 
  (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0011)    
Year 0.0008 0.0000 0.0032*** 0.0031*** 0.0046*** 0.0047*** 0.0040*** 0.0042*** 0.0040*** 0.0041*** 
  (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0009)    
Constant -1.6174 0.6881 -6.1236*** -6.2959*** -8.8343*** -9.5434*** -7.8162*** -8.6820*** -7.9346*** -8.1177*** 
  (1.2463) (2.5596) (1.6909) (1.3949) (2.7910) (2.2870) (2.7879) (2.1923) (2.2896) (1.9261)    









0.033   














  Reich 2002 (hybrid) Skaaning et al. 2015 
Wahman et al. 2013 (any 
change) 
Wahman et al. 2013 (1.5+ 
points) 
  T3, MC T3, ME T3, MC T3, ME T3, MC T3, ME T3, MC T3, ME 
Lag Democracy Score -0.0201*** -0.0197*** -0.0474** 0.1847 -0.0481*** -0.0521*** -0.0234*** -0.0242*** 
  (0.0056) (0.0038) (0.0200) (0.5082) (0.0061) (0.0060) (0.0044) (0.0032)    
Gini 0.0670 -0.1183 -0.2230 114.2926 -0.3103 7.0360** 0.4131 4.7208    
  (0.0825) (0.2591) (0.9169) (248.6343) (0.4936) (3.5409) (0.3062) (2.8768)    
GDP per capita -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000*** -0.0000** -0.0000 -0.0000    
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)    
Rural inequality -0.0059 -0.0123 -0.0869 0.6900 -0.1556 -0.1229 -0.0408 -0.0319    
  (0.0332) (0.0273) (0.1388) (1.8286) (0.1677) (0.1522) (0.1051) (0.0839)    
Vanhanen Knowledge -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0120** -0.0066 -0.0082*** -0.0073*** -0.0052*** -0.0048*** 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0049) (0.0179) (0.0030) (0.0023) (0.0017) (0.0013)    
Year 0.0012** 0.0012*** 0.0187*** -0.0024 0.0121*** 0.0101*** 0.0059*** 0.0041**  
  (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0038) (0.0480) (0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0017) (0.0019)    
Constant -2.2397** -2.1474*** -36.2772*** -47.1822 -22.9262*** -22.3818*** -11.5615*** -9.9160*** 
  (1.0181) (0.7971) (7.4536) (36.3747) (5.7762) (5.1779) (3.3009) (3.1340)    







0.039   























  T3, MC T3, ME T3, MC T3, ME T3, MC T3, ME T3, MC T3, ME T3, MC T3, ME 
Lag Democracy Score -0.2357*** -0.2369*** -0.1500*** -0.1606*** -0.2173*** -0.2252*** -0.1853*** -0.1876*** -0.1838*** -0.1895*** 
  (0.0421) (0.0298) (0.0404) (0.0340) (0.0646) (0.0499) (0.0365) (0.0321) (0.0537) (0.0401)    
Gini 0.1841 0.3553 0.1722 1.0257* 0.2558* 1.0467 0.2741* 0.7293 0.1258 0.6964    
  (0.1314) (0.6222) (0.1119) (0.6037) (0.1526) (0.6766) (0.1614) (0.6367) (0.1109) (0.5975)    
GDP per capita -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000* -0.0000    
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)    
Rural inequality -0.0595 -0.0549 -0.0842 -0.0617 -0.1607** -0.1392** -0.1634*** -0.1508** -0.1145** -0.0989*   
  (0.0553) (0.0571) (0.0574) (0.0547) (0.0643) (0.0623) (0.0613) (0.0589) (0.0560) (0.0549)    
Vanhanen Knowledge -0.0017* -0.0016* -0.0014 -0.0010 -0.0018 -0.0015 -0.0017 -0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0012    
  (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009)    
Year 0.0036*** 0.0036*** 0.0035*** 0.0035*** 0.0038*** 0.0038*** 0.0036*** 0.0036*** 0.0031*** 0.0031*** 
  (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008)    
Constant -6.8727*** -6.9470*** -6.7869*** -7.1882*** -7.3856*** -7.7338*** -7.0359*** -7.2248*** -5.9414*** -6.1866*** 
  (1.9259) (1.6271) (2.0856) (1.5653) (2.5053) (1.7867) (2.0521) (1.6772) (1.7870) (1.5599)    









0.017   

























  T3, MC T3, ME T3, MC T3, ME T3, MC T3, ME T3, MC T3, ME T3, MC T3, ME 
Lag Democracy Score -0.1592*** -0.1711*** -0.1650*** -0.1950*** -0.2268*** -0.2315*** -0.1817*** -0.1968*** -0.2340*** -0.2984*** 
  (0.0457) (0.0410) (0.0344) (0.0308) (0.0309) (0.0247) (0.0312) (0.0259) (0.0494) (0.0382)    
Gini -0.0128 1.3387 0.1459 1.9318* -0.0038 0.4101 0.0729 1.2144* 0.1927 4.0567*** 
  (0.1481) (1.2735) (0.1180) (1.0581) (0.0916) (0.4462) (0.1135) (0.7197) (0.1325) (1.1787)    
GDP per capita 0.0000** 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000*** -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000    
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)    
Rural inequality -0.1030* -0.0556 -0.0407 0.0185 -0.1242*** -0.1132*** -0.1024** -0.0682 -0.1305*** 0.0065    
  (0.0589) (0.0758) (0.0480) (0.0585) (0.0393) (0.0409) (0.0405) (0.0512) (0.0465) (0.0667)    
Vanhanen Knowledge -0.0040*** -0.0039*** -0.0032*** -0.0031*** -0.0022** -0.0020*** -0.0020* -0.0017** -0.0011 -0.0004    
  (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0009)    
Year 0.0037*** 0.0043*** 0.0035*** 0.0042*** 0.0029*** 0.0029*** 0.0037*** 0.0039*** 0.0021** 0.0036*** 
  (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0009)    
Constant -7.1192*** -8.8979*** -6.8657*** -9.0016*** -5.5633*** -5.7648*** -7.1256*** -8.0032*** -3.9834** -8.7642*** 
  (2.1354) (2.5548) (1.7991) (1.9196) (1.7972) (1.1826) (1.6703) (1.5256) (1.9928) (2.1572)    









0.033   















b) AUT only 
  
Freedom House (FIW, any 
change) 
Freedom House (PR, any 
change) 
Freedom House (FIW, 1+ 
points) 
Freedom House (PR, 1+ 
points) 
  T3, MC T3, ME T3, MC T3, ME T3, MC T3, ME T3, MC T3, ME 
Lag Democracy Score 0.0435** 0.1538 0.0366** 0.0738** -0.0070 0.0324 0.0346** 0.0784**  
  (0.0205) (0.1008) (0.0149) (0.0302) (0.0158) (0.0431) (0.0156) (0.0319)    
Gini -0.5464 -57.9453 -0.2816 -18.7371 0.7809 -19.6845 -0.2008 -21.8923*   
  (0.8605) (47.1835) (0.6729) (12.0208) (0.8408) (20.1655) (0.7344) (12.7030)    
GDP per capita -0.0000 0.0002 -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001    
  (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)    
Rural inequality -0.0029 -0.2694 0.0682 0.0099 -0.0225 -0.1175 0.0327 -0.0359    
  (0.1345) (0.4421) (0.1119) (0.1852) (0.0838) (0.1889) (0.1111) (0.1957)    
Vanhanen Knowledge -0.0077* -0.0051 -0.0108*** -0.0094*** -0.0051** -0.0042 -0.0105*** -0.0089**  
  (0.0046) (0.0076) (0.0037) (0.0034) (0.0022) (0.0032) (0.0035) (0.0036)    
Year 0.0129*** 0.0175** 0.0143*** 0.0163*** 0.0075*** 0.0092*** 0.0140*** 0.0163*** 
  (0.0035) (0.0083) (0.0028) (0.0037) (0.0017) (0.0035) (0.0027) (0.0039)    
Constant -25.0009*** -9.2195 -27.9867*** -23.8496*** -14.9724*** -9.3457 -27.3934*** -22.5308*** 
  (6.8121) (19.5188) (5.4240) (7.3188) (3.4401) (8.3420) (5.2670) (7.7341)    







0.036   













  Gasiorowski 1996 (hybrid) 
Gates et al. 2006 (any 
change) Polity IV (any change) Polity IV (3+ points) Polity IV (5+ points) 
  T3, MC T3, ME T3, MC T3, ME T3, MC T3, ME T3, MC T3, ME T3, MC T3, ME 
Lag Democracy Score insufficient observations -0.1346 -0.3643** 0.0012 0.0011 0.0098* 0.0097*** 0.0073 0.0073*** 
  
  
(0.0869) (0.1760) (0.0060) (0.0039) (0.0057) (0.0031) (0.0047) (0.0027)    
Gini 
  
0.6224 27.4112* 0.1550 0.5567 0.2528 0.6489 0.3001 0.2805    
  
  
(0.5716) (15.2983) (0.3295) (0.7857) (0.2753) (0.6332) (0.2573) (0.5392)    
GDP per capita 
  
-0.0000 -0.0001* 0.0000 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000** 0.0000* 0.0000**  
  
  
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)    
Rural inequality 
  
-0.1140*** 0.4461 -0.1102 -0.0889 -0.0886 -0.0676 -0.0086 -0.0096    
  
  
(0.0426) (0.3476) (0.1034) (0.0951) (0.0686) (0.0766) (0.0692) (0.0653)    
Vanhanen Knowledge 
  
-0.0061*** 0.0048 -0.0044* -0.0042** -0.0045** -0.0044*** -0.0055*** -0.0055*** 
  
  
(0.0016) (0.0070) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0013)    
Year 
  
0.0071*** 0.0098*** 0.0059** 0.0061*** 0.0046** 0.0047*** 0.0051*** 0.0051*** 
  
  
(0.0013) (0.0031) (0.0026) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0012)    
Constant 
  
-13.9160*** -31.6344*** -11.5352** -12.0600*** -8.9028** -9.4202*** -9.9251*** -9.8996*** 
  
  
(2.5341) (11.4297) (5.1221) (3.4454) (3.7374) (2.7768) (3.3390) (2.3644)    
N 
  









0.033   














  Reich 2002 (hybrid) Skaaning et al. 2015 
Wahman et al. 2013 (any 
change) 
Wahman et al. 2013 (1.5+ 
points) 
  T3, MC T3, ME T3, MC T3, ME T3, MC T3, ME T3, MC T3, ME 
Lag Democracy Score insufficient observations no DEM/ AUT threshold -0.0182 -0.0490** 0.0006 -0.0121    
  
    
(0.0136) (0.0229) (0.0111) (0.0115)    
Gini 
    
-0.6576 -25.3300* 1.0121** -9.1285    
  
    
(0.5983) (14.4428) (0.4820) (7.2471)    
GDP per capita 
    
-0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000    
  
    
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)    
Rural inequality 
    
-0.1118 -0.2400 -0.0455 -0.0982    
  
    
(0.1405) (0.2427) (0.0953) (0.1218)    
Vanhanen Knowledge 
    
-0.0137*** -0.0115*** -0.0092*** -0.0084*** 
  
    
(0.0048) (0.0044) (0.0027) (0.0022)    
Year 
    
0.0179*** 0.0206*** 0.0087*** 0.0098*** 
  
    
(0.0036) (0.0047) (0.0018) (0.0024)    
Constant 
    
-34.3658*** -28.4234*** -17.3684*** -14.9260*** 
  
    
(7.0280) (9.4961) (3.4188) (4.7650)    
N 
    
1500 1500 1500 1500    
R2 
    
0.041 
 
0.037   














Appendix XI: Robustness Checks: Gibler and Randazzo 2011 
















Established Judiciary -0.506** -0.777*** -1.155** -0.721*** 
  (0.20) (0.28) (0.50) (0.28)    
Newly Formed Judiciary 0.269 0.586** 0.749* 0.636**  
  (0.26) (0.29) (0.42) (0.29)    
Independent Legislature -0.018 -0.349** -0.474** -0.375**  
  (0.13) (0.16) (0.24) (0.16)    
Wealth (log of GDP) -0.209*** -0.257*** -0.379*** -0.220*** 
  (0.07) (0.08) (0.13) (0.08)    
Age of Democracy (logged) -0.011*** -0.009 -0.002 -0.011*   
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
Past Democratic Reversions 0.169 0.227 0.333 0.217    
  (0.12) (0.15) (0.23) (0.15)    
Economic Crisis -0.142 0.013 -0.086 0.030    
  (0.12) (0.15) (0.23) (0.15)    
Presence of Territorial Rivalry 0.135 0.266 0.607** 0.301*   
  (0.14) (0.17) (0.25) (0.17)    
Highest level of militarization among neighbors 0.124 0.018 -0.043 -0.036    
  (0.13) (0.16) (0.25) (0.17)    
Constant 0.450 0.071 -0.235 -0.494    
  (0.86) (1.07) (1.65) (1.09)    
N 3022 2739 2744 2736    
Chi2 94.794 104.639 64.370 97.659    
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    




































Established Judiciary -0.427 -1.138** -1.564*** -3.255*** 0.000    
  (1.25) (0.50) (0.48) (1.20) (.)    
Newly Formed Judiciary 1.387 0.440 0.642* 0.521 0.349    
  (1.13) (0.44) (0.38) (0.60) (0.71)    
Independent Legislature -0.969* -1.074*** -0.211 -1.086*** -2.374*** 
  (0.59) (0.22) (0.20) (0.30) (0.36)    
Wealth (log of GDP) 0.035 -0.332*** -0.195* -0.216 -0.485**  
  (0.28) (0.12) (0.11) (0.19) (0.23)    
Age of Democracy (logged) 0.018 -0.006 0.004 0.014 0.012    
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
Past Democratic Reversions 1.241** 0.465** 0.501*** 0.502* 0.032    
  (0.50) (0.21) (0.19) (0.28) (0.34)    
Economic Crisis -0.114 -0.247 0.152 -0.235 -0.157    
  (0.46) (0.21) (0.19) (0.28) (0.33)    
Presence of Territorial Rivalry 1.061** 0.559** 0.295 0.063 0.372    
  (0.48) (0.23) (0.20) (0.30) (0.34)    
Highest level of militarization among neighbors -0.655 -0.062 -0.009 0.229 0.837**  
  (0.69) (0.24) (0.21) (0.32) (0.34)    
Constant -8.294** -0.169 -1.946 -0.644 5.357**  
  (3.66) (1.49) (1.34) (2.09) (2.51)    
N 2160 3192 3932 3325 1280    
Chi2 20.306 104.659 61.928 62.313 70.125    
Prob>Chi2 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    




































Established Judiciary -0.410 -2.842** -0.469** -0.979    
  (0.92) (1.12) (0.20) (0.77)    
Newly Formed Judiciary 0.150 0.483 0.306 1.433**  
  (1.06) (0.56) (0.25) (0.59)    
Independent Legislature -0.581 -1.624*** 0.173 -0.960**  
  (0.47) (0.25) (0.13) (0.40)    
Wealth (log of GDP) -0.119 -0.302** -0.130** -0.231    
  (0.25) (0.14) (0.06) (0.20)    
Age of Democracy (logged) -0.011 0.005 -0.013*** 0.007    
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)    
Past Democratic Reversions 1.244*** 0.603*** 0.206* 0.679*   
  (0.43) (0.21) (0.12) (0.35)    
Economic Crisis -0.209 -0.146 -0.159 0.084    
  (0.41) (0.21) (0.12) (0.36)    
Presence of Territorial Rivalry 1.004** 0.411* 0.145 0.690*   
  (0.41) (0.24) (0.13) (0.37)    
Highest level of militarization among neighbors -0.785 0.405* -0.044 -0.404    
  (0.56) (0.24) (0.13) (0.43)    
Constant -7.583** 1.421 -1.077 -4.137    
  (3.22) (1.61) (0.83) (2.70)    
N 3470 3394 3258 2884    
Chi2 29.826 155.918 76.356 32.257    
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    









































Established Judiciary -0.774 -0.724 -0.043 -0.476 -0.732    
  (0.49) (0.44) (0.33) (0.39) (0.45)    
Newly Formed Judiciary 0.512 0.741* 0.387 0.547 0.614    
  (0.49) (0.42) (0.41) (0.42) (0.45)    
Independent Legislature -0.851*** -0.521** -0.548** -1.309*** -0.450*   
  (0.23) (0.23) (0.22) (0.24) (0.24)    
Wealth (log of GDP) -0.196 -0.240* -0.009 -0.178 -0.194    
  (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13)    
Age of Democracy (logged) -0.004 -0.000 0.003 -0.000 0.001    
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)    
Past Democratic Reversions 0.763*** 0.762*** 0.994*** 1.019*** 0.758*** 
  (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.21) (0.21)    
Economic Crisis -0.019 -0.061 0.028 -0.125 -0.020    
  (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.22) (0.22)    
Presence of Territorial Rivalry 0.368* 0.505** 0.368* 0.452** 0.399*   
  (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22)    
Highest level of militarization among neighbors -0.175 -0.401 -0.240 -0.130 -0.170    
  (0.23) (0.25) (0.21) (0.23) (0.24)    
Constant -2.481* -3.335** -4.544*** -1.891 -2.875*   
  (1.45) (1.56) (1.42) (1.60) (1.55)    
N 3894 3868 3817 2952 3941    
Chi2 82.664 63.167 45.424 100.538 47.207    
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    











































Established Judiciary -1.228** -0.400 -1.422** -0.651 -0.382    
  (0.54) (0.49) (0.72) (0.41) (0.45)    
Newly Formed Judiciary 0.292 -0.027 -0.140 0.105 -0.580    
  (0.49) (0.63) (0.77) (0.49) (0.74)    
Independent Legislature -1.983*** -3.248*** -3.213*** -3.059*** -1.583*** 
  (0.24) (0.36) (0.45) (0.36) (0.33)    
Wealth (log of GDP) -0.251* -0.274 -0.089 -0.088 -0.188    
  (0.14) (0.18) (0.23) (0.17) (0.18)    
Age of Democracy (logged) -0.011 0.001 0.004 0.001 -0.013    
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
Past Democratic Reversions 0.691*** 0.183 0.353 0.293 0.643**  
  (0.21) (0.32) (0.43) (0.31) (0.29)    
Economic Crisis -0.403* -0.173 0.398 0.048 -0.115    
  (0.22) (0.32) (0.39) (0.30) (0.31)    
Presence of Territorial Rivalry 0.398* 0.586* 1.174*** 0.576* 0.220    
  (0.22) (0.33) (0.43) (0.33) (0.32)    
Highest level of militarization among neighbors 0.357 0.116 0.583 -0.009 0.546*   
  (0.24) (0.35) (0.38) (0.30) (0.31)    
Constant 1.828 1.917 1.632 0.049 1.611    
  (1.61) (2.16) (2.73) (2.05) (2.14)    
N 2634 1990 1840 1855 2137    
Chi2 208.077 140.108 102.981 105.049 72.241    
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    































Established Judiciary -0.530** -0.990*** -0.724 -0.895*** 
  (0.25) (0.34) (0.52) (0.34)    
Newly Formed Judiciary 0.385 0.683* 0.672 0.744**  
  (0.32) (0.35) (0.53) (0.36)    
Independent Legislature -2.164*** -2.662*** -3.328*** -2.728*** 
  (0.46) (0.52) (0.51) (0.52)    
Wealth (log of GDP) -0.422*** -0.295* -0.533** -0.288*   
  (0.13) (0.16) (0.22) (0.16)    
Age of Democracy (logged) -0.013** -0.015* -0.015 -0.016**  
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
Past Democratic Reversions 0.050 0.217 0.331 0.296    
  (0.21) (0.27) (0.39) (0.27)    
Economic Crisis -0.241 -0.049 -0.066 -0.050    
  (0.20) (0.25) (0.36) (0.25)    
Presence of Territorial Rivalry 0.324 0.093 0.797** 0.138    
  (0.23) (0.30) (0.39) (0.30)    
Highest level of militarization among neighbors 0.081 -0.022 -0.184 -0.034    
  (0.20) (0.25) (0.40) (0.25)    
Constant 4.425*** 2.932 3.512 2.772    
  (1.57) (1.90) (2.79) (1.93)    
N 1432 1399 1432 1399    
Chi2 128.516 125.252 108.206 122.826    
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    





































Established Judiciary 0.589 -1.066* 
not concave 
-2.033* 0.000    
  (1.28) (0.59) (1.08) (.)    
Newly Formed Judiciary 1.406 0.256 
 
0.435 0.445    
  (1.30) (0.55) 
 
(0.64) (0.76)    
Independent Legislature -4.146*** 0.000 
 
-6.120*** -5.541*** 
  (0.86) (.) 
 
(0.80) (0.63)    
Wealth (log of GDP) 0.021 -0.739*** 
 
-0.811*** -0.758**  
  (0.40) (0.25) 
 
(0.31) (0.34)    
Age of Democracy (logged) 0.072 -0.020 
 
-0.007 -0.003    
  (0.05) (0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.02)    
Past Democratic Reversions 0.872 0.536 
 
0.874* 0.678    
  (0.77) (0.40) 
 
(0.46) (0.54)    
Economic Crisis 1.115 -0.156 
 
0.231 0.089    
  (0.73) (0.38) 
 
(0.44) (0.50)    
Presence of Territorial Rivalry 1.107* -0.124 
 
-0.217 0.168    
  (0.67) (0.44) 
 
(0.52) (0.54)    
Highest level of militarization among neighbors 0.718 -0.091 
 
0.088 0.134    
  (1.03) (0.40) 
 
(0.46) (0.51)    
Constant 1.194 2.382 
 
8.839*** 7.752**  
  (5.02) (2.90) 
 
(3.42) (3.72)    
N 176 1815 
 
1939 905    
Chi2 48.386 49.111 
 
235.415 152.346    
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000    




































Established Judiciary -0.066 no thresholds 
for DEM/  
AUT 
-0.377 -0.423    
  (1.17) (0.26) (1.03)    
Newly Formed Judiciary 0.326 -0.246 0.344    
  (1.16) 
 
(0.38) (1.18)    
Independent Legislature -3.936*** 
 
0.000 0.000    
  (0.70) 
 
(.) (.)    
Wealth (log of GDP) 0.097 
 
-0.543*** -0.292    
  (0.33) 
 
(0.14) (0.60)    
Age of Democracy (logged) 0.039 
 
-0.012** -0.005    
  (0.04) 
 
(0.01) (0.02)    
Past Democratic Reversions 0.596 
 
0.490** 1.111    
  (0.61) 
 
(0.24) (0.90)    
Economic Crisis 0.353 
 
-0.064 1.408    
  (0.60) 
 
(0.22) (0.94)    
Presence of Territorial Rivalry 1.200** 
 
0.158 -0.423    
  (0.58) 
 
(0.25) (1.22)    
Highest level of militarization among neighbors 0.855 
 
-0.175 -3.677**  
  (0.67) 
 
(0.22) (1.63)    
Constant 1.337 
 
2.033 -19.981**  
  (4.29) 
 
(1.65) (9.16)    
N 350 
 
1270 1270    
Chi2 60.631 
 
85.883 15.634    
Prob>Chi2 0.000 
 
0.000 0.048    
















Appendix XII: Robustness Checks: Goldstone et al. 2010 
















Partial Autocracy 1.095 0.854 1.925 0.854    
  (1.47) (1.55) (1.54) (1.55)    
Partial Democracy with Factionalism 5.279** 6.069** 5.463*** 6.069**  
  (2.08) (2.59) (2.11) (2.59)    
Partial Democracy without Factionalism 1.610 1.769 1.906 1.769    
  (1.53) (1.51) (1.49) (1.51)    
Full Democracy 7.269** 4.138 4.185 4.138    
  (3.20) (6.96) (3.96) (6.96)    
Infant mortality  4.084** 5.066** 3.559* 5.066**  
  (1.96) (2.50) (1.93) (2.50)    
Armed conflict in 4+ Bordering States 15.873 12.642 
 
12.642    
  (3144.58) (6801.26) 
 
(6801.26)    
State-Led Discrimination -1.327 -0.849 -0.653 -0.849    
  (1.09) (1.12) (1.03) (1.12)    
N 66 63 52 63    
Chi2 30.265 31.631 23.141 31.631    
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000    
















Partial Autocracy not concave 1.805 3.760*** 3.434** 0.573      (1.21) (1.12) (1.38) (1.57)    
Partial Democracy with Factionalism  3.898*** 5.350*** 5.425*** 2.728*   
   (1.32) (1.16) (1.42) (1.40)    
Partial Democracy without Factionalism  1.677 3.160*** 3.221** 0.193    
   (1.05) (1.07) (1.26) (1.39)    
Full Democracy  -15.569 2.510* 2.354 -0.183    
   (3789.08) (1.28) (1.64) (1.76)    
Infant mortality   1.234* 1.471** 1.645** 1.807**  
   (0.74) (0.58) (0.65) (0.78)    
Armed conflict in 4+ Bordering States  -0.394 -1.090 -1.367 0.000    
   (7645.49) (1.75) (1.92) (.)    
State-Led Discrimination  0.390 -0.814 -1.074 -0.867    
   (0.97) (0.63) (0.76) (0.81)    
N  81 185 148 98    
Chi2  31.130 78.082 63.179 34.820    
Prob>Chi2  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    


















Partial Autocracy not concave -16.009 1.568    not concave   (7824.06) (1.42)    
Partial Democracy with Factionalism   3.875*** 4.929***   
    (1.33) (1.73)      
Partial Democracy without Factionalism   1.596 2.834*     
    (1.40) (1.51)      
Full Democracy   -12.346 4.678*     
    (5591.16) (2.53)      
Infant mortality    2.043 2.255**    
    (1.93) (1.02)      
Armed conflict in 4+ Bordering States   -16.980 -0.536      
    (4971.68) (1.68)      
State-Led Discrimination   -0.009 -1.403      
    (1.26) (0.96)      
N   67 80      
Chi2   33.309 31.530      
Prob>Chi2   0.000 0.000      




















Partial Autocracy 1.704*   not concave 2.412** 1.694 2.320**  
  (0.87)    (1.03) (1.35) (1.03)    
Partial Democracy with Factionalism 3.080***  2.712*** 3.249*** 3.202*** 
  (0.95)     (0.86) (1.24) (1.05)    
Partial Democracy without Factionalism 1.921**   2.584** 2.337* 2.320**  
  (0.93)     (1.03) (1.24) (1.01)    
Full Democracy 0.815     2.950* 1.010 1.937    
  (1.19)     (1.55) (1.92) (1.39)    
Infant mortality  0.541     1.418* 1.421 0.817    
  (0.61)     (0.83) (1.01) (0.65)    
Armed conflict in 4+ Bordering States 14.481     -16.781 14.069 14.347    
  (2247.90)     (3187.08) (4187.88) (1886.29)    
State-Led Discrimination -0.196     0.460 -0.199 -0.388    
  (0.74)     (0.70) (0.83) (0.84)    
N 89     87 68 77    
Chi2 23.757     22.944 24.234 21.420    
Prob>Chi2 0.003     0.002 0.002 0.003    




























Partial Autocracy 0.433 35.394 not concave not concave not concave 
  (1.51) (48632700.04) 
Partial Democracy with Factionalism 19.976 34.018 
  
  
  (5593.66) (48632700.04) 
  
  
Partial Democracy without Factionalism 1.313 32.549 
  
  
  (1.25) (48632700.04) 
  
  
Full Democracy -1.639 16.928 
  
  
  (1.81) (48632700.20) 
  
  
Infant mortality  0.309 2.341 
  
  
  (0.95) (2.15) 
  
  
Armed conflict in 4+ Bordering States 16.362 0.000 
  
  
  (12681.42) (.) 
  
  
State-Led Discrimination -0.641 -0.578 
  
  
  (1.28) (1.64) 
  
  
N 54 27 
  
  
Chi2 22.990 12.476 
  
  
Prob>Chi2 0.003 0.014 
  
  





















Partial Autocracy not concave not concave not concave not concave   
Partial Democracy with Factionalism    
  
     
  
Partial Democracy without Factionalism    
  
     
  
Full Democracy    
  
     
  
Infant mortality     
  
     
  
Armed conflict in 4+ Bordering States    
  
     
  
State-Led Discrimination    
  
     
  
N    
  
Chi2    
  
Prob>Chi2    
  




















Partial Autocracy not concave not concave 2.788 1.890 -32.585 
  (2.68) (2.80) (28969612.04) 
Partial Democracy with Factionalism   2.103 1.983 -32.179 
    (2.09) (2.01) (28969612.04) 
Partial Democracy without Factionalism   -18.244 -18.348 -52.012 
    (6723.31) (8058.92) (28969613.08) 
Full Democracy   -51.839 -52.477 -50.849 
    (12538.36) (14791.67) (28969612.70) 
Infant mortality    1.577* 1.643* 1.566* 
    (0.88) (0.91) (0.87) 
Armed conflict in 4+ Bordering States   -17.783 -18.020 0.000 
    (7971.39) (9092.26) (.) 
State-Led Discrimination   -2.314 -1.998 -1.468 
    (1.59) (1.57) (1.52) 
N   81 77 68 
Chi2   40.909 38.801 33.452 
Prob>Chi2   0.000 0.000 0.000 














Partial Autocracy not concave no thresholds 
for DEM/  
AUT 
not concave not concave   
Partial Democracy with Factionalism   
  
     
  
Partial Democracy without Factionalism    
  
     
  
Full Democracy    
  
     
  
Infant mortality     
  
     
  
Armed conflict in 4+ Bordering States    
  
     
  
State-Led Discrimination    
  
     
  
N    
  
Chi2    
  
Prob>Chi2    
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